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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters related to the microeconomic interactions in markets.
The first paper deals with markets with many participants, and in which monetary transfers
are allowed, and studies core convergence. The second paper considers reputation building
in time-limited negotiations. The third paper studies two-sided markets with no monetary
transfers, governed by stable matching mechanisms.
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Introduction
This thesis is about markets and analyzing them at different levels. Each chapter of the
thesis represents an approach that is useful under certain information constraints, but they
do have a shared goal which is determining who gets what in the market. Due to the
different environments considered, the specificity of the answers also varies and ranges from
a general statement such as “the short side is likely to gain more under a core allocation”
to detailed predictions such as “Player 1 gets a payoff of x with probability that tends to 1
under any Sequential equilibrium”.
The first chapter (“An Approximate Law of One Price in Random Assignment Games”)
takes the broadest perspective by looking at markets from an ex-ante point of view, before
players’ preferences and tastes are known to anyone. At this stage, only very limited
information is available to the modeler, and therefore the solution concept of choice is the
core. Not only that, but due to the stochastic nature of the environment, the only meaningful
predictions are probabilistic. In this transferable utility setting we show that as the market
gets larger, the salaries that workers get become more and more similar, as do the payoffs of
firms (under any core allocation). This property implies core shrinkage in both balanced and
unbalanced markets, and provides a strong prediction on surplus distribution in unbalanced
markets.
The second chapter (“Building Reputation at the Edge of the Cliff”) is on the other
extreme, as it assumes complete knowledge of players’ payoffs and strategic situation. The
only uncertainty in this model is related to whether a player is a commitment type or not.
These commitment types are used as a technical tool to explain reputation formation in
1
a simplified two-player interaction with a deadline. The main prediction in this context
is a strong deadline effect, i.e., players tend to delay their interaction until very near the
deadline, and this delay may often lead to inefficient outcomes (for example, a negotiation
that ends with a disagreement when the deadline is hit).
The third chapter (“Implications of Capacity Reduction and Entry in Many-to-One Stable
Matching”) takes the middle road by considering two-sided many-to-one matching markets
without transfers in which players’ identities are already known (including their preferences
on being matched with agents from the other side of the market). Nevertheless, players are
not taken to be strategic agents, but rather the set of stable matchings is examined under
different assumptions on players’ participation in the market. For example, it is shown how
to identify a set of players that become strictly better off following entry on the other side
of the market, regardless of the stable matching that is being selected before and after the
entry takes places. Similar results are established for the case of capacity reduction and
using a truncation strategy. These results extend known result for the one-to-one case.
2
Chapter 1
An Approximate Law of One Price in
Random Assignment Games1
1.1 Introduction
The “law of one price” asserts that homogeneous goods must sell for the same price across
locations and vendors. This basic postulate is assumed in much of the economic literature,
and its origins can be traced to Adam Smith’s discussion on arbitrage (Smith, 1776, e.g.,
Book I, Chapter V). While many (sometimes consistent) deviations from this “law” have
been observed and documented in the real world (see, for example, Lamont and Thaler,
2003, and references therein), it remains an interesting and useful building block in economic
theory, and serves as a benchmark for empirical studies. A crucial underlying assumption
used in arguing for the validity of the law of one price is the homogeneity of goods and
buyers: buyers do not care which of the goods they end up buying, or which seller they are
buying it from, nor do sellers care about the identity of the buyers. In other words, any two
instances of the good are perfect (or at least near-perfect) substitutes for the buyers, as are
any two buyers from any seller’s point of view.
However, there are many markets in which the assumption of homogeneity is highly
1Co-authored with Dr. Avinatan Hassidim, Bar Ilan University, Department of Computer Science
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implausible. For example, in labor markets there are some workers are skilled and some un-
skilled, and similarly some firms are generally considered better places to work. In addition
to these measurable quality differences, workers may exhibit heterogeneous preferences over
being employed by different firms, due to personal likes and dislikes, location, values, and a
variety of other individually determined factors. Firms may also have diverse preferences
over workers, and may, for example, favor workers who seem to share their vision or fit
well within their corporate culture. Similarly, in markets where buyers and sellers have
heterogeneous preferences over trading with the other side, the law of one price generally
should not hold.
This paper makes the formal claim that even in the presence of heterogeneous prefer-
ences, an approximate version of the law remains valid, and the approximation improves as
the market grows large. We focus on labor markets as our leading example, and argue that a
likely outcome of the market is that workers who are roughly equally skilled receive similar
wages, and firms of similar quality garner similar profits. Because of the inherent hetero-
geneity in firms’ and workers’ preferences, the law of one price holds only approximately,
with some workers being paid more than their peers with identical levels of human capital.
To prove this result we use the assignment game model of Shapley and Shubik (1971)
in which there is a finite set of firms and a finite set of workers, and each firm is looking
to hire exactly one worker in exchange for a negotiable salary. Each firm has a (possibly
different) value for hiring each of the workers, and each worker has a (possibly different)
reservation value for working for each of the firms, and utilities are assumed to be linear
in money. Since transfers are freely allowed, we can describe the net productivity of each
firm-worker pair by a single number, and we assume that this productivity is separable
in the firm’s quality, the worker’s human capital level, and an idiosyncratic noise element
that is independently and identically distributed according to some bounded distribution.2
2This assumption is similar in spirit to the one made in many papers in auction theory, where bidders’
valuations are assumed to be heterogeneous and determined according to some random distribution. However,
unlike most of the literature on auction theory, we do not wish to study the effects of the random generation
on agents’ beliefs and equilibrium behavior. Instead we take a different approach and characterize the likely
outcomes in a typical complete information matching market created in that manner.
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We then provide a probabilistic analysis of the core of the game, and show that with high
probability the differences in the payoffs of agents on the same side of the market behave
like log nn , where n is the size of the market (Theorem 1). We also prove that this bound is
tight (Theorem 2).
The fact that there are heterogeneous preferences in the market also implies that there
are good and bad matchings between firms and workers, and that there is a surplus that
is created by matching the right worker to the right firm.3 Our approximate law of one
price helps us to analyze the distribution of this surplus between firms and workers in
balanced and unbalanced markets. In an unbalanced market with more workers than
firms, at least one worker will be left out, and that worker will be willing to transact with
any matched firm even for a minuscule gain. This constrains the profit of the worker
matched to any firm that has good idiosyncratic fit with the unmatched worker, and by
the approximate law of one price, the rest of the agents on the long side will necessarily
make very small profits as well (Corollary 4). This argument shows why most of the surplus
goes to market participants on the short side, despite the assumed idiosyncratic nature of
pairwise productivities. In a balanced market we show that the surplus can be distributed
in a variety of ways (Corollary 3).
These two results extend our economic intuitions about competition and surplus distri-
bution in markets for homogeneous goods. If there are 10 farmers trying to sell 10 bushels
of wheat to 9 identical buyers, and each of the buyers is interested in buying exactly one
bushel of wheat and is willing to pay up to $100 for it, then the price of wheat will be $0,
and each buyer’s welfare is $100. In a market with 10 farmers and 10 buyers, the price of
wheat can be as high as the buyers’ willingness to pay.
As mentioned earlier, some of our results rely heavily on two assumptions: separability
of production factors and boundedness of the idiosyncratic noise factor. We relax the first
assumption by considering a model with a Cobb–Douglas productivity function, in which
3One interpretation of the productivities appearing in our model is to think of them as actual output of
workers, which is likely to be affected by heterogeneous person-organization fit. See Kristof-Brown and Guay
(2011) for a recent survey of most of the important contributions to the literature on this issue.
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the firm’s quality and the worker’s human capital level are complements. We prove that
in this model the efficient assignment is with high probability approximately assortative
(Lemma 5), and recover the approximate law of one price (Theorem 6). This analysis reveals
that the argument for an approximate law of one price is at least to some extent robust to
other forces in the market, such as efficiently matching good workers with good firms (and
vice versa).
We conclude by focusing on the boundedness assumption and show that it cannot be
dispensed with. We consider a model with exponential noise and show that the differences
in workers’ payoffs do not vanish as the market grows (Proposition 8). Nevertheless, we do
present computer simulations and a partial argument for why surplus distribution under
exponential noise may present similar properties to surplus distribution under bounded
noise (Theorem 10).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature related to
our paper. Section 1.3 introduces the model and the formal notation. Section 1.4 contains the
statement and the proof of the main result, as well as the tightness result, and an analysis of
surplus distribution. Section 1.5 discusses the extension of the main result to a market with
interaction terms in the joint productivity of firms and workers. Section 1.6 presents some
results related to unbounded noise distributions. Section 1.7 provides simulation results,
and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Assignment games were first introduced by Shapley (1955). Shapley and Shubik (1971)
thoroughly analyze them and show that the core can be described as the set of solutions to
a linear program dual to the optimal assignment problem, and that it is therefore nonempty,
compact, and convex. They also prove that it contains two special allocations: a firm-optimal
and a worker-optimal core allocation. Demange and Gale (1985) extend the analysis and
show, among other things, that the core has a lattice structure. They also point to the
nonmanipulability by workers of the worker-optimal core allocation. Assignment games
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bear a great resemblance to the very familiar assortative matching model of Becker (1981),
with the main difference being the lack of agreement of agents on one side over the ranking
of agents on the other side in the more general assignment game model. In a slightly
different interpretation, Demange et al. (1986) use the assignment game framework to
describe auctions of heterogeneous items with unit demand bidders (with this interpretation
in mind, core allocations are equivalent to Walrasian equilibria, and therefore our results
provide insight into revenue acquired by multiple auctioneers under different market
conditions).
Within the literature that focuses on assignment games, a paper related to ours is
Kanoria et al. (2014). They too study a random version of the assignment game and
show core convergence in the sense of agents getting similar payoffs across different core
allocations. The most striking difference between the models is that in theirs each agent
has a type (out of a finite set of fixed types), and agents’ preferences depend only on the
type of the agent to which they are matched, whereas in our model each agent may have
a ranking over individual agents on the other side of the market. Other relevant papers
within this literature are those that study the size of the core (in deterministic assignment
games) such as Quint (1987) who defines two measures for core elongation and shows the
relation between them, and Núñez and Rafels (2008) who investigate the dimension of the
core based on the entries in the productivity matrix.
Several recent empirical works estimate a model similar to ours (and even more closely
related to Kanoria et al., 2014), with the caveat of using an extreme value distribution for the
idiosyncratic component. Choo and Siow (2006) consider marital behavior in the United
States and estimate a model in which each agent has a type, and idiosyncratic preferences
over being matched with any type of agent on the other side of the market. Similarly,
Botticini and Siow (2008) study whether there are increasing returns to scale in marriage
markets, and Chiappori et al. (2011) study the marital college premium.
From a broader point of view, this paper belongs to the theoretical literature on matching
in two-sided markets. This literature gained prominence in the 1960s and early 1970s
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following the publication of the seminal papers by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley
and Shubik (1971), and research remained mostly divided (with some notable exceptions)
into two parallel strands: with and without transferable utility (i.e., money). The bulk of
the literature on matching markets without transfers, also known as the marriage market
model (in the one-to-one case) and the college admissions model (in the many-to-one case),
is focused on studying theory related to markets with fixed preferences, often under the
additional assumption of complete information. Within this realm, two important papers
for our discussion are Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982). These
papers describe the detailed connection between marriage markets and assignment games,
and point to an auction process similar to the deferred-acceptance algorithm that produces
an approximation to a side-optimal core allocation.4 We employ a similar auction process in
the proof of our lower bound of variation in workers’ salaries (Theorem 2).
The past two decades have seen the emergence of more models that allow for stochastic
markets and incomplete information. This new focus has revealed to market designers
that some of the subtleties related to small markets may very well become negligible once
we consider large “likely” markets. Yet the works on large markets most relevant to our
present study were already written in the 1970s by Wilson (1972) and Knuth (1976), and
were extensively developed by Pittel (1989, 1992). These papers analyze marriage markets
with preferences that are determined uniformly at random and show that in a situation
in which the number of men is equal to the number of women, with high probability the
proposing side’s (in a deferred acceptance algorithm) mean rank of partners behaves like
log n, whereas the other side’s mean rank of partners behaves like nlog n . This particular
strand of the literature remained dormant for almost three decades, but several papers
have recently used similar methods. Ashlagi et al. (2013) show that in unbalanced random
marriage markets with high probability under any stable matching the short side’s mean
rank of partners behaves like log n, whereas the long side’s mean rank of partners behaves
4For further generalizations of the marriage market model and the assignment game model see, for example,
the works by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Ostrovsky (2008), Hatfield et al. (2013), and references therein.
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like nlog n . Coles et al. (2014) and Coles and Shorrer (2014) employ these results to study
aspects of strategic behavior in marriage markets with incomplete information. Lee (2014)
and Lee and Yariv (2014) assume that preferences are derived from underlying cardinal
utilities and study the issues of core convergence and efficiency, respectively.
Using somewhat different methods, but still trying to explain core convergence using
different modes of competition, Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) explain in a breakthrough
paper why in a large random marriage market with one of the sides having rank-ordered
lists of bounded length and with incomplete information, truth-telling become an approx-
imately dominant strategy. Kojima and Pathak (2009) extend this result to the college
admissions model, and Storms (2013) extends it to many-to-one markets with substitutable
preferences.5 Kojima et al. (2013) use a similar strategy to prove that in a market with “not
too many” couples, a stable matching exists despite the complementarities imposed by
couples’ preferences. Ashlagi et al. (forthcoming) further improve this result, show that
stability is also implied for groups that can contain more than two members, and provide a
counterexample to the case of a similar number of singles and couples.
Technically, our analysis is also related to what is known in the operations research and
computer science literature as the random linear sum assignment problem. Specifically, two
results that are used repeatedly in our proofs are the calculation of the limit value of a large
random assignment game (Aldous, 2001), and the bounding of the minimal productivity
in the optimal assignment (Frieze and Sorkin, 2007). For a more exhaustive survey of the
random linear sum assignment problem (and closely related problems) see Krokhmal and
Pardalos (2009).
1.3 Model and Notation
Consider a sequence of markets {Mn}∞n=1, such that each market can be described as
Mn = (Fn, Wn, qn, hn, αn), where Fn is a set of firms of size n, Wn is a set of workers of size
5Related analysis was also applied by Manea (2009), Che and Kojima (2010) and Kojima and Manea (2010)
to the problem of optimal object assignments.
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n + k(n), with k(n) ∈N and k(n) = O(n),6 qn is a vector of qualities related to firms in Fn,
hn is a vector of human capital levels related to workers in Wn, and αn is an |Fn| × |Wn| real
matrix representing the value of pairs of firms and workers. We assume throughout that
each element of αn can be described as
αnij = u
(
qni , h
n
j
)
+ εnij,
where u is the part of the production function that depends only on the firm’s quality and
the worker’s human capital level, and εnij is idiosyncratic noise representing the productivity
related to the identities of the firm and the worker. εnij is independently and identically
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function G which has a continuous and
strictly positive probability density function g.7
For technical purposes we will assume (unless otherwise noted) that the elements of the
vectors hn are identically and independently distributed on the interval
[
h, h
]
according to
the cumulative distribution function H. If h 6= h we will also require H to have positive and
continuous density on this interval. This assumption can easily be relaxed, but it is kept for
clarity. Note that it does not hold for the specific distribution we use in Appendix A.3.
• The separable case: u(q, h) = q + h.
• The interactive case: u(q, h) = qγh1−γ.
Note that while q and h appear without a transformation in both cases, any continuous
transformation can be applied directly to their distributions. Therefore, the word “separable”
accurately describes the domain of the first case. We also distinguish between several
possible assumptions on G:
• Bounded noise: G is bounded on the interval [0, 1] (G(1) = 1).
• Unbounded noise: There exists no c ∈ R such that G(c) = 1.
6The latter assumption is introduced for mathematical convenience.
7In fact for our results to hold we only need that the density be continuous near its supremum.
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• Exponential noise: G = Exp(1) (special case of unbounded noise).
We prove our main result for the separable case with bounded noise, and extend it (under a
certain technical assumption to be mentioned later) to the interactive case with bounded
noise. We show that an approximate law of one price (properly formulated) does not hold in
general for unbounded noise. Nevertheless, we explain why we believe some of our surplus
distribution results do hold (in a weak form), at least for the case of exponential noise.
In market Mn, the value of a coalition of firms and workers S is given by
v(S) = max
[
αni1 j1 + α
n
i2 j2 + · · ·+ αnil jl
]
,
where the maximum is taken over all arrangements of 2l distinct agents, f ni1 , . . . , f
n
il
∈ S ∩ Fn,
wnj1 , . . . , w
n
jl
∈ S ∩Wn, l ≤ min {|S ∩ Fn| , |S ∩Wn|}. An allocation is denoted by (µ, u, v)
with µ being a matching of firms to workers and vice versa, and u and v being payoff vectors
for the firms and workers, respectively. We refer to u as firms’ “profits,” and to v as workers’
“salaries.” Formally, µ : Fn ∪Wn → Fn ∪Wn ∪ {∅}, and satisfies
1. ∀ f ∈ Fn : µ( f ) ∈Wn ∪ {∅},
2. ∀w ∈Wn : µ(w) ∈ Fn ∪ {∅}, and
3. ∀ f ∈ Fn, w ∈Wn : µ( f ) = w ⇐⇒ µ(w) = f .
An allocation is a core allocation if no coalition can deviate and split the resulting value
between its members such that each member of the coalition becomes strictly better off.
We denote the set of core allocations of Mn by C (Mn). As mentioned above, Shapley and
Shubik (1971) show that the core is a nonempty compact and convex set, and that it is
elongated in the sense that there is a firm-optimal core allocation in which salaries are at
their lowest level among all core allocations, and a worker-optimal core allocation in which
salaries are at their highest level among all core allocations.
Most of our results are going to hold for “most” realizations of some stochastic matrices
and vectors. We often use the technical term with high probability (or whp for short) to
mean that some result holds for the sequences of markets Mn with probability 1−O ( 1n).
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Whenever it is not mentioned, the term refers to realizations of the stochastic matrices αn as
well as the quality vectors qn and hn. However, in some places we explicitly mention that
the term refers only to αn or only to the quality vectors.
1.4 An approximate law of one price
This section presents our main result, which shows that in the separable case with bounded
noise there cannot be too much variation in the payoffs of the agents on either side of the
market. We then proceed to improve our upper bound on this variation for the special
case of side-optimal core allocations, and establish a lower bound. These two proofs use
a different method that relies on the salary adjustment procedure described by Crawford
and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982). The following subsection employs these
results to characterize surplus distribution in these markets, and argues that the range of
potential outcomes (i.e., payoffs in the core) crucially depends on whether the market is
exactly balanced or not.8 If it is not exactly balanced, the short side keeps most of the
created surplus (or at least the surplus due to the idiosyncratic noise).
1.4.1 The main result
In order to gain some intuition into the mechanics of the proof and the argument behind it,
let us first assume that the market is balanced, that all firms have the same quality, and that
all workers have the same level of human capital. In this specific scenario our result implies
that whp all workers (for example) should earn a very similar salary.
Suppose that worker w1 is employed by firm f1 and earns a salary of s1 and worker
w2 is employed by f2 and earns a salary of s2. Suppose further that s2 > s1. If workers
and firms were homogeneous goods, firm f2 could offer worker w2’s job to worker w1 for
any salary strictly between s1 and s2. That is the usual argument for the law of one price
in a two-sided market. However, it may well be that the combination of f2 and w2 has
8The term “balanced” is also used in the context of cooperative game theory to describe games with a
nonempty core. This meaning is not used anywhere in this paper.
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much higher productivity than f2 and w1, and therefore there is no mutually beneficial
opportunity for f2 and w1. Nevertheless, we do know that there are about n
2
3 workers in the
market such that their productivity with firm f2 is no less than 1− 1
n
1
3
. For each of those
workers the original argument works perfectly, and so none of these workers can be paid
less than s2 − 1
n
1
3
, because otherwise she and firm f2 might deviate. Now we have a set of
size n
2
3 , each getting a salary of at least s2 − 1
n
1
3
. Consequently there are about n
2
3 firms
paying a salary of at least s2 − 1
n
1
3
, and whp one of these firms, say f ′, is a good match with
worker w1, in the sense that their joint productivity is more than 1− 1
n
1
3
. By considering the
possibility of deviation by f ′ and w1, we reach the conclusion that s1 ≥ s2 − 2
n
1
3
.
The argument used above is not quite accurate, since we do not account for the fact
that firms in the intermediate set are not random, but are rather chosen in a specific way
(i.e., they are matched to workers who are also productive when matched with firm f1).
The formal proof handles this issue by considering the likely expansion properties of the
directed graph induced by the random productivity matrix and showing that a path must
exist between f2 and w1.
As implied, the other difference from the informal argument above is that the proof uses
the smallest possible expansion that still results in the necessary paths between all pairs of
agents, i.e., a strongly connected digraph. This minimality is also formally established in
our derivation of a lower bound for the variation in agents’ payoffs. The technical element
of the proof that allows for constructing high-probability paths is based on the result of
Frieze and Sorkin (2007), which we extend here to deal with unbalanced markets as well as
bounded distributions other than the uniform distribution.
The intuition behind proving the result for unbalanced markets is pretty straightforward
given our understanding of how to utilize improvement paths, as previously described. We
first show that whp all workers above a certain level of human capital are matched. Other-
wise, one could replace a low-quality worker with a high-quality worker, and then reshuffle
the matched workers such that the impact on the efficiency coming from idiosyncratic noise
component will not be too substantial. We next show that the same logic that was used in
13
the balanced case can be applied to the unbalanced case, if we focus only on agents above a
certain level of human capital.
Theorem 1. In the separable case with bounded noise, there exists c ∈ R+ such that whp for any
(µn, un, vn) ∈ C (Mn) we have
1. ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . |Fn|} : uni − unj ≤
(
qni − qnj
)
+ c log nn , and
2. ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . |Wn|} , µn(wni ), µn(wnj ) ∈ Fn : vni − vnj ≤
(
hni − hnj
)
+ c log nn .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that in a large random assignment game, all firms make
approximately the same profits, and all matched workers earn approximately the same
salary. In a sense, this theorem states that the core is not only elongated, as implied in
Shapley and Shubik (1971) and Demange and Gale (1985), but that it is also narrow.
The bounds already provided do not leave much room for further improvements (let
alone the constants used in the proof), but we still wish to verify that they are tight, at
least in terms of order of magnitude. The following theorem shows that they are. We focus
on balanced markets with all firms having the same quality and all workers having the
same human capital level, governed by a specific core allocation, namely, the firm-optimal
core allocation. We know that we can find the firm-optimal core allocation via the auction-
like algorithm proposed by Crawford and Knoer (1981). When firms propose to workers,
the auction process ends when all workers have received an offer. We can compute the
probability that at each stage a worker who has not received an offer so far receives an
offer, and then calculate the number of discrete steps required to reach the last worker. The
approximation is possible thanks to our bounds from Theorem 1. This gives us a lower
bound for the expected sum of workers’ salaries, which implies a lower bound on what
the top earner gets with high probability. Since we know the lowest earner gets zero, we
are done. We note that the same procedure can also be used to provide better constants in
Theorem 1 for the specific cases of the side-optimal core allocations.
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Theorem 2. In the separable case with bounded noise, if k(n) ≡ 0, qn ≡ 0 and hn ≡ 0, there
exists c ∈ R+ such that whp there exist (µn, un, vn) ∈ C (Mn) and i, j ∈ {1, . . . |Wn|} for which
vni − vnj ≥ c log nn .
Proof. See Appendix A.2
We conclude this subsection by suggesting an interpretation of our results in terms of
the shape of the core. As mentioned above, Shapley and Shubik (1971) already noticed that
the core is compact and convex, and that it is shaped like a nut, in the sense that it contains
firm-optimal and worker-optimal core allocations. Our results suggest that in large markets
the core tends to be almost one-dimensional in the sense that one parameter defines it up to
very small perturbations. In balanced markets, once we know what is the average profits of
firms, we also approximately know the average salaries of workers, and what every firm
and worker makes under that core allocation. The same holds for unbalanced markets.
However, as we will see in the next section, workers’ salaries in unbalanced markets are
in fact determined by the human capital levels of those workers who are left unmatched,
and therefore the core actually has no real variation and resembles a point more than a line.
An interesting exercise would be to calculate the elongation measures suggested by Quint
(1987) for large unbalanced markets and show that they indeed converge to zero.
1.4.2 Surplus distribution
With the results from the previous subsection at hand, we are now ready to explore their
implications for surplus distribution. However, before doing so it is important to understand
how much surplus is created in a large market. Aldous (2001) proved that in a large balanced
random market with all firms having a quality of zero, and all workers having a human
capital level of zero, and noise being distributed according to the uniform distribution on
[0, 1], the expected surplus created is n− pi26 . This result can be easily extended both to
general bounded distributions (with positive and continuous density) and to unbalanced
markets, and in general we know that the surplus to be divided between firms and workers
15
is Ω(n). As for qualities and human capital, our analysis suggests that with high probability
the workers who will take part in the optimal assignments are all those above a certain
human capital level (see Lemma 36 in Appendix A.1), and so we can tell from the distribution
of qualities and human capital levels what is going to be the surplus created due to those
factors.
Our main result in this subsection is that when the market is exactly balanced (i.e.,
k(n) ≡ 0) the surplus that is created from the idiosyncractic matching between firms and
workers can be divided in very different ways. However, in the presence of even a slight
imbalance, most of the surplus related to the noise goes to the short side (the firms). This
indicates that a large core is a knife-edge case that is not likely to be found in any real
applications. This result is the assignment games parallel to Ashlagi et al. (2013), who prove
that in the realm of matching without transfers a large core is only possible if the number of
men and women is exactly equal, and that in unbalanced markets the short side has a big
advantage in determining the resulting matching.
Corollary 3. In the separable case with bounded noise, let k(n) ≡ 0 and let (µn, un,F, vn,F) be the
firm-optimal core allocation. Then there exist c ∈ R+ such that whp
∀wnj ∈Wn : vn,Fj ∈
((
hnj − h
)
− c log n
n
,
(
hnj − h
)
+
c log n
n
)
.
Intuition for the proof. Under the firm-optimal core allocation there is at least one worker
who gets a salary of exactly zero; otherwise we could reduce all salaries by a small constant
without violating any of the inequalities defining the core. This worker’s human capital
level cannot be too high (otherwise, by the approximate law of one price, others with lower
human capital levels would get negative salaries). Then, by the approximate law of one
price, all workers must get only the difference between their human capital level and that
worker’s human capital level. For the full proof see Appendix A.2.
A similar argument to the one we used for balanced markets can be applied to unbal-
anced markets. In this case, a worker who is left unmatched gets a salary of zero, and
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this constrains at least some of the salaries of the workers who are matched. Then, by the
approximate law of one price, we get bounds on the salaries of all workers.
Corollary 4. In the separable case with bounded noise, let k(n) > 0 for all n. Then there exist
c ∈ R+ such that whp for all (µn, un, vn) ∈ C (Mn) and for all wnj ∈Wn such that µ(wnj ) ∈ Fn,
vnj ∈
((
hnj − hn[n]
)
− c log n
n
,
(
hnj − hn[n]
)
+
c log n
n
)
,
where hn[n] signifies the n-th highest element in the vector hn.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Corollary 3 implies in particular that in a balanced market the expected division of
surplus is such that the workers get the contribution of their excess human capital (above h)
and then only O
(
log n
n
)
out of the part of the surplus that is related to the noise distribution.
Note that while Corollary 3 is put in terms of the firm-optimal core allocation, it is completely
symmetric, and therefore the same applies to the opposite case of the worker-optimal core
allocation. The convexity property of the core ensures that any compromise distribution
is also possible in a core allocation. Unlike the long (and narrow) core characterization in
balanced markets, Corollary 4 shows that in unbalanced markets the core quickly converges
to almost a point. The resulting surplus division is such that under any core allocation, the
agents on the long side (the workers) get the contribution of their excess quality (not above
the lower bound of the distribution, but rather above the highest quality of an unmatched
agent) plus a O
(
log n
n
)
fraction of the surplus created by the idiosyncratic matching.
1.5 Extension to Cobb–Douglas productivities
In the previous section we showed that an approximate law of one price holds for markets
in which both firms’ quality and workers’ human capital affect the productivity of each
matched pair, but we did not allow for any interaction between those two properties. In
other words, good workers provided the same output regardless of whether they were
working in a good firm or in a bad firm. While mathematically convenient, it is not a very
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plausible assumption. In this section we wish to relax our previous separability assumption
and consider also the family of productivity functions suggested by Cobb and Douglas
(1928).
Our main concern when considering interaction is that workers and firms will tend
to ignore their idiosyncratic productivity noise and will match solely on the basis of their
respective qualities. This is known in the economics literature as “assortative matching,” and
within the matching literature it is most identified with the work of Becker (1981). If firms
and workers match assortatively, there will not be any chance of having an approximate
version of the law of one price, since the idiosyncratic productivities can tilt the profits of
matching pairs.
We find that as the market grows large (and under certain technical assumptions on the
qualities of firms and workers), there is a trade-off between matching assortatively on the
quality dimension and matching efficiently on the noise dimension. We define the concept
of “approximately assortative matching,” which means that all firms are matched to workers
who have approximately the same level of human capital as the firms’ quality. The fact
that the matching is only approximately assortative and not completely assortative allows for
more efficient matching in terms of idiosyncratic noise.
Definition 1. A model exhibits approximately assortative matching if there exist c ∈ R+ and
a ∈ (0, 1) such that whp for any (µn, un, vn) ∈ C (Mn) and for any i, j such that µn( f ni ) = wni we
have
∣∣∣qni − hnj ∣∣∣ ≤ cn−a.
We now turn to a specific model, which we refer to as the Cobb–Douglas benchmark model.
The Cobb–Douglas benchmark model consists of a balanced market (k(n) ≡ 0) in which
productivities are given by αnij = 2
√
qni h
n
j + ε
n
ij, and q
n
k = h
n
k =
k
n , i.e., qualities of firms and
human capital levels of workers are evenly spaced.
Lemma 5. The Cobb–Douglas benchmark model exhibits approximately assortative matching.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
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Having established an approximately assortative matching, we can prove the approxi-
mate law of one price using the tools developed for the separable case, but not quite the
same ones since we need to make sure that we limit the paths used in those proofs so that
they do not go through firms or workers that have very different qualities. Even then a direct
comparison between firms or between workers of different qualities is not straightforward,
and so we restate our main result in terms of agents that have similar qualities.
Theorem 6. In the Cobb–Douglas benchmark model there exist c1, c2 ∈ R+ and a, b ∈ (0, 1) such
that whp for any (µn, un, vn) ∈ C (Mn):
• ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
∣∣∣qni − qnj ∣∣∣ ≤ c1n−b: uni − unj ≤ c2n−a, and
• ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
∣∣∣hni − hnj ∣∣∣ ≤ c1n−b: vni − vnj ≤ c2n−a.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
1.5.1 Surplus distribution
Still focusing on the Cobb–Douglas benchmark model, it is quite clear that while the analysis
of surplus distribution is not as straightforward as the separable case, it is still not much
different. The rough intuition for the next result is that we can compare the salary of any
worker with that of a worker who has a slightly lower or slightly higher human capital level,
if both workers have a relatively high joint productivity with the firm that employs one of
them. This allows us to build paths from any worker to one of the workers with the lowest
human capital levels and deduct that the former can only make a salary that is the sum of
the differences between productivities of workers along the path. In other words, the salary
of a worker with human capital level hnj is roughly the integral from 0 to h
n
j of the marginal
productivities of workers. Since we know that there is approximately assortative matching,
we also know the quality of firms matched to workers along the path.
Corollary 7. In the Cobb–Douglas benchmark model let
(
µn, un,F, vn,F
)
be the firm-optimal core
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allocation. Then there exist c, a ∈ R+ such that
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : vn,Fj ∈
(
j
n
− cn−a, j
n
+ cn−a
)
.
Proof. Omitted.
We note that the surplus created by worker wnj is approximately
2j
n + 1, and so we learn
that the workers get only the share of the surplus related to their own contribution to the
correlated component, and none of the surplus related to the idiosyncratic component under
the firm-optimal core allocation.
We conclude this section by noting that none of the technical steps we took seem to
require balancedness. We therefore conjecture that in unbalanced markets any worker’s
salary under any core allocation will be bounded above by the integral of the marginal
productivity from the highest human capital level of any unemployed worker to her own
human capital level, plus an expression that behaves like O
( 1
na
)
for some a ∈ (0, 1).
Simulation results presented in Section 1.7 also indicate that this conjecture holds.
1.6 Unbounded noise
Up until now we have established that an approximate version of the law of one price
holds in two-sided economies with heterogeneous preferences. However, one of the more
restrictive assumptions that we used was the boundedness of the noise distribution, which
obviously leads to a relatively high concentration of “good enough” matches, and in
particular allows an assignment so efficient that it misses a potential first-best only by a
constant (Aldous, 2001). In this subsection we relax this assumption for the first time and try
to understand what happens when the noise is unbounded. Apart from the mathematical
elegance and conceptual difference of unbounded noise, understanding the implications of
this concept is also important for comparing our work with some of the empirical papers
on two-sided matching markets with transfers, which are based on models with unbounded
noise (e.g., Choo and Siow, 2006).
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When we discuss unbounded noise it is important to understand what it means to
have “one price” in the market, since the average productivity may tend to infinity as
the market grows large. Our interpretation is that an approximate law of one price holds
if the variation among agents’ profits is a vanishing fraction of the average productivity.
In the bounded case, the average productivity approaches a constant, and therefore any
sub-constant differences in profits are considered as an approximate law of one price. In
what follows we focus on the exponential distribution, under which the average productivity
behaves like log n, and we show that whp there are two workers in the market whose salaries
differ by Θ (log n). Hence, we conclude that in the presence of unbounded noise the law of
one price might not hold.
The intuition for our “counterexample” is that unbounded distributions with a heavy
tail may create “good” outliers, i.e., agents that are highly productive compared to others,
and such that agents from the other side fiercely compete to be matched with them. These
agents share a significant portion of the surplus they help to create, and if they are common
enough, they may offset other forces that would otherwise squeeze the surplus from their
side (such as an adversarial core allocation, or a slight imbalance in favor of the other side
of the market). Our example is based precisely on the existence of such agents.
Proposition 8. In the separable case with exponential noise, let the market be balanced (k(n) ≡ 0),
with all firms having the same qualities (qn ≡ 0), and with all workers having the same human
capital level (hn ≡ 0). Let (µn,F, un,F, vn,F) denote the firm-optimal core allocation of Mn. Then
average productivity is Θ(log n), and there exists c ∈ R+ such that whp there are two workers wni
and wnj with
∣∣∣vn,Fi − vn,Fj ∣∣∣ > c log n.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
1.6.1 Surplus distribution under exponential noise
Despite the fact that the law of one price does not apply in general to unbounded noise,
we would like to argue that at least some of the main conclusions, i.e., the convergence of
the share of the surplus that each side gets, continues to hold to some extent. By studying
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simulation data carefully (see Figure 1.11 in Section 1.7), one suspects that the behavior of
the workers’ expected share of the surplus in a balanced market under the firm-optimal core
allocation is Θ
(
log log n
log n
)
. In what follows we assume the following mathematical conjecture
is true, and show that indeed the share of the surplus behaves in that manner.
Conjecture 9. In the separable case with exponential noise, let k(n) ≡ 0, qn ≡ 0 and hn ≡ 0. Then
there exists c ∈ R+ such that whp under the maximal assignment each firm is matched to one of the
c log n workers who have the highest joint productivity with that firm.
We note that Conjecture 9 parallels Theorem 2 of Frieze and Sorkin (2007), in the sense
that it bounds the lowest possible element in the optimal assignment. While computer
simulations suggest that it holds (see Section 1.7), we are not familiar with any work within
the computer science literature or the operations research literature that tackles the problem
of unbounded distributions.9
Theorem 10. In the separable case with exponential noise, let k(n) ≡ 0, qn ≡ 0, and hn ≡ 0.
Assume Conjecture 9 holds, and let ψF (Mn) =
(
µn, un,F, vn,F
)
be the firm-optimal core allocation.
Then there exists c ∈ R+ such that
E
[
∑j v
n,F
j
∑i u
n,F
i +∑j v
n,F
j
]
≤ c log log n
log n
Intuition for the proof. In a balanced market governed by the firm-optimal core allocation, a
worker cannot make more than the value she creates together with the firm that employs her
minus the lowest value that any other worker creates (Lemma 40). Given the assumption
and the above claim, it remains to show that with high probability the lowest value created
by any worker behaves like log n − c log log n (Lemma 41). The full proof appears in
Appendix A.2.
It is worth mentioning that by observing simulation results for unbalanced markets
(Figure 1.11), one may arrive at the following conjecture.
9Those two literatures focus on minimizing the sum of costs, and not maximizing productivity, and therefore
unbounded distributions are less intuitive.
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Conjecture 11. In the separable case with exponential noise, let k(n) > 0, qn ≡ 0, and hn ≡ 0, and
let ψW (Mn) =
(
µn, un,W , vn,W
)
be the worker-optimal core allocation. Then there exists c ∈ R+
such that
E
[
∑j v
n,W
j
∑i u
n,W
i +∑j v
n,W
j
]
≤ c log log n
log n
.
In particular, this implies that for any core mechanism (that is, any function from markets to core
allocations) the expected surplus of the workers is O
(
log log n
log n
)
.
We conclude this section by suggesting that although we were focused on the study of
the exponential distribution, much can be inferred about other unbounded distributions.
Proposition 8 provided a counterexample to a theorem that held for the bounded case. The
conjectures we discussed in this subsection were strictly about the exponential distribution,
but it is our belief that other distributions that have similar tail behavior will exhibit the
same phenomena (see also Figure 1.12 and Figure 1.13 in Section 1.7).
1.7 Simulations
In this section we present results of computerized simulations that demonstrate how quickly
the dispersion of payoffs contracts, and how this affects the market. Unless explicitly noted,
figures are based on averaging 400 trials for each market size, where the size of balanced
markets ranges from (10, 10) to (300, 300) with jumps of 5 agents on each side, and the size
of unbalanced markets ranges from (5, 6) to (300, 301) with jumps of 5 agents on each side.
1.7.1 The separable case with bounded noise
We first focus on the benchmark case of uniform [0, 1] distribution with all firms having
the same quality (qn ≡ 0) and all workers having the same human capital level (hn ≡ 0),
and study wage dispersion in balanced markets under the firm-optimal core allocation.
Figure 1.1 shows that indeed in a balanced market the maximal difference between the
profits of any two firms in any core allocation behaves like log nn , as proved by Theorem 1
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and Theorem 2.10
Figure 1.1: Approximate law of one price in balanced markets
The left panel of Figure 1.2 shows that in this case the maximum salary any worker gets
under the firm-optimal core allocation also behaves like log nn , and the right panel of the
same figure exemplifies the fact that the core in balanced markets is long, as suggested by
Corollary 3.
Figure 1.2: Surplus distribution in balanced markets
In unbalanced markets we expect the core to be much more narrow, per Corollary 4. The
left panel of Figure 1.3 shows that even when the number of workers is only one more than
the number of firms, the maximal salary any worker gets approaches zero rapidly, even
under the worker-optimal core allocation. Furthermore, as the right panel demonstrates, in
this case the workers’ share in the surplus approaches 0, even under the worker-optimal
core allocation. Figure 1.4 parallels Figure 4 of Ashlagi et al. (2013), and depicts the workers’
share of the surplus when the number of workers is constant at 50, and the number of firms
10Figure 1.1 is based on only 25 trials for every market size, since finding the maximal difference across all
core allocations requires solving n(n− 1) linear-programming problems.
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varies from 20 to 80.
Figure 1.3: Surplus distribution in unbalanced markets
Figure 1.4: Surplus distribution with 50 workers
We now wish to verify that adding qualities to the mix does not substantially change any
of these results. We let qni ∼ U[0, 1] for every i, and hnj ∼ U[0, 1] for every j. In a balanced
market we expect each worker to get roughly her human capital level, and for all workers
to take 25% of the surplus. Under the worker-optimal core allocation we expect workers
to take about 75% of the surplus. This is indeed shown in Figure 1.5. In an even slightly
unbalanced market, we expect each worker to get her human capital level under any core
allocation, and for the whole population of workers to take 25% of the surplus. This is
demonstrated in Figure 1.6.
1.7.2 Cobb–Douglas productivity with bounded noise
We first try to demonstrate that assortative matching takes place in the model mentioned in
Appendix A.3; i.e., each side of the market is characterized by evenly spaced qualities on the
interval [0, 1], and the idiosyncratic noise is distributed according to U[0, 1]. In Section 1.5
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Figure 1.5: Surplus distribution in balanced markets with qualities
Figure 1.6: Surplus distribution in unbalanced markets with qualities
we proved just one aspect of assortative matching, namely, whp no firm is matched to a
worker whose human capital level is substantially different from the firm’s own quality
(Lemma 5). The left panel of Figure 1.7 depicts the average and the maximal absolute quality
difference between firms and the workers they employ under the optimal assignment. It
is easy to see that these differences shrink as market size grows, and by looking at the
logarithms of both axes (right panel) we can see that indeed these differences behave like a
negative power of n.
Figure 1.7: Assortative matching when production factors are complements
The surplus distribution described in Corollary 7 is depicted on the left panel of Fig-
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ure 1.8. This panel shows the average absolute difference between workers’ salaries and
workers’ human capital levels under the firm-optimal and the worker-optimal core alloca-
tions. The right panel supports the conjecture we raised at the end of Section 1.5 by showing
the same metric in unbalanced markets for both the firm-optimal and the worker-optimal
core allocations.
Figure 1.8: Surplus distribution when production factors are complements
1.7.3 Unbounded distributions
As mentioned in Section 1.6, unbounded noise distributions give rise to quite different
phenomena than those mentioned with respect to bounded distributions. Figure 1.9 depicts
the maximal difference between any two workers’ salaries divided by the average surplus
created under the optimal assignment, in a balanced market with exponential noise governed
by the firm-optimal core allocation. As predicted by Proposition 8, the difference does not
vanish as n gets large.
Figure 1.9: No law of one price under Exponential distribution
In Section 1.6 we also mentioned a conjecture about the behavior of the optimal as-
27
signment under the exponential distribution (Conjecture 9). Figure 1.10 shows that indeed
it holds for medium-sized markets. The left panel of Figure 1.11 exemplifies how this
conjecture translates into the conclusion of Theorem 10, and the right panel of that figure
suggests that Conjecture 11 is true.
Figure 1.10: Maximal rank of matched agents under exponential distribution
Figure 1.11: Surplus distribution under exponential distribution (balanced and unbalanced)
We conclude this subsection by noting that while our discussion was mostly about the
exponential distribution, there are many other distributions that have similar tail behavior,
and therefore are likely to exhibit the same phenomena. In particular, the extreme value
distribution used in some empirical papers seems to have similar effects. Figure 1.12
parallels Figure 1.10 and shows the maximal rank of any two matched agents in a balanced
market with noise distributed according to an extreme value distribution, and Figure 1.13
shows surplus distribution for both balanced and slightly unbalanced markets.
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Figure 1.12: Maximal rank of matched agents under extreme value distribution
Figure 1.13: Surplus distribution under extreme value distribution (balanced and unbalanced)
1.8 Conclusion
During the 1980s, as it became clear that real-life centralized clearing houses could be
immensely improved using intuitions gained in the study of marriage markets, the trans-
ferable utility strand of the literature became slightly neglected compared to its glorified
non-transferable utility half-sibling. We decided to focus our attention in this paper on
assignment games because it is our belief that they provide an excellent way to model
decentralized markets, and that both strands of the matching theory literature can benefit
from the continuous cross-fertilization.
We have investigated the applicability of the law of one price in two-sided matching
markets with transfers, when agents have heterogeneous preferences over matching with
the other side of the market. We have shown that an approximate law of one price holds,
and that it implies core convergence and sharp predictions about surplus distribution in
unbalanced markets. We have explained why the same kind of forces continue to work in
markets in which there is interaction between the production factors, and why they fail to
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hold in markets in which the idiosyncratic noise is unbounded. These results indicate that
only in knife-edge cases, in which the markets are exactly balanced, can we expect to see
any significant variation in core outcomes.
We conclude the paper by noting that many of our assumptions were for expositional
clarity only. The fact that firms had unit demand and workers supplied one unit of work
is of course not crucial to our results, nor is the fact that all agents can possibly work in
all the firms. The same results will hold in markets with discrete and finite demand and
supply, and in markets that are less thick (at least to some extent). Nevertheless, some of
the assumptions were crucial, and weakening them could lead to further understanding
of markets with heterogeneous preferences. Specifically, the mechanism through which
markets with unbounded noise converge remains a mystery, and the extent to which these
results hold for markets with general utility functions (not quasi-linear) can be further
studied. Finally, generalizing our results and the results of Ashlagi et al. (2013) to markets
with substitutable preferences (with or without transferable utility) is another very promising
direction for future research.
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Chapter 2
Building Reputation at the Edge of
the Cliff
2.1 Introduction
The 2012 New Year’s Eve celebrations in America were somewhat clouded by the gloomy
predictions of the Congressional Budget Office about an upcoming fiscal crisis that might
take place in 2013. This unsettling forecast originated from the expiration of several laws,
most notably the 2010 Tax Relief Act and the Budget Control Act of 2011, which entailed an
increase in taxes as well as major spending cuts, leading to a sharp decline in the budget
deficit. If all the changes were to go into effect simultaneously they would have induced a
recession by cutting household incomes, increasing unemployment rates, and hurting both
consumers’ and investors’ confidence in the economy. This dire situation sparked extensive
media coverage that referred to the December 31 midnight deadline and the sharp decline
in the budget deficit expected to ensue as the “fiscal cliff.”
Preventing the fiscal cliff was supposedly a very simple task. Either the tax reliefs were
to be extended, spending cuts were to be canceled, or some combination of these measures
was to be taken. However, the political situation provided an extremely inconvenient
environment for enacting such reforms. President Barack Obama and the Democratic-
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controlled Senate disapproved of across-the-board tax cuts (as opposed to tax cuts for only
the bottom 98%), and wanted to keep the spending level relatively high. The Republican-
controlled House of Representatives preferred a solution that would lower spending as well
as tax rates. Several proposals for amending the budget had been suggested by President
Obama, House Speaker John Boehner, and others, but all were quickly rejected. In an
attempt to reach an agreement, negotiations extended until the very last hours of 2012.
There was some uncertainty about whether a compromise would be reached in time, and the
entire bipartisan negotiation process was described by several commentators as an elaborate
and dangerous high-stakes game of “chicken.”1 An agreement was finally reached just
before the deadline, with legislation passing in the Senate on January 1, and in the House
the following day.2
This paper models the negotiations as a revision game with reputation formation.3 In
the revision game model, introduced by Kamada and Kandori (2011), players prepare (pure)
actions over a continuous and finite time horizon. They can change their actions only when
they are called to play by stochastic Poisson processes. When the deadline is reached, the
last actions prepared are used to determine the payoffs. This model also encompasses the
idea of an uncertain deadline, as its effect is similar to the randomness induced by the
stochastic revision opportunities.4 We expand the model to accommodate for incomplete
information, which allows us to study how adding a small probability irrational type into
the game affects the equilibrium outcome.
1See, for example, Robin Harding, “US Plays Chicken on Edge of Fiscal Cliff”, ft.com/world, November
11, 2012, and Robert Reich, “Cliff Hanger: Obama’s Last Stand and the Republican Strategy of Fanaticism”,
Huffington Post, December 26, 2012.
2Several economists insist that the consequences of passing the deadline by several days would not have
been as catastrophic as portrayed by the media; see, e.g., Baker (2013). However, our theoretical analysis applies
to other situations of negotiating close to a deadline, as well as to the described situation where the utilities
of the players represent the political cost of not reaching agreement for the two parties rather than the actual
economic implications of the fiscal cliff.
3Our results also apply to a model of war of attrition with a deadline and with independent and stochastically
distributed exit opportunities (see Section 2.5).
4Explicitly adding a deadline over which there is common uncertainty would not substantially change any
of the results.
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In simplifying the negotiation alternatives to a 2x2 game of opposing interests, we demon-
strate that the effect of reputation-building on equilibrium outcomes can be substantial, even
as the time horizon becomes infinitely long. That is, we show that, generically, reputation
formation by one player prevents her opponent from achieving her most-preferred outcome
(Proposition 12). Furthermore, one-sided reputation-building often leads to last-minute
revisions that push some of the strategic interaction close to the deadline and induce a
chance of falling over the cliff, i.e., reaching an outcome that neither side desires (Theo-
rem 13).5 When both parties try to build reputation, substantial delay must arise with
positive probability and inefficiency is inevitable (Theorem 15). Furthermore, in this case
the probability of not reaching an agreement can be non-negligible. It is important to stress
that as our model contains no flow payoffs inefficiencies are caused only by ex-post Pareto
inefficient outcomes, and that as a result of the discreteness of the revision phase any form
of delayed action is necessarily tightly connected with inefficiency.
We provide some illustrative comparative statistics, as well as suggestive computational
evidence, that help in assessing the magnitude of inefficiency. These results demonstrate
that the more players are similar in strength, the more likely they are to hold to their
bargaining position for a long time, leading to a deadline effect with harmful implications
for the players’ expected utility. In the limit case of equal strengths, the inefficiency does not
vanish even as the ex-ante probability of the commitment types approaches zero.
Some methods used in the study of revision games are similar to those employed when
discussing wars of attrition. We introduce a model of war of attrition over a continuous
and finite horizon with Poisson arrivals and incomplete information. We prove that all
sequential equilibria possess a simple structure in which one of the players uses a strategy
that is completely characterized by a cutoff time, and the other player’s strategy also
adheres to the same cutoff time (but could be more complicated before it). This allows us
to provide sharper results concerning delay and inefficiency in one-sided and two-sided
5It is straightforward to show existence of an equilibrium with such properties. Our contribution is in
showing that every sequential equilibrium must exhibit the same inefficiency. The same is true for most of the
results in this paper.
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reputation-building scenarios.
The deadline effect that our model predicts is widely prevalent not only in political
circumstances, but also in situations of a purely economic nature. It was observed in
empirical data on labor strikes (Cramton and Tracy, 1992), and was replicated in lab
experiments (Roth et al., 1988). While the present paper stresses the role of reputation-
building in inducing such an effect, other authors have suggested explanations such as
irreversible commitments (Fershtman and Seidmann, 1993), private information about
second-order beliefs (Feinberg and Skrzypacz, 2005), strategic delay in a bargaining process
(Ma and Manove, 1993), individual deadlines (Sandholm and Vulkan, 1999), and optimism
(Yildiz, 2004). Two papers that investigate this subject and have closer assumptions to ours
are Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) and Ponsati (1995) who discuss continuous-time bargaining
with private information and a deadline. Both papers point to a positive mass of agreements
at the deadline, which is hard to interpret as inefficiency without a proper discretization of
their continuous-time models.
This paper belongs to a growing body of work that follows Kamada and Kandori (2011)
and studies different aspects of revision games. Some of the intuition is based on the
analysis of the complete-information case by Calcagno et al. (2014). Other papers that
employ similar methods include Ishii and Kamada (2011) and Kamada and Muto (2011).
A few papers use a continuous-time finite-horizon framework to explore specific topics
such as bargaining (Ambrus and Lu, 2010) or online auctions (Ambrus et al., 2013). The
novel feature of this strand of the literature is the tractable compromise between having a
continuous-time model, which often requires extreme technical effort to get rid of unwanted
equilibria, and using a discrete-time model, which may add additional strategic aspects
(such as the exact order of play) that have nothing to do with the main issues.6
This work also relates to a vast literature that explores the effects of building reputation
in repeated games, following the seminal papers of Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1982). Several of the many papers on reputation, and perhaps most notably
6For a relevant discussion on this topic see Hendricks et al. (1988).
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Abreu and Gul (2000), demonstrate the existence of delay and inefficiency, where delay is
measured from the first period of play and inefficiency is due to forgone payoff opportunities.
Our results resemble these contributions in the sense that perturbing the game by adding
commitment types can significantly shift the outcome when the time horizon is long enough.
Players sacrifice utility to convince their opponent of their intentions not by decreasing
immediate payoffs (as in the repeated games literature), but rather by increasing the
probability of reaching an inferior outcome at the deadline. In this paper, the delay is
measured backward from the deadline, and reputation formation is based on reaching an
ex-post inefficient outcome with positive probability.7
The war of attrition extension is reminiscent of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) who study
what happens in a duopoly exit situation when there are commitment types. Unlike our
model which is in continuous-time but has discrete preparation opportunities, in their
model players can exit at any point in time, which makes their uniqueness proof far more
involved. Other related models are the continuous-time model with two-sided uncertainty
of Kreps and Wilson (1982a, Section 4),8 the bargaining model of Osborne (1985), the
discrete time model with generalized reputation of Kornhauser et al. (1989), and Atakan and
Ekmekci (2013) who show that equilibrium behavior in a repeated game with two-sided
reputation-building is similar to a war of attrition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model and
the formal notation. Section 2.3 analyzes the general form in the presence of one-sided
reputation. Section 2.4 deals with the case of two-sided reputation-building and provides
results concerning the induced inefficiency. Section 2.5 discusses wars of attrition with a
deadline, and Section 2.6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
7It is possible to apply some involved transformations between the revision game model and the repeated
game model, so that the probabilities of reaching a Pareto inferior outcome are reflected in flow payoffs and in
the discount factor. Nevertheless, using any such transformation will strip the model, the methods, and the
results of any reasonably intuitive interpretation. We choose not to pursue the search for such an equivalence
any further in this paper.
8That model uses flow payoffs and strategies in continuous-time, and therefore has a recursive structure.
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Republicans
(L)arger spending (R)educed spending
Democrats
Taxes (U)p u1(U, L), u2(U, L) u1(U, R), u2(U, R)
Taxes (D)own u1(D, L), u2(D, L) u1(D, R), u2(D, R)
Figure 2.1: Payoff matrix for rational types
2.2 Model
Since the fiscal cliff negotiations included many elements and neither side had full control
over any of the parameters of the final proposal, we choose here to abstract away from
the details and present a simplified version of the process. We consider a two-player
Bayesian revision game,9 summarized by the parameters (T; u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2). For i ∈ {1, 2},
ui : {U, D} × {L, R} → R is a payoff function for the rational type of Player i (see Figure 2.1
below), and ξi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that Player i is a commitment type. We refer to the
normal form game associated with the payoff matrix in Figure 2.1 as the component game.
The underlying story is that Player 1 (the Democratic Party) has sole authority to set
taxes back to their original level (before the expiration of the tax relief acts), whereas Player 2
(the Republican Party) alone can approve a spending increase. We assume that both (U, L)
and (D, R) are strict Nash equilibria of the component game and that
u1(U, L) > u1(D, R) and u2(U, L) < u2(D, R).
These assumptions represent two main features of the story. First, the game is a game of
opposing interests; i.e., each party has a preferred solution to the fiscal crisis situation.10 The
Democrats favor raising taxes and keep spending high, while the Republicans would rather
lower taxes and embrace the upcoming spending cuts. Second, if both parties insist on their
preferred outcome, then the economy falls over the fiscal cliff. That is, if the Democrats keep
9Alternatively, we could have used the model of Kamada and Kandori (2011) with a different equilibrium
concept that takes into account the evolving probabilities about (nonexistent) irrational types.
10We do not consider common interest games since the analysis of such games does not become more
interesting with the introduction of reputation. In such games rational players have no incentive to communicate
anything other than being rational and willing to cooperate.
36
taxes up and the Republicans go with the reduced spending, then the resulting scenario is
undesirable for both players compared to any agreed-upon solution. Finally, if both parties
concede then the combination of low taxes and high spending may drive the economy to a
fiscal wall, a situation in which there is too much spending and not enough taxes to cover it,
and this alternative is unattractive for both players as well.
Denote the possible types of Player i by τri (rational type) and τ
c
i (commitment type).
We model the commitment type of Player 1 (Player 2) as an agent who can only prepare U
(R). We often refer to U and R as the commitment actions. We stress that the rational types’
payoffs are independent of their rival’s type.
Following the notation used by Calcagno et al. (2014), players prepare actions on the
interval [−T, 0], and the component game is played once at time 0. At time −T, both
players simultaneously choose the initial profile of actions. We restrict players to choose
pure actions at this initial choice.11 Between time −T and 0, Players 1 and 2 are called
to prepare an action according to two independent Poisson processes. For expositional
purposes, we assume in the main text that the frequencies of the Poisson processes are both
equal to 1; i.e., each player has on average one revision opportunity per unit of time. All the
results for arbitrary revision rates are stated and proved in the appendix. Players are not
informed of the realizations of their opponent’s Poisson process, but are informed of the
current profile at any point in time.12 This means that players’ strategies depend only on
their own preparation opportunities, the prepared action profiles, and time, but not on their
opponents’ preparation opportunities. At t = 0 the action profile that has been prepared
most recently determines the payoffs for the players. In order for expected payoffs and
probabilities of preparing certain profiles in the revision phase to be well defined for all
11This restriction is mostly for clarity of exposition and focusing the analysis on what we perceive as the
important part of the game, namely, the revision phase. In an earlier draft we show that most of the results
continue to hold if we allow mixed action at −T. We can also replace this assumption by an exogenous selection
of a default profile of actions (U, R).
12Loosely interpreted: one player cannot tell when the other player considered preparing a different action,
but only when the opponent actually did prepare a different action. It is also possible to consider a model in
which players are aware of opponents’ revision times. However, analyzing this model becomes cumbersome
very quickly due to discontinuities at the revision opportunities. See also the concluding discussion.
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strategy profiles, we restrict players’ strategies to be measurable with respect to the natural
topologies. All the elements of the model are common knowledge, and the type of each
player is private information (see the appendix for a formal definition of the strategy space).
We employ the solution concept of Sequential Equilibrium (SE) (Kreps and Wilson,
1982b), which guarantees that even off the equilibrium path a player that revised her action
to D or L is believed to be rational with probability 1.13 We consider the limit set of SE
payoffs as the length of time horizon, T, approaches infinity.14 We are interested mostly
in the rational types’ payoffs, and so we denote by φ(T; u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2) the set of interim SE
payoffs of the profile (τr1 , τ
r
2). We define the revision equilibrium payoff set of (u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2)
by
φ¯(u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2) = lim
T′→∞
φ(T′; u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2).
Besides the eventual payoffs of the players, we also wish to discuss cases in which
a significant delay in reaching an agreement is mandated by equilibrium behavior. We
distinguish between two situations in which strategic interaction is significantly delayed.
We say that a vector of parameters (u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2) induces substantial delay if with strictly
positive probability the prepared profile does not change throughout the game until close
to the deadline. We say that it exhibits last-minute strategic interaction if there is a strictly
positive probability that the prepared profile changes close to the deadline. In both cases, we
say that the vector of parameters induces inefficiency if there is a strictly positive probability
of reaching ex-post Pareto inefficient payoffs. The following definition formalizes these
statements.
Definition 2. A vector of parameters (u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2) induces
• substantial delay if there exists a time −t′ < 0 and δ > 0, such that for every sequence
13Alternatively, we could have modelled the commitment type as having the possibility of choosing either
action, but with utilities such that U and R are dominant. In this case we would also need a refinement akin to
the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987), since merely using the concept of Sequential Equilibrium would
not rule out “strange” beliefs on and off the equilibrium path.
14A different interpretation is that the time horizon is fixed, and the revision rates approach infinity while
the ratio between them is preserved.
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{Tk}∞k=1 such that Tk → ∞, and every corresponding sequence of SEs, the probability that
only (U, R) is being prepared before time −t′ is bounded above δ as k approaches infinity.
• last-minute strategic interaction if there exists a time −t′ < 0 and δ > 0, such that for
every sequence {Tk}∞k=1 such that Tk → ∞, and every corresponding sequence of SEs, the
probability that the prepared profile changes between time −t′ and time 0 is bounded above δ
as k approaches infinity.
• inefficiency if there exists δ > 0, such that for every sequence {Tk}∞k=1 such that Tk → ∞,
and every corresponding sequence of SEs, the probability of reaching ex-post inefficient payoffs
is bounded above δ as k approaches infinity.
Note that whenever a vector of parameters induces substantial delay, it also induces last-
minute strategic interaction. When a vector of parameters induces last-minute strategic
interaction it necessarily induces inefficiency (this is Lemma 50 in the appendix).
2.3 One-sided reputation-building: Last-minute strategic interac-
tion
We begin our analysis by focusing on one-sided reputation-building and its consequences.
This simpler environment allows us to introduce some of the intuitions that continue to
guide us when studying two-sided reputation-formation. The analysis is required for the
study of two-sided reputation-formation also because it represents what happens after either
of the players is revealed as a rational type. In what follows we establish first that even
when the time horizon becomes long, a prior positive probability of acting “crazy” prevents
an opponent from getting the entire surplus.15
To do this, we first rephrase and explain a useful definition of Calcagno et al. (2014) that
summarizes several aspects of the players’ bargaining power in our setting.
15As is the case in the complete information game (Calcagno et al., 2014, Theorem 3).
39
Definition 3. Player i’s strength is given by
si(ui) ≡ |ui(U, L)− ui(D, R)|[ui(U, L)− u1(U, R)] + [ui(D, R)− ui(U, R)] .
Player i is stronger than Player j if si(ui) > sj(uj). Player i’s relative strength (with regard to Player
j) is
∆ij(u1, u2) = si(ui)− sj(uj).
The denominator of the expression in Definition 3 can be thought of as the expected
surplus of Player i when both players try to myopically best-respond over a time period, and
there is an equal probability that any one of them will manage to stop before the deadline.
This value is normalized by the difference between Player i’s preferred component game
equilibrium payoff and her less-preferred component game equilibrium payoff.16 Player i is
less strong if her preferred component game equilibrium payoff is higher, and is stronger
if her less-preferred component game equilibrium payoff is higher, or if ui(U, R) is higher.
Intuitively, lower payoffs for reaching the preferred outcome, and higher payoffs for reaching
the less-preferred outcome and or for no agreement, all allow a player to insist longer. Note
that for generic payoffs, ∆ij(u1, u2) 6= 0 and so one of the players is stronger than the other.17
Proposition 12. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, ξ1 = 0, and ξ2 > 0; then the revision
equilibrium payoff set is bounded away from Player 1’s preferred outcome:
u(U, L) /∈ φ¯(u1, u2; 0, ξ2).18
16Calcagno et al. (2014) note that there is an equivalent and perhaps more readable form for the inverse of si:
1
si(ui)
= 1+ 2 · min{ui(U, L), ui(D, R)} − ui(U, R)|ui(U, L)− ui(D, R)| .
17One may be tempted to compare this strength notion with the concept of risk-dominance (Harsanyi and
Selten, 1988). Generally, these two measures do not agree. For example, consider the following games:
L R
U 7, 5 2, 0
D 0, 0 3, 6
L R
U 8, 8 0, 5
D 0, 0 5, 9
Player 1 is stronger than Player 2 in both games. However, the risk-dominant equilibrium in the left-most matrix
is (U, L), and the risk-dominant equilibrium in the right-most matrix is (D, R).
40
Proof sketch. The theorem shows that one-sided reputation-building bounds the revision
equilibrium payoff set away from the stronger player’s preferred outcome as the length of
the time horizon tends to infinity. Intuitively, to get this outcome in the limit the rational
Player 2 must prepare L on average further and further away from t = 0. But this implies
that if the stronger player is called to prepare an action at any time before t = 0 and the
weaker player’s prepared action is the commitment action, then the stronger player will
attribute a very high probability to the event that the weaker player is a commitment type,
and will have a strict incentive to myopically best-respond from there on. This in turn
creates an incentive for the rational type of the weaker player to imitate the commitment
type, and we get a contradiction. The complete proof is in the appendix.
To fully understand the role of the random processes in the derivation of the above result,
it may be helpful to consider briefly a model in which the times of players’ preparations are
well known in advance. If there is no incomplete information about players’ types, it is easy
to see (using backward induction) that the last mover will have to prepare the action related
to his less-preferred component game equilibrium. The same pair of strategies will also
form a SE in an incomplete information game, as long as the probability of the other player
being a commitment type is small enough. Generally, a deterministic order of play enhances
such bargaining strengths as first-mover or last-mover advantage or disadvantage. When
preparations are random both players can find themselves in a situation where they are the
last player to prepare an action, which makes the exact order of preparations irrelevant in
determining the bargaining strengths of the two players.
Proposition 12 indicates what kind of outcomes are impossible, but does not provide a
full description of what does happen. For example, the expected payoffs may be bounded
away from u(U, L) due to some plays ending with Pareto inefficient outcomes, or the
equilibrium behavior may dictate arriving at the weaker player’s preferred outcome with a
18We write u(U, L) instead of (u1(U, L), u2(U, L)), and similarly for all action pairs.
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positive probability. Theorem 13 demonstrates that under certain parameters the equilibrium
behavior necessarily involves last-minute strategic interaction that may lead to inefficient
outcomes.
Theorem 13. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, and ξ1 = 0. Then there exists ξ¯2 > 0 such
that for every ξ2 ∈
(
0, ξ¯2
)
, the parameters induce last-minute strategic interaction and inefficiency.
Proof sketch. If the probability that Player 2 is a commitment type is small enough, then
Player 1 can get a payoff strictly above u1(D, R) with high probability by never changing
her action and waiting for Player 2 to best-respond. That is, some histories lead to Player 1
getting her most-preferred payoff, and Player 2 getting less than her most-preferred payoff.
We know from Proposition 12 that Player 2 cannot prepare the action L too soon, and
when she does not, Player 1 cannot always prepare D or else Player 2 will have a profitable
deviation. This necessarily implies last-minute strategic interaction, which in turn directly
causes inefficiency. The complete proof is in the appendix.
We are inclined to interpret Theorem 13 as relating to different notions of advantage.
These two flavors of strategic advantage are reminiscent of those discussed in the context
of bargaining. For example, Rubinstein (1982) uses slight differences in impatience to
determine the bargaining outcome, whereas Abreu and Gul (2000) suggest irrationality as
an explanation for the final division of residual claims in the bargaining procedure. In our
case the strength of Player 1 cannot prevent the rational type of Player 2 from imitating the
commitment type and creating reputation. At the same time Player 1 cannot completely give
up her strong bargaining posture too soon, as she knows that rationality dictates a change
in the revisions of the rational type of Player 2 close to the deadline. As the probability of
actually facing a commitment type becomes small, Player 1 has an incentive to preserve
some bargaining power to the end of the revision phase. This means that for an open set
of parameters, one-sided reputation-building leads to last-minute strategic interaction and
inefficiency.19 In Section 2.5 we strengthen this result for the case of War of Attrition with
19Strictly speaking, we have not shown that the set of parameters is open. However, looking at the proof of
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Poisson arrivals (Corollary 20).
An important question, to be discussed further in the two-sided reputation formation
case, is whether the effect of reputation vanishes as the probability of a commitment type
tends to zero. While we do not prove that it necessarily does, we can demonstrate that the
efficient outcome related to the subgame perfect equilibrium of the complete information
game is a limit of a sequence of outcomes in games with diminishing probability for
a commitment type. That is, we show that φ¯ is lower hemi-continuous in ξ2 at 0. To
prove this result we explicitly construct a specific sequence of equilibria that has a simple
structure of using cutoff strategies (that is, insisting up to a certain time and then myopically
best-responding from there on), and show that the related expected payoffs converge to
u(U, L).
Proposition 14. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, and ξ1 = 0. Then Player 1’s preferred
outcome is in the limit of the revision equilibrium payoff set as20 ξ2 → 0:
u(U, L) ∈ lim inf
ξ2→0
φ¯(u1, u2; 0, ξ2).
2.4 Two-sided reputation-building: Falling over the cliff
As demonstrated in the previous section, one-sided reputation formation may lead to
inefficiency under certain conditions. The inefficiency is realized on the equilibrium path
when the Democrats insist on keeping taxes high (U) and the Republicans insist on reducing
spending (R), a scenario that leads to a fiscal cliff. The basic argument was that the
Republicans, who are perceived as having a positive probability of being committed to
reducing spending, cannot fold too quickly, or else the entire surplus will be taken by
the Democrats who are stronger along other bargaining dimensions. This section applies
Theorem 13, we can see that ξ¯2 can be chosen as a continuous function u1 and u2, and hence finding an open
set of parameters is trivial.
20Note that φ¯(u, 0, ξ2) is a set. The operator lim inf here means that for every sequence ξk2 → 0 we can choose
equilibrium payoffs uk ∈ φ¯(u, 0, ξk2) such that uk → u(U, L). Note also that Proposition 14 does not completely
characterize the limit set of the payoffs.
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a similar logic to situations with two-sided reputation-formation, and describes how it
necessarily induces a positive probability of falling over the fiscal cliff. That is, the probability
of seeing any action prepared in the game other than the commitment actions is bounded
below 1 until the very end of the game, and the expected payoffs cannot be on the Pareto
frontier. We characterize the inefficiency for the special case of equilibrium in cutoff
strategies, and present comparative statics and limit results. Finally, we present a variety of
numerical and analytic calculations that indicate that the inefficiency can be substantial for
reasonable values of the parameters.
As described above, not only does our first theorem in this section predict a shift from
the complete information outcome, but it also demonstrates that with positive probability
a long delay must occur before any player prepares anything but the commitment action.
This delay in turn must cause inefficiency, as agreement might not be reached before the
deadline. Theorem 15 therefore combines and strengthens the results of Proposition 12 and
Theorem 13 for the case of two-sided reputation-building.
Theorem 15. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2,21 and ξ1, ξ2 > 0. Then substantial delay
and inefficiency are induced.
The intuition for Theorem 15 is an extension of the one used to derive the one-sided
reputation results. The rational type of the weaker player (in terms of payoffs) cannot give
up on building reputation too quickly in equilibrium. If she does, then, by extension of
Calcagno et al. (2014, Theorem 3), her payoff will approach her least preferred component
game equilibrium payoff, while pretending to be a commitment type will guarantee a larger
payoff. Given that there is a time before which the weaker player’s probability of revealing
her rationality is bounded below 1, there is also an earlier time before which the rational
type of the stronger player cannot reveal her rationality too early either. If she does that her
utility will be bounded away from her preferred outcome (by Proposition 12), and deviating
21This assumption is only for the sake of simplicity. The case of equal strengths is susceptible to similar
analysis but requires proving first that if players are equally strong, ξ1 > 0 and ξ2 = 0, then equilibrium payoffs
approach u(U, L) as T approaches infinity.
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ensures a payoff that approaches the preferred outcome. This dictates substantial delay,
which necessarily leads to inefficiency.
The above theorem points to some of the problematic efficiency properties of two-sided
reputation-building. The rest of this section is dedicated to uncovering the magnitude of the
inefficiency, and how different parameters of the game affect it. In what follows we focus on
the simple equilibrium form in which each rational type insists on her commitment action
until some point in time and myopically best-responds (according to the component game’s
payoffs) from there on. We know that in order for these strategies to form an equilibrium,
each rational type must be indifferent between both actions at the switching point, and
this together with the Bayesian updating of beliefs allows us to solve for the cutoff times.
The following proposition gives us some basic comparative statics regarding the extent of
inefficiency that Theorem 15 predicts.
Proposition 16. If ξ1, ξ2 > 0, both players play cutoff strategies, and Player 2’s cutoff is earlier
than Player 1’s cutoff, then the probability of reaching an ex-post Pareto inferior outcome is
1. increasing in u1(D, R), and decreasing in u1(U, L) and u1(U, R),
2. increasing in u2(D, R) and u2(U, R), and decreasing in u2(U, L).
It is instructive to read Proposition 16 in light of Definition 3, and see that each element
of the bargaining strength affects the inefficiency in the same way it affects the relative
strength, ∆12(u1, u2). Changes in the payoffs that push the relative strength away from zero
decrease the inefficiency, and changes that push it towards zero increase the inefficiency.
From symmetry it follows that the maximal inefficiency is attained when ∆12(u1, u2) = 0.
To get a feeling of what that maximal inefficiency might be, Theorem 17 below takes both
probabilities of being a commitment type to zero.
Theorem 17. 1. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, and both players play cutoff
strategies. Then in the limit as ξ1 → 0 and ξ2 → 0, the probability of reaching ex-post
inefficiency tends to zero.
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2. Assume players are equally strong (∆12(u1, u2) = 0), and both players play cutoff strategies.
Let the sequence (ξk1, ξ
k
2)
∞
k=1 be such that limk→∞ ξ
k
1 = limk→∞ ξ
k
2 = 0, and limk→∞
ξk2
ξk1
≤ 1.
Then in the limit as k→ ∞, the probability of reaching ex-post inefficiency tends to[
u1(U, L)− u1(D, R)
u1(U, L) + u1(D, R)− 2u1(U, R)
]
× lim
k→∞
ξk2
ξk1
.
The interpretation of Theorem 17 is that as the probability of commitment types goes
to zero, the inefficiency (generically) goes to zero as well. Nevertheless, if the probability
that either of the sides is a commitment type does not merely serve as a refinement tool,
but rather constitutes an essential part of the dynamics, then the balance of the different
forces becomes important. As the second part of the theorem shows, even for relatively
small probabilities of being commitment types, the inefficiency can be substantial. Roughly,
if the players are close to being equally strong in terms of payoffs, then reputation effect
may cause significant efficiency loss. However, if one of the players is much stronger (in
terms of payoffs), reputation effects only mildly hurt efficiency. Similarly, if one player’s
reputation is much stronger than the other player’s (the ratio ξ2ξ1 is very small or very big),
then the inefficiency is negligible.
To illustrate the extent to which the equilibrium result may be inefficient we solve for a
variety of parameters. We first note that when the two players are equally strong we can
use the formula of Theorem 17 to compute the limit inefficiency. We assume ξ1 = ξ2 and
(without loss of generality) normalize u1(U, R) to be zero, and get the reduced formula
Inefficiency =
u1(U, L)− u1(D, R)
u1(U, L) + u1(D, R)
.
This implies that for a standard battle of the sexes payoff matrix, the inefficiency tends to
1
3 in the limit. If the stakes are higher, say if u1(U, L) = u2(D, R) = 99 and u1(D, R) =
u2(U, L) = 1, then the inefficiency is 98%. In this case equilibrium behavior dictates that
both players insist on playing the commitment action until very close to time 0, and the first
to be called to prepare an action chooses her less-preferred component game equilibrium
and gets a payoff of 1, whereas the other player gets 99. However, the time at which players
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stop preparing the commitment action is so close to the deadline that only with probability
2% is either of them is going to be called, which pins their expected payoff at exactly 1.
Figure 2.2 illustrates several of the properties that were just discussed. In this figure we
see the extent of inefficiency for the game form presented in the top left panel for x ∈ (0.5, 2)
and y ∈ (1, 3), and for three values of ξ1 and ξ2. The three shapes resemble shark fins
that become narrower as ξ1 and ξ2 become smaller. This demonstrates that the maximal
inefficiency is always at ∆12(u1, u2) = 0 and does not vanish, and that everywhere else the
inefficiency tends to zero as the ex-ante probability of commitment types approaches zero.
Figure 2.3 offers a different view of the same family of payoff matrices, but here the payoffs
are held constant and the ex-ante probabilities of commitment types vary. A careful look
at those graphs reveals that there is a trade-off between strength (in terms of payoffs) and
commitment power when it comes to bargaining posture, which in turn leads to inefficiency.
2.5 Wars of attrition with Poisson arrivals
In many negotiations (including those related to the fiscal cliff), reaching a final agreement
before the deadline is also a possibility. This is inherently different from the model of
revision games in which even after one of the parties decides to concede, it can still return
to its previous bargaining position. Assuming that a concession ends the game simplifies
the model and turns it into a model of a war of attrition. Wars of attrition can generally be
described as situations in which the first player to take action over some defined period of
time determines the payoffs for both players. This model was first introduced by Maynard
Smith (1974) to model biological situations in which two animals fight over a disputed
territory. While the first animal to leave the territory receives a lower payoff than its rival,
both animals suffer from the preceding fight. The framework also captures some of the
economic incentives that govern firms when they are engaged in a patent race or when
trying to become a monopolist in a market that cannot sustain multiple competitors. An
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L R
U 2, 1 0, 0
D 0, 0 x, y
The payoff matrix
ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.1
ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.05 ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.01
Figure 2.2: Varying payoffs
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x = 1 , y = 2 (side) x = 1 , y = 2 (top)
x = 1 , y = 1.9 (side) x = 1 , y = 1.9 (top)
x = 0.97 , y = 2 (side) x = 0.97 , y = 2 (top)
Figure 2.3: Varying commitment probabilities
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extensive literature studies different aspects of the game.22
As mentioned in the Introduction, variants of wars of attrition that include reputation
have been analyzed in the literature in both discrete and continuous-time. Here we introduce
a new timing structure, namely, continuous and finite time, where players can exit only
when being called to play by a stochastic process. We restrict ourselves to payoffs that
correspond to a 2x2 opposing interests game when the stochastic processes governing the
timing of the players’ decisions are independent Poisson processes. One specific instance
from this class of games is the “three-state example” analyzed (without reputation effects)
by Kamada and Sugaya (2010, Section 6.1).
Roughly speaking, all of the previous results hold for this class of games. However, it
turns out that in the war of attrition with Poisson arrivals all equilibria have the special
structure of both players exiting with probability one when being called to play after some
cutoff time, and at least one of the two players exiting with zero probability before that time.
Furthermore, every equilibrium payoff can be mimicked using cutoff strategies for both
players. We use these observations to pin down the limit results.
The fact that the strategies are simpler allows us to provide even sharper results. We
continue to use the same basic definitions of types and utilities (see the appendix for
formal definitions of histories, information sets, and strategies). As before, we now let
φwoa(T; u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2) denote the set of interim SE payoffs of the profile (τr1 , τ
r
2) in the war of
attrition with Poisson arrivals and payoffs given by u1 and u2. We define φ¯woa(u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2)
as the limit payoffs set of this game as T approaches infinity.
Lemma 18. In the war of attrition with Poisson arrivals (and incomplete information), for any T,
all sequential equilibria have the property that there exists a cutoff time −t∗ such that both players
exit if being called to play after −t∗, and at least one of them exits with zero probability before −t∗.
Corollary 19. In the war of attrition with Poisson arrivals (and incomplete information), for any T
all SE payoffs can be attained by SEs in which both players use cutoff strategies.
22Such as random rewards (Bishop et al., 1978), asymmetric equilibria (Nalebuff and Riley, 1985), effects of
continuous-time (Hendricks et al., 1988), strong evolutionary equilibria (Riley, 1980), and more.
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The intuition for the proof of Lemma 18 is that players can use strategies that do not
depend on their previous decision opportunities because the other player’s inference does
not depend on those opportunities. Furthermore, the nature of players’ incentives is such
that if one player exits at some time −t, and there is a strictly positive probability that the
second wants to exit from then on until some future time −t′ > −t, then after time −t′
the first player will definitely want to exit. This “pairwise monotonicity” property, which
is precisely defined in the appendix, can be used to show that all equilibria have a cutoff
time −t∗. Corollary 19 then follows by reducing the probability with which the “weaker”
player exits before −t∗ to an interval just before −t∗, while preserving the conditions for
equilibrium and giving the same expected payoffs as the original SE.
Lemma 18 and Corollary 19 represent the key difference between the analysis presented
in the previous sections and the analysis of a war of attrition. Specifically, we can use
Lemma 18 and Corollary 19 and repeat the same arguments from before to get sharper
results. In the case of one-sided reputation formation, the results about efficiency and
inefficiency under certain parameters are stronger, and equilibrium payoffs are uniquely
determined for small enough values of ξ2. Uniqueness is established by ruling out any other
equilibrium payoffs using only cutoff strategies. Then the construction that appears in the
proof of Proposition 14 nails down the exact values of the cutoff times. These results again
demonstrate that the ability to build reputation is an extremely important property of the
bargaining process.
Corollary 20. In a war of attrition model, assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2 and ξ1 = 0.
Then there exists ξ¯2 such that for every ξ2 ∈ (0, ξ¯2), the parameters induce substantial delay and
inefficiency.
Corollary 21. In a war of attrition model, assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2; then her
preferred outcome is the unique limit of the equilibrium payoff set as the probability of Player 2 being
the commitment type approaches zero. Formally, lim infξ2→0 φ¯
woa(u1, y2; 0, ξ2) = {u(U, L)}.
As for the case of two-sided reputation-building, all the results from Section 2.4 hold,
but whenever the restriction about cutoff strategies appears it is redundant. We here avoid
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repeating these results or providing their proofs, which resemble the proofs that were used
for the revision game model but also employ Corollary 19.
For the sake of completeness it is useful to review how our results relate to previous
models of the war of attrition with incomplete information in continuous-time. First, as
mentioned before, the continuous-time framework makes proving uniqueness results far
more complicated than the results we present here. Our model relies on discrete actions,
and so we can more easily apply the sequential rationality property to establish uniqueness.
Second, a striking feature is that the rates at which players exit in the war of attrition
are similar. Since we employ cutoff strategies, players exit according to the two Poisson
processes that govern their action opportunities starting from a certain time. Osborne (1985)
provides an expression that amounts to exactly the same exit rate when the players are
risk-neutral.
2.6 Conclusion
While the fiscal cliff negotiations ended with an agreement between the two parties, similar
bargaining situations often lead to an outcome undesirable to both sides in the form of
passing the deadline. While ignoring some real-life reasons that may cause this to happen
(animosity, miscommunication, and so on), we provide an intuitive explanation for such
events. Our prediction of non-degenerate equilibrium play with the possibility of a deadline
effect stands in sharp contrast with previous results on complete information play, and
suggests that reputation formation may play a crucial part in delaying meaningful bargaining
in the presence of a deadline.
It is likely that the effects mentioned in this paper would only become stronger if there
were an element of repeated bargaining between the parties, as is natural in the political
arena. In this case, reputation formation would not only serve the present agenda, but
would also be beneficial for future negotiations. A different direction in which our results
can be extended is to consider a game with incomplete information on the rates of revision
opportunities. In such a game each player may try to persuade her opponent that her
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rate of revision opportunities is low. This creates an incentive for the opponent to give up
her bargaining posture faster than she would have done had she known she was facing a
player who can still react with high probability before the deadline. This particular kind
of incomplete information may serve as a good model of the level of interest that each of
the players invests in the game, and provides yet another reason why even players who
care dearly about the results of the game would like to hold their position as the deadline
approaches.
Finally, it is possible to consider an alternative model in which players’ revision op-
portunities are observed by their opponents. While non-observable arrivals of revision
opportunities are slightly more intuitive, the alternative model may also be relevant for
certain applications. However, once players’ revision opportunities become common knowl-
edge delicate issues of playing mixed strategies arise. Studying the structure of strategies in
a war of attrition with Poisson arrivals and incomplete information under this observability
condition also becomes tricky, and it remains an open question whether or not cutoff
strategies can be used to exhaust the entire space of equilibrium payoffs.
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Chapter 3
Implications of Capacity Reduction
and Entry in Many-to-One Stable
Matching
3.1 Introduction
Many economic environments can be characterized as matching markets in which agents
of two different populations contract to achieve a common goal. Two prominent examples,
which were extensively studied in the market design literature, are school choice problems
and allocations of interns to hospitals.1 Natural experiments with various centralized
matching mechanisms have made it quite clear that the single most important property
determining the success of a mechanism is its stability or lack thereof (Roth, 1991). The
importance of stability drove many economists to study the properties of stable mechanisms
in one-to-one matching markets, as well as more general and more realistic models of
matching that allow agents to contract with multiple parties, to specify salaries or other
benefits as part of the contracts, and so on.
As is by now well-known, participants in markets governed by stable mechanisms may
1See Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) and Roth (2002) for a survey of these case studies.
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have an incentive to report their preferences and attributes (such as capacities) untruthfully.
Roth (1982) proves that any stable mechanism can be manipulated by some participants,
and Sönmez (1997) shows that every stable mechanism is manipulable via capacities.2
We follow up on this literature by investigating the implications of capacity reductions in
many-to-one markets, and show that if a capacity reduction is binding then there exists a
mechanism-independent non-empty set of doctors and a related set of hospitals, such that
every doctor in the first set is worse off and every hospital in the second set is better off
following the capacity reduction (under any stable mechanism). Moreover, if it so happens
that the hospital with the reduced capacity belongs to the set of hospitals mentioned above,
then this hospital can report a lower capacity and be certain to get a better outcome, even
without knowing which stable matching will be realized. That is, in this situation reporting
a reduced capacity dominates truth-telling regardless of the stable mechanism that is being
used. We then consider a larger domain of preferences, namely substitutable preferences
that satisfy the law of aggregate demand, and prove that a capacity reduction has slightly
different yet similar consequences.
We apply our results to the study of entry in many-to-one markets. While early works
on entry in the matching literature focused on specific mechanisms,3 Theorem 2.26 of Roth
and Sotomayor (1990), which is an adaptation of previous work on assignment games by Mo
(1988), stands out as it holds regardless of the matching process. We show that their result
is false in many-to-one matching markets when a doctor enters the market. That is, there
2Further contributions include Konishi and Ünver (2006), who show that in a game of capacity manipulation
every pure strategy equilibrium is weakly preferred by the hospitals to the outcome of any larger capacity
profile, and on this matter see also Ehlers (2010), Kesten (2011), Kojima (2006), Mumcu and Saglam (2009) and
Romero-Medina and Triossi (2007). Azevedo (2014) uses a continuum model (Azevedo and Leshno, 2011) to
perform a more detailed analysis of hospitals’ incentives to reduce capacity.
3For example, the results of Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Theorems 2.25 and 5.35), which are reminiscent
of those by Kelso and Crawford (1982, Theorem 5) and Demange and Gale (1985, Corollary 3), show that it
is possible to make weak comparisons with regard to the entire population when either the hospital-optimal
or the doctor-optimal stable matching mechanisms are being used. That is, one can predict that all agents on
one side of the market are made weakly better off or weakly worse off following the arrival of a new agent.
By technically treating hospital’s positions as separate entities (i.e., the equivalent marriage market approach),
these theorems also imply that capacity reductions have a similar effect under these two mechanisms. The weak
comparison results are extended to other matching environments by Crawford (1991), Hatfield and Kominers
(2013) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005, Theorem 6).
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are cases in which a doctor enters the market and is matched, and yet the conclusion of the
mentioned theorem about which doctors become worse off does not hold. We establish a
weaker result by allowing only responsive preferences and focusing on the set of hospitals
that become better off following a doctor’s entry. In the case of hospitals being at full
capacity prior to the entry we can also identify a non-empty related set of doctors that
become worse off. We also show that the original statement does hold when a hospital joins
the market.
Manipulation via truncations and dropping strategies is another strategic issue frequently
discussed in the matching literature.4 Roth and Vande Vate (1991) note that in a one-to-
one matching environment it is sufficient to consider a special subclass of preference
manipulations called truncation strategies, in which the hospital reports a preference
that coincides with the real preference in its ordering of acceptable alternatives, but may
misreport its least preferred acceptable alternative.5 We prove that whenever a hospital uses
a (binding) truncation, it harms some non-empty set of doctors and benefits a related set of
hospitals. However, as soon as attention is turned to many-to-one matching, hospitals may
want to resort to the broader class of dropping strategies (Kojima and Pathak, 2009). We
show that even a binding dropping strategy may not have similar implications.
Our somewhat partial welfare analysis is mandated by the broad domain of matching
environments to which it can be applied. For example, stability has emerged in the
theoretical literature as something one may expect even in decentralized markets in which
the precise matching mechanism may not be so clearly defined. Roth and Vande Vate
(1990) show that reasonable random processes will converge to a stable matching, but may
converge to different stable matchings at different realizations of the random process. While
many of the results in the matching literature do not apply when the stable matching
is stochastically determined, our results are robust even under such uncertainty. The
4Other forms of manipulation, which are not discussed in this paper, are via pre-arranged matches (Sönmez,
1999), creating fictitious doctor records (Afacan, 2011), and application fee manipulation (Afacan, 2012).
5For more on truncation strategies, see Ashlagi and Klijn (forthcoming), Coles and Shorrer (2014), Ehlers
(2004), Ma (2002), Ma (2010), and Roth and Rothblum (1999).
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applicability of our results to decentralized markets also explains why our analysis is useful
despite the simplifying assumption of complete information over preferences, as it allows
us to be agnostic about what information is available regarding the details of the matching
process and which stable matching will be selected.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model. Section 3.3 studies
the implications of capacity reduction. Section 3.4 applies them to study entry in many-to-
one markets. Section 3.5 considers the effects of truncation and dropping strategies, and
Section 3.6 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3.2 The model
Let D be a finite set of doctors and H a finite set of hospitals. A doctor can be matched
to at most one hospital, but hospitals can be matched to several doctors. Doctors and
hospitals have strict preferences over possible matchings with agents from the other side of
the market, as well as remaining unmatched (which we denote by ∅). The strictness of the
preferences is crucial to our results (see also the closing discussion). Each d ∈ D is endowed
with a transitive and complete preference d over H ∪ {∅}, and every h ∈ H is endowed
with a transitive and complete preference h over 2D, i.e., all possible subsets of D. We
write preferences as ordered lists and abbreviate them by omitting those elements that are
unacceptable (that is, less preferred to remaining unmatched). Hospital h also has a capacity
qh, which is the cardinality of the largest acceptable set doctors.
We will denote by P the set of all problems, with a general element
P = (D, H, {qh}h∈H, {i}i∈D∪H) .
Throughout this paper we restrict ourselves to the analysis of two important sub-domains of
preferences for the hospitals, namely the domain of responsive preferences, and the domain
of substitutable preferences that satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Both of these domains
have been extensively used in the literature, mostly due to their intuitive interpretations and
their convenient mathematical properties when it comes to the analysis of stable matchings.
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Hospital h is said to have responsive preferences and h is said to be responsive if for
every set of doctors D′ ⊆ D such that |D′| ≤ qh, every d1 ∈ D′ and every d2 ∈ D \ D′ we
have:
1. D′ h D ∪ {d2} \ {d1} ⇐⇒ {d1} h {d2}
2. D′ h D′ \ {d1} ⇐⇒ {d1} h ∅
Loosely interpreted, a responsive preference is consistent with its ordering of individual
doctors, and prioritizes a set with more acceptable doctors (as long as it does not exceed its
capacity). We denote the subset of problems in which hospitals have responsive preferences
by PR.
Define for any hospital h ∈ H the choice function Ch : 2D → 2D by:
Ch(D′) = maxh
{D′′ | D′′ ⊆ D′}
We say that hospital h’s preference relation is substitutable if ∀D′′ ⊆ D′ ⊆ D : D′′ ∩
Ch(D′) ⊆ Ch(D′′). Intuitively, a hospital’s preference relation is substitutable if a doctor
who is accepted remains accepted when the set of doctors under consideration shrinks.
Hospital h’s preference relation satisfies the law of aggregate demand if ∀D′′ ⊆ D′ ⊆
D : |Ch(D′′)| ≤ |Ch(D′)|.6 We denote the subset of problems in which hospitals have
substitutable preferences that satisfy the law of aggregate demand by PSL. It is easy to verify
that a responsive preference is substitutable and satisfies the law of aggregate demand, and
so PR ⊆ PSL.
A matching is a function µ : D ∪ H → H ∪ 2D such that every doctor is either matched
to one hospital or remains unmatched (denoted by ∅), every hospital is matched to a set of
doctors,7 and the matching is consistent. Formally: for every d ∈ D we have µ(d) ∈ H ∪{∅},
for every h ∈ H we have µ(h) ∈ 2D, and µ(d) = h if and only if d ∈ µ(h).
6For matching markets without contracts such as ours, this property was first introduced under the name
cardinal monotonicity by Alkan (2002).
7Restricting the definition to only allow hospitals to be matched to sets of doctors smaller than their capacity
does not affect our analysis.
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A matching is individually rational if all doctors and hospitals (weakly) prefer their
matching to remaining unmatched. A matching is unblocked if there is no set of doctors and
a hospital such that every doctor prefers the hospital to her current match, and the hospital
prefers the union of this set of doctors and some subset of its currently matched doctors
to its current match.8 A matching is stable if it is individually rational and unblocked.
Formally, matching µ is stable if it is:
1. Individually rational: For every i ∈ D ∪ H, µ(i) i ∅.9
2. Unblocked: There exist no h ∈ H, D′ ⊆ D and D′′ ⊆ µ(h) such that for all d′ ∈ D′,
h d′ µ(h) and D′ ∪ D′′ h µ(h).
For any P ∈ P , we denote by Ψ(P) the set of stable matchings. A mechanism is a function
from P to matchings. Mechanism ψ is a stable mechanism on sub-domain P ′ if for any
P ∈ P ′, ψ(P) ∈ Ψ(P), that is, its outcome for problems in P ′ is always a stable matching.
Throughout the paper it will be clear what is the sub-domain currently under discussion and
we will not be explicit about it when we refer to a specific stable mechanism. We denote by
ψD the doctor-optimal stable mechanism, and by ψH the hospital-optimal stable mechanism.
The existence of these two mechanisms is proved by Gale and Shapley (1962) for the domain
of responsive preferences, and by Roth (1984b) for the domain of substitutable preferences.
We study preference domains in which the “rural hospital theorem” holds, i.e., the set
of unmatched doctors remains unchanged for all stable matchings, as well as the set of
doctors assigned to hospitals that fail to reach their capacity. This result was first proved by
Roth (1984a, Theorem 9), and was extended to the domain of q-separable and substitutable
preferences by Martínez et al. (2000). For a recent treatment and a survey of the different
extensions see Klijn (2011). It immediately follows that given a problem P ∈ PSL any agent
i is matched to the same number of partners under all stable matchings, and we denote this
8We employ here the notion of setwise stability. In the many-to-one markets with substitutable preferences
that we consider, this is equivalent to pairwise stability (Blair, 1988).
9One can also define individual rationality for the hospitals by requiring that ∀h ∈ H : µ(h) = Ch (µ(h)).
This yields the same stability concept and does not affect our results.
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number by mi(P).
3.3 Capacity reduction
For any hospital h ∈ H with preference relation h and capacity qh and for any q′ < qh,
define q=q′h as the preference relation derived from h by imposing capacity q′, that is,
for all D′, D′′ ⊆ D:
D′ q=q′h D′′ ⇐⇒
(|D′| ≤ q′ and |D′′| ≤ q′ and D′ h D′′) or(|D′| ≤ q′ and |D′′| > q′) or(|D′| > q′ and |D′′| > q′ and D′ h D′′)
Lemma 22. Let h and qh be hospital h’s preference relation and capacity respectively, and q=q
′
h
the preference relation derived from h by imposing capacity q′. Then:10
1. If h is responsive, then so is q=q
′
h .
11
2. If h is substitutable and satisfies the law of aggregate demand, then q=q
′
h satisfies the law of
aggregate demand.
3. Even if h is substitutable and satisfies the law of aggregate demand, it does not necessarily
follow that q=q′h is substitutable.
Our first result states that if preferences are responsive and a hospital reduces its capacity
(or at least reports such a reduced capacity) beneath the number of doctors who are assigned
to it in a stable matching, then it is possible to find some non-empty set of doctors and
a (possibly empty) set of hospitals such that each doctor in the former set is worse off,
and each hospital in the latter set is better off following the reduction. It is important to
10Parts of this result are similar in spirit to Mongell and Roth (1986) who demonstrate why imposing budget
constraints on a firm in the model of Kelso and Crawford (1982) may cause the gross substitutes condition to
stop holding for the budget-constrained firm.
11That is, when the capacity used in the definition of responsiveness is taken to be q′.
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note that throughout this paper comparisons are strict, and so “better (worse) off” means
“strictly better (worse) off”. We explicitly note when the comparison is weak. Furthermore,
whenever we make a comparison between outcomes it is with respect to the true capacity
and full preferences (in the next section, including possible entrants), and not with respect
to any partial preferences or reported capacities.
Theorem 23. Assume P ∈ PR.12 Let h0 ∈ H and 0 ≤ q′ < mh0(P), and set
P′ =
(
D, H,
(
q′, q−h0
)
, {i}i∈D∪H\{h0} ∪ {q=q
′
h0
}
)
.
Then there exists a non-empty subset of doctors S ⊆ D, such that under any stable mechanism ψ,
every doctor in S is worse off and every hospital in
{
h | ψD(P′)(h) ∩ S 6= ∅} is better off under
ψ(P′) compared to ψ(P).
Note that the relevant set of hospitals mentioned in the theorem includes exactly those
hospitals that employ some doctors from the specified set of doctors following the capacity
reduction under the doctor-optimal stable matching. The two sets are invariant under
different stable mechanisms, and therefore the conclusion does not depend on the stable
mechanism used. This mechanism-free welfare comparison is equivalent to the claim that all
the specified doctors are worse off and all hospitals in the related set are better off under any
stable matching following the capacity reduction compared to any stable matching before it.
The economic intuition and the proof of this theorem are both loosely based on Theo-
rem 2.26 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). For the sake of completeness we reproduce the
statement of this theorem here. To make the connection clearer, the theorem is reformulated
in terms of doctors and hospitals instead of men and women. Note however that the original
theorem is stated in “the opposite direction” (a hospital enters the market), whereas we
focus on capacity reductions that are a generalization of leaving a market.
Theorem 24 (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 2.26). Assume all hospitals have a capacity
12Theorem 23 holds for a more general preferences domain, namely q-separable and substitutable preferences
(Martínez et al., 2000). However, the proof is far more involved, and so we use the stronger assumption of
responsiveness. For further details on the proof under the weaker assumptions, please contact the author.
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of one. Suppose hospital h0 is added to the market, i.e.,
P′ = (D, H ∪ {h0}, (1, 1, . . . , 1), {h0} ∪ {i}i∈D∪H) .
If mh0(P
′) > 0, then there exists a non-empty subset of doctors S ⊆ D, such that under any stable
mechanism ψ, every doctor in S is better off and every hospital in
{
h | ψD(P)(h) ∈ S} is worse off
under ψ(P′) compared to ψ(P).
The idea in the many-to-one case is that h0’s capacity reduction, which is in a sense
opposite to h0’s entry in the one-to-one case, initiates a rejection chain. That is, a doctor
that was previously matched to hospital h0 is now “rejected” and is possibly matched
to a different hospital, which in turn rejects another a doctor, and so forth until either a
doctor remains unmatched or a previously empty position is filled. If it was the one-to-one
case doctors on these rejection chains were all worse off, whereas hospitals were better off.
However, in the many-to-one case things are not quite so simple as a hospital may employ
several doctors (before and after the capacity reduction). The responsiveness assumption
ensures that the same kind of welfare comparisons can be made on the (generalized) rejection
chain.
Technically, the proof relies on constructing a directed graph whose vertices are the
agents in the market such that there is an edge from a hospital to a doctor if they are
matched under the hospital-optimal stable matching before the capacity reduction, and
from a doctor to a hospital if they are matched under the doctor-optimal stable matching
following the capacity reduction. The original proof (for the case of one-to-one matching)
follows a path from h0 until reaching an unmatched agent. This proof strategy cannot always
work in a many-to-one environment, as paths can split and cycles can appear. Instead we
consider properties of the component reachable from h0. The implications for all stable
mechanisms follow from the doctor-optimality and hospital-optimality of the matchings
that were used to construct the directed graph. A similar logic applies to most of the proofs
in the rest of the paper, under various adjustments to account for the different assumptions
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and desired conclusions.13
Proof of Theorem 23. Let µ = ψH(P) and µ′ = ψD(P′). The latter matching is well-defined
because q=q′h0 is responsive, by Lemma 22. Throughout this proof “agent i is better off”
means µ′(i) i µ(i), and similarly for “indifferent”, “weakly worse off”, and so on.
Assume in contradiction that there exists no S ⊆ D such that S 6= ∅, every doctor in S is
worse off, and every hospital in {h | µ′(h) ∩ S 6= ∅} is better off.
Construct a directed graph with vertices and edges defined as:
V = D ∪ H
E = {(d, h) | µ′(d) = h} ∪ {(h, d) | µ(d) = h}
Denote by W the set of vertices reachable from h0, including h0 itself (see for example
Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: An example of the graph used in Theorem 23
Claim 24.1. All doctors in D either have an outgoing edge or are indifferent.
13Theorem 23 is not a direct implication of Theorem 2.26 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) using an equivalent
marriage market (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, section 5.3.1). The equivalent marriage market approach
will only imply that some slots of some hospitals now hold doctors that the hospital prefers, but the hospital
may possibly also employ doctors that it prefers less in other slots. Similar arguments explain why the rest of
the theorems in this paper are not trivially implied by Theorem 2.26 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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Proof. Let d ∈ D be some doctor who is not indifferent. If d is worse off and has no outgoing
edge then S = {d} contradicts our assumption (with µ′(d) = ∅ being the set of hospitals
which are better off). Suppose d is better off. From individual rationality µ(d) d ∅,
meaning that µ′(d) 6= ∅ and d has an outgoing edge. 
Claim 24.2. All hospitals in H are weakly worse off.
Proof. Let h ∈ H be better off. If there exists d ∈ µ′(h) who is worse off, use S = {d} to get
a contradiction. On the other hand, if all doctors in µ′(h) are weakly better off we get a
contradiction to the stability of µ (blocked by hospital h and doctors µ′(h)). This argument
applies to h0 as well. 
Claim 24.3. For every hospital h ∈ H, if there is at least one doctor who is better off in µ′(h), then
|µ(h)| = qh, and all doctors in µ(h) are weakly better off.
Proof. Let d′ ∈ µ′(h) be a doctor who is better off. If |µ(h)| < qh then d′ and h form a
blocking pair for µ. Suppose d ∈ µ(h) is worse off. Then from the stability of µ it follows
that:
µ(h) h µ(h) ∪ {d′} \ {d},
and from the stability of µ′ that:
µ′(h) h µ′(h) ∪ {d} \ {d′},
which together contradict the responsiveness of h. This means that there is no doctor in
µ(h) who is worse off. 
Claim 24.4. All doctors inW ∩ D are weakly worse off.
Proof. Let Db = {d ∈ D | d is better off}. Let deg−b (h) denote the number of incoming edges
from doctors in Db to hospital h, and deg
+
b (h) denote the number of outgoing edges from
hospital h to doctors in Db.
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UnlessW ∩ Db = ∅ we can find d′ ∈ argmind∈W∩Db δ(h0, d), where δ(x, y) denotes the
distance between nodes x and y on the graph (V , E). We denote h′ = µ(d′) (which is not ∅
because d′ is reachable from h0).
We claim that:
deg−b (h
′) < deg+b (h
′). (3.1)
To see that note first that d′ ∈ µ(h′) and so deg+b (h′) ≥ 1. If deg−b (h′) = 0, then we
are done. Let ni = |µ(h′) ∩ µ′(h′)| denote the number of doctors who are indifferent in
µ(h′). If 1 ≤ deg−b (h′) + ni < qh′ then we can use Claim 24.3 to get Equation 3.1. If
deg−b (h
′) + ni = qh′ then it must be that h′ 6= h0 (because h0’s capacity was reduced below
qh0). In this case there must be d
′′ ∈ µ′(h′) ∩ Db such that δ(h0, d′′) < δ(h0, d′), contradicting
the way d′ was chosen.
Putting everything together we know that:14
∀h ∈ H : deg−b (h) ≤ deg+b (h) (Claim 24.3)
deg−b (h
′) < deg+b (h
′) (Equation 3.1)
∀d ∈ Db : deg−(d) ≤ deg+(d) (individual rationality)
We sum over all hospitals in H to get:
∑
h∈H
deg−b (h) < ∑
h∈H
deg+b (h) = ∑
d∈Db
deg−(d) ≤ ∑
d∈Db
deg+(d) ≤ ∑
h∈H
deg−b (h)
Which is a contradiction, proving thatW ∩ Db must be empty. 
Pick some d ∈ µ(h0) \ µ′(h0), and let h = µ′(d) (exists by Claim 24.1). We get that
hospital h (which is worse off by Claim 24.2) and the doctors in µ(h) (who are weakly worse
off by Claim 24.4) form a blocking coalition under µ′. This concludes the contradiction
argument, proving that the required S exists.
The conclusion of the theorem follows from the hospital-optimality and the doctor-
14For any i ∈ D ∪ H, deg−(i) denotes the indegree of i and deg+(i) denotes the outdegree of i.
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optimality of µ and µ′ respectively. We showed that every d ∈ S prefers µ(d) to µ′(d).
Since the hospital-optimal stable matching is the least preferred stable matching for doctors
(Knuth, 1976) we know that for any stable mechanism ψ, d weakly prefers ψ(P)(d) to µ(d)
and weakly prefers µ′(d) to ψ(P′)(d), so it must prefer ψ(P)(d) to ψ(P′)(d). A similar
argument (in the opposite direction) is true for the hospitals in
{
h | ψD(P)(h) ∈ S}.
To better understand some of the implications of Theorem 23 to manipulating capacities,
it is instructive to look at the next example, in which the relevant set of hospitals contains
the hospital h0 itself.
Example Let P ∈ PR be such that D = {d1, d2, d3, d4}, H = {h0, h1}, qh0 = 3, qh1 = 2, and
the (responsive) preferences are given by:
d1=h1, h0
d2=h0, h1
d3=h0, h1
d4=h0
h0={d1, d2, d4}, {d1, d3, d4}, {d1, d2, d3}, {d1, d4}, {d1, d2}, {d1, d3},
{d1}, {d2, d3, d4}, {d2, d4}, {d3, d4}, {d4}, {d2, d3}, {d2}, {d3}
h1={d2, d3}, {d1, d2}, {d2}, {d1, d3}, {d3}, {d1}
Define P′ =
(
D, H, (1, 2), {i}i∈D∪H\{h0} ∪ {q=1h0 }
)
. We have Ψ(P) = {µ} and Ψ(P′) =
{µ′}, where µ and µ′ are given by:
µ =
(
h0
d2 d3 d4
h1
d1
)
µ′ =
(
h0
d1
h1
d2 d3
)
Therefore h0 should not report its true capacity in this market, because it can always obtain
a better match by reporting a capacity of 1. Note that if h0 reports a capacity of 2 and
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P′′ =
(
D, H, (2, 2), {i}i∈D∪H\{h0} ∪ {q=2h0 }
)
, then we have Ψ(P′′) = {µ′′1 , µ′′2}, where:
µ′′1 =
(
h0
d1 d4
h1
d2 d3
)
µ′′2 =
(
h0
d2 d4
h1
d1 d3
)
This means that if, for example, the hospital is uncertain about which stable matching will
come about, it may want to avoid reporting a capacity of 2 in order not to lose d3 (e.g. in
case the doctor-optimal mechanism is being used). However, such hesitations should not
bother the hospital when considering reporting a capacity of just one position.
Example 3.3 can also serve as an alternative and a more direct proof for (a slight
modification of) Theorem 1 of Sönmez (1997). This theorem states that if there are at
least two hospitals and three doctors then there exists no matching rule that is stable and
non-manipulable via capacities. When using our example as the proof, the reason for non-
existence of any such mechanism becomes much clearer. Instead of relying on the interaction
between two hospitals’ incentives under the structure imposed by the stability constraint as
in the original proof, we only need to consider a rejection chain that is generated by just one
hospital and the benefits it gets from inducing this chain.
Corollary 25 (Modified version of Theorem 1 of Sönmez (1997)). Suppose there are at least
two hospitals and four doctors. Then there exists no stable mechanism that is non-manipulable via
capacities.
It is certainly not the case that a hospital always wants to report a lower capacity. For
example, in a market with just one hospital, reporting a lower capacity can only make the
hospital weakly worse off. In this market Theorem 23 holds with the relevant set of hospitals
being empty. Furthermore, it is possible that the set of hospitals mentioned in the theorem
is not empty, but does not contain h0, which means that the effect of its capacity reduction
on some other hospitals is predictable, but the welfare effect on itself does not have to
be. Another interesting observation is that in a setting in which doctors are in very high
demand (that is, under any stable matching every doctor is employed by some hospital), it
is straightforward that Theorem 23 holds with the relevant set of hospitals being non-empty.
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While the earlier study of many-to-one matching focused solely on the domain of
responsive preferences, in recent years the literature converged to studying a less restrictive
preferences domain that still preserves the lattice structure of stable matchings, namely
the domain of substitutable preferences. Most of the results on one-to-one matching were
extended to this domain, with the occasional restriction of requiring preferences to satisfy
the law of aggregate demand, a key property when attempting to prove extended versions
of the rural hospital theorem and similar results. We now show that the result described
above breaks down when the domain of preferences is extended to substitutable preferences
that satisfy the law of aggregate demand. The reason for the failure is that unlike in the
one-to-one case or the responsive preferences case, the matching of a hospital with a single
doctor does not contain all the information about the hospital’s welfare change. When
hospitals offer multiple positions, a doctor taking a previously vacant position could possibly
have a marginal positive direct effect on the hospital employing her, but at the same time
induce a different mix of the other doctors altogether, and the latter can have a much more
substantial effect on hospitals’ ranking of their outcomes.
Example Let P ∈ PSL be such that D = {d1, d2, d3}, H = {h0, h1, h2}, qh0 = 1, qh1 = 2,
qh2 = 1, and:
d1= h0, h1
d2= h2, h1
d3= h1, h2
h0= {d1}
h1= {d1, d2}, {d2}, {d2, d3}, {d1, d3}, {d1}, {d3}
h2= {d3}, {d2}
Hospitals’ preferences are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.15 Define
P′ =
(
D, H, (0, 2, 1), {i}i∈D∪H\{h0} ∪ {q=0h0 }
)
. One can verify that Ψ(P) = {µ1, µ2} and
15However, preferences are not q-separable (Martínez et al., 2000). See also Footnote 12.
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Ψ(P′) = {µ′1, µ′2}, where:
µ1 =
(
h0
d1
h1
d3
h2
d2
)
µ′1 =
(
h1
d1 d3
h2
d2
)
µ2 =
(
h0
d1
h1
d2
h2
d3
)
µ′2 =
(
h1
d1 d2
h2
d3
)
Thus if we define a stable mechanism ψ such that ψ(P) = µ2 and ψ(P′) = µ′1 we can
clearly see that an exact analog of Theorem 23 fails. This is because the only doctor who is
made worse off following h0’s capacity reduction is d1, and yet the hospital that employs d1
under ψD(P′), namely h1, also becomes worse off following the capacity reduction.
Inspecting Example 3.3, one may conjecture that weakening the conclusion of Theorem 23
could help in establishing a similar result even without responsiveness, and indeed this is
the case.
Theorem 26. Assume P ∈ PSL. Let h0 ∈ H, 0 ≤ q′ < mh0(P), and set
P′ =
(
D, H, {i}i∈D∪H\{h0} ∪ {q=q
′
h0
}
)
.
If P′ ∈ PSL,16 then there exists a non-empty subset of doctors S ⊆ D, such that under any stable
mechanism ψ, every doctor in S is worse off and every hospital in
{
h | ∅ 6= ψD(P′)(h) \ ψH(P)(h) ⊆ S
}
is better off under ψ(P′) compared to ψ(P).
Theorem 26 modifies the conclusion by relating a more restricted set of hospitals to the
set of doctors who are made worse off following the capacity reduction. That is, the set
of hospitals is now those hospitals that, except for doctors who were employed by them
under the hospital-optimal stable matching prior to the reduction, employ only doctors
from S under the doctor-optimal stable matching following the reduction. For any subset of
doctors who are not indifferent between ψD(P′) and ψH(P), this relation induces a subset
16This condition is required since it is not immediate (Lemma 22) and the proof uses the doctor-optimal
stable matching following the manipulation, a construct that may not exist if q=q′h0 is not substitutable.
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of hospitals that is weakly included in the subset mentioned in Theorem 23. That is to say:
∀S′ ⊆
{
d | ψD(P′)(d) 6= ψH(P)(d)
}
:{
h | ∅ 6= ψD(P′)(h) \ ψH(P)(h) ⊆ S′
}
⊆
{
h | ψD(P′)(h) ∩ S′ 6= ∅
}
Moreover, as Example 3.3 shows, in some cases the inclusion is strict. The restriction is
necessary because when preferences are substitutable but not responsive, comparisons
across individual doctors employed by a hospital become impossible, and one has to resort
to comparisons between sets of doctors. When restricted to one-to-one environments the two
definitions coincide and both Theorem 23 and Theorem 26 reduce to a statement equivalent
to Theorem 2.26 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
3.4 Entry in many-to-one markets
We now turn to applying our results on capacity reduction to the study of entry in many-to-
one markets. As was already briefly mentioned in the intuition for the proof of Theorem 23,
a hospital’s entry is the mirror image of a hospital’s leaving the market, which is equivalent
to reducing the hospital’s capacity to zero. This relation provides us immediately some
predictions that hold regardless of the stable mechanism used.
For any P ∈ P and any d ∈ D we denote the market without d by:
P−d =
(
D \ {d}, H, {qh}h∈H, {i}i∈D\{d} ∪ {h|2D\{d}}h∈H
)
,
where h|2D\{d} ≡ {(S1, S2) ∈h| S1, S2 ⊆ D \ {d}}. We similarly define P−h for any h ∈ H.
Corollary 27. Assume P ∈ PR. If h0 ∈ H and mh0(P) > 0 then there exists a non-empty subset
of doctors S ⊆ D, such that under any stable mechanism ψ, every doctor in S is better off and every
hospital in
{
h | ψD(P−h0)(h) ∩ S 6= ∅
}
is worse off under ψ(P) compared to ψ(P−h0).
Corollary 28. Assume P ∈ PSL. If h0 ∈ H and mh0(P) > 0 then there exists a non-empty subset
of doctors S ⊆ D, such that under any stable mechanism ψ, every doctor in S is better off and every
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hospital in {
h | ∅ 6= ψD(P−h0)(h) \ ψH(P)(h) ⊆ S
}
is worse off under ψ(P) compared to ψ(P−h0).
Unlike the case of a hospital’s entry, we now establish that Theorem 2.26 of Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) cannot be directly applied to many-to-one markets when a doctor enters
the market. Recall that this theorem states that if a doctor enters the market and gets
matched then there exists a non-empty set of hospitals such that every hospital in this set
becomes better off following the entry under any stable mechanism. Furthermore, every
doctor who was previously employed by some hospital in the mentioned set of hospitals
becomes worse off following the entry. Example 3.4 describes a situation in which the one
doctor that was previously in the market does not become worse off following another
doctor’s entry.
Example Let P ∈ PR be such that D = {d0, d1}, H = {h1}, qh1 = 2, and the preferences are
given by:
d0= h1
d1= h1
h1= {d0, d1}, {d1}, {d0}
Note that Ψ(P−d0) = {µ} and Ψ(P) = {µ′}, where µ and µ′ are given by:
µ =
(
h1
d1
)
µ′ =
(
h1
d0 d1
)
Therefore, this example simply points to the fact that a doctor could get a vacant place
without having any impact on the welfare of other doctors in the system.
While the original result cannot be fully recuperated in the many-to-one case, a partial
formulation that predicts only that some hospitals will be made better off following the
entry of a doctor is possible under the assumption of responsive preferences. Furthermore,
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if we assume all hospitals were at full capacity prior to the entry, we also get predictions on
welfare effects on the entrant’s side.17
Theorem 29. Assume P ∈ PR. If doctor d0 ∈ D is such that md0(P) = 1 then there exists a
non-empty subset of hospitals S ⊆ H, such that under any stable mechanism ψ, every hospital in S
is better off under ψ(P) compared to ψ(P−d0).
Theorem 30. Assume P ∈ PR. If doctor d0 ∈ D is such that md0(P) = 1 and ∀h ∈ H :
mh(P−d0) = qh, then there exists a non-empty subset of hospitals S ⊆ H, and a non-empty subset of
doctors T ⊆ {d | ψH(P−d0)(d) ∈ S}, such that under any stable mechanism ψ, every hospital in S
is better off and every doctor in T is worse off under ψ(P) compared to ψ(P−d0).
We conclude this section by showing that Theorem 29 and Theorem 30 fail to hold when
preferences are allowed to be non-responsive, even when they are substitutable and satisfy
the law of aggregate demand.
Example Let P ∈ PSL be such that D = {d0, d1, d2, d3}, H = {h1, h2}, qh1 = 2, qh2 = 1, and
the preferences are given by:
d0=h1
d1=h1, h2
d2=h2, h1
d3=h1
h1={d0, d2}, {d2, d3}, {d0, d1}, {d0, d3}, {d1, d3}, {d1, d2},
{d0}, {d1}, {d2}, {d3}
h2={d1}, {d2}
It is easy to verify that both h1 and h2 are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggre-
gate demand.18 The stable matchings before and after d0 enters the market are given by
17I thank the associate editor for suggesting this extension.
18In fact, h1 is also 2-separable and h2 is 1-separable (Martínez et al., 2000).
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Ψ(P−d0) = {µ1, µ2} and Ψ(P) = {µ′1, µ′2}, where the different matchings are:
µ1 =
(
h1
d1 d3
h2
d2
)
µ′1 =
(
h1
d0 d1
h2
d2
)
µ2 =
(
h1
d2 d3
h2
d1
)
µ′2 =
(
h1
d0 d2
h2
d1
)
Define a stable mechanism ψ such that ψ(P−d0) = µ2 and ψ(P) = µ
′
1, and then both hospitals
are worse off following d0’s entry.
3.5 Truncations and dropping strategies
Having dealt with the effects of capacity reduction and its potential to allow successful
manipulation regardless of the stable mechanism, we now wish to study similar effects when
a hospital reports a preference relation that is different than its true preference relation. For
any hospital h ∈ H with a preference relation h, we say that h plays a dropping strategy
dr(E)h for some E ⊆ D if:
1. For all D′ ⊆ D: D′ dr(E)h ∅ ⇐⇒ D′ h ∅ and D′ ∩ E = ∅.
2. For all D′, D′′ ⊆ D: If D′ dr(E)h ∅ and D′′ dr(E)h ∅, then D′ dr(E)h D′′ ⇐⇒ D′ h
D′′.
In other words, a hospital playing a dropping strategy submits its true preference over some
subset of its acceptable doctors. Note that this definition coincides with the definition of
Kojima and Pathak (2009) for the domain of responsive preferences. We say that h plays
a truncation strategy tr(d)h (or simply that tr(d)h is a truncation of h) if tr(d)h is derived
from h by “truncating” all doctors below and including d ∈ D. Formally, we require:
1. For all D′ ⊆ D: D′ tr(d)h ∅ ⇐⇒ D′ h ∅ and ∀d′ ∈ D′: {d′} h {d}.
2. For all D′, D′′ ⊆ D: If D′ tr(d)h ∅ and D′′ tr(d)h ∅, then D′ tr(d)h D′′ ⇐⇒ D′ h D′′.
That is, tr(d)h is the same as h, except it does not accept any subset of doctors containing
any doctor who is weakly less preferred to d. It is easy to see that a truncation strategy is
also a dropping strategy.
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Observation 31. Let h be hospital h’s preference relation. If h is responsive, then for any d ∈ D,
tr(d)h is also responsive.
Our next theorem states that if hospital h0 reports a truncated preference such that some
doctor who was previously assigned to h0 under the hospital-optimal stable matching is
now unacceptable according to the truncated preference, then a similar conclusion to the
one that appears in Theorem 23 holds.19
Theorem 32. Assume P ∈ PR.20 Let h0 ∈ H, d¯ ∈ D, and d∗ ∈ ψH(P)(h0) be such that{
d¯
} h0 {d∗}, and P′ = (D, H, {i}i∈D∪H\{h0} ∪ {tr(d¯)h0 }
)
. Then there exists a non-empty
subset of doctors S ⊆ D, such that under any stable mechanism ψ, every doctor in S is worse off and
every hospital in
{
h | ψD(P′)(h) ∩ S 6= ∅} is better off under ψ(P′) compared to ψ(P).
The intuition here resembles the one for Theorem 23, as a hospital that uses a truncation
strategy practically does something which is very much like reducing its capacity. Rejecting
the less attractive doctors mimics what would have happened, for example, in a deferred
acceptance algorithm (with either doctors or hospitals proposing), and again causes rejection
chains that may lead to more preferred doctors being available for the hospital to hire.
Theorem 32 uses truncations, which play an important role in preferences manipulation
in one-to-one markets. Specifically, in these markets a player trying to act strategically to
manipulate the results of the stable mechanism can restrict herself to the class of truncation
strategies. However, in many-to-one matching truncations do not exhaust the space of
strategies that may lead to better outcomes. Kojima and Pathak (2009, Lemma 1) show that
using dropping strategies a hospital can mimic all the manipulations that are possible by
reporting a reduced capacity and some preference relation over individual doctors. It turns
19Note that for the case of doctors truncating their preferences, truncating above the doctor-optimal stable
match always results in remaining single, and so it is equivalent to leaving the market. Truncating below the
doctor-optimal stable match does not give rise to any consistent welfare predictions (i.e., independently of the
mechanism).
20Theorem 32 does not hold under the weaker assumption of q-separable and substitutable preferences. See
Example 3.5.
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out there is no immediate counterpart for Theorem 32 that holds for dropping strategies. To
see that, consider the following counterexample:
Example Let P ∈ PR be such that D = {d1, d2}, H = {h0, h1}, qh0 = qh1 = 1, and the
preferences are given by:
d1= h0, h1
d2= h0, h1
h0= {d1}, {d2}
h1= {d2}, {d1}
Suppose that for some reason h0 considers playing the dropping strategy:
′h0= {d2}
Define P′ =
(
D, H, {qh}h∈H, {d1 ,d2 ,′h0 ,h1}
)
. It is easy to verify that Ψ(P) = {µ} and
Ψ(P′) = {µ′}, where:
µ =
(
h0
d1
h1
d2
)
µ′ =
(
h0
d2
h1
d1
)
This implies that the non-empty set of doctors in the theorem must be S = {d1}. However,
this means that the relevant set of hospitals contains only h1, which is worse off following
the manipulation. Thus, the theorem must be revised in some way if it is to be applied to
dropping strategies. Note that despite the fact that in this particular example playing the
dropping strategy hurts h0, in all other results in this paper the hospital that reduced its
capacity or reports different preferences can be worse off, better off or indifferent.
Another reasonable question is whether it is possible to extend the theorem to the case
of substitutable preferences that satisfy the law of aggregate demand in a manner similar to
Theorem 26. The answer is again negative, as the following example demonstrates.
Example Let P ∈ PSL be such that D = {d1, d2, d3, d4}, H = {h0, h1}, qh0 = qh1 = 2, and the
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preferences are given by:
d1=h1, h0
d2=h1, h0
d3=h0, h1
d4=h0, h1
h0={d1, d2}, {d1, d3}, {d1, d4}, {d2, d3}, {d2, d4},
{d3, d4}, {d3}, {d4}, {d1}, {d2}
h1={d3, d4}, {d1, d3}, {d2, d3}, {d1, d4}, {d2, d4},
{d1, d2}, {d3}, {d4}, {d1}, {d2}
These preferences are not only substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand, they
are also q-separable. However, it is important to note that h0 is not responsive. Consider
the truncation tr(d1)h0 , which is responsive and is therefore substitutable and satisfies the law
of aggregate demand. Let P′ =
(
D, H, {qh}h∈H, {i}i∈D∪H\{h0} ∪ {tr(d1)h0 }
)
be the problem
in which h0 truncates, and note that Ψ(P) = {µ1, µ2} and Ψ(P′) = {µ′}, where:
µ1 =
(
h0
d1 d2
h1
d3 d4
)
µ′ =
(
h0
d3 d4
h1
d1 d2
)
µ2 =
(
h0
d3 d4
h1
d1 d2
)
This means that there exists a stable mechanism ψ such that ψ(P) = µ1 and ψ(P′) = µ′, and
all doctors are better off following the manipulation.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper explored welfare consequences of capacity reductions, entries and truncations
in many-to-one matching markets governed by stable mechanisms. We showed that there
are situations in which even if participants have imperfect information about the matching
process, they may profitably manipulate by reducing capacity. It should be emphasized
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that one key argument for reducing capacity is gaining the ability to propose positions to
doctors while bypassing the centralized mechanism (e.g. market unraveling or off-shore
hiring). This paper does not incorporate the advantage gained by freeing up additional
positions. It does show that doing so may create a second-order effect that also works to
the hospital’s benefit, and therefore encourages rather than inhibits the process of market
unraveling.
We assumed throughout that hospitals have strict preferences over acceptable doctors
and vice-versa. While this assumption could be defended in some markets, it is quite
problematic when discussing school choice, where students are frequently assigned the
same priority by the schools and the indifferences are motivated by moral considerations
and not by lack of sufficient information. The fact that mechanisms can break ties in different
ways implies that the structure of stable matchings is a bit different, and this prevents us
from applying the same techniques. Note however that in this case even comparisons that
take the mechanism to be a fixed one usually hold only under a specific tie-breaking rule,
so it is possible that we should be less ambitious when trying to come up with predictions
that hold across all stable mechanisms as well.
Finally, throughout our analysis we used the language of the college admissions model
(applied to hospitals and doctors). However, the market design literature has recently
witnessed the emergence of several generalized matching models.21 One may wonder to
which extent our results continue to hold in these more sophisticated environments. First,
all the results hold for the many-to-one generalized matching with contracts framework of
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).22 This implies that the results we described are also true for
matching with salaries and with other properties that may be embedded in the contracts.23
Furthermore, while it is probably true that similar results will continue to hold in other
21Some of those can be found in Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Echenique and Oviedo (2006), Hatfield et al.
(2013) and Ostrovsky (2008).
22For details please contact the author.
23For a comparison of the generality of matching with contracts and matching with just salaries, see
Echenique (forthcoming).
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matching frameworks as long as we assume everybody has responsive preferences, it is also
quite easy to see that in many-to-many matching environment with substitutable preferences
one will run into problems trying to generalize our results, by extending Example 3.4 (in
which a doctor enters the market). However, it is my belief that similar predictions are still
possible in supply networks that have a pyramid structure, i.e., in which each firm can sell
to multiple clients, but can have only one supplier.24
24In this suggested framework, a manipulation by one of the first-layer suppliers has predictable outcomes
on a set of firms (intermediate or final users) and a related set of firms, which are the immediate suppliers of
the first set.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For simplicity, the proof uses results that were proven for the uniform noise distribu-
tion G = U[0, 1]. However, all claims hold for more general distributions. A complete proof
for general distributions (albeit one that provides slightly less tight bounds and only deals
with balanced markets) can be found in the working paper version of the present work
(Hassidim and Romm, 2014).
The general structure of the proof is as follows.
1. Given an arbitrary vector of workers’ human capital, show that whp (relevant to the
distribution of
{
εnij
}
) there are only finitely many workers above a certain human
capital level who are unemployed, and similarly finitely many workers below a
different human capital level who are employed (Lemma 33).
2. Based on the previous step, show that a version of the result of Frieze and Sorkin
(2007) holds, but with some restrictions on its applicability to workers (Lemma 34).
3. Show that in fact whp all workers above a certain human capital level are employed,
and all workers below a certain human capital level are not employed (Lemma 35).
4. Improve the applicability of Lemma 34 to workers (Lemma 36).
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5. Put everything together with the intuition presented in the main text to complete the
proof.
For a given a vector of human capital levels hn (of length n + k(n)), let us denote by
hn[m] the m-th highest value.
Lemma 33. For any e > 0 there exist M ∈N such that
1. whp there are at most M workers with a human capital level greater than hn[n] + e who are
unemployed under the optimal assignment for Mn;
2. whp there at most M workers with a human capital level less than hn[n]− e who are employed
under the optimal assignment for Mn.
Proof. Denote by Vnopt the value resulting from the optimal assignment in Mn, and by Vnbound
the value resulting from optimally assigning the top n workers (in terms of human capital
level) to the n available firms. From Aldous (2001) we know that
lim
n→∞ E[V
n
bound] =
n
∑
i=1
qni +
n
∑
j=1
hn[j] +
(
n− pi
2
6
)
. (A.1)
Taking qn and hn as given, we know from Wästlund (2005) that
Var[Vnbound] =
4ξ(2)− 4ξ(3)
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
≈ 1.7715
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
. (A.2)
By approximating the limit in (A.1), bounding the variance in (A.2), and using Markov
inequality:
Pr
(
Vnbound ≤
n
∑
i=1
qni +
n
∑
j=1
hn[j] + (n− 2)
)
≤ 13.6
n
.
This also implies that whp
Vnopt ≥
n
∑
i=1
qni +
n
∑
j=1
hn[j] + (n− 2).
Now assume that there are M workers with a human capital level greater than or equal to
hn[n] + e who do not participate in the optimal assignment (or alternatively that there are
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M workers with a human capital level less than or equal to hn[n]− e who do participate in
the optimal assignment). It must be that
Vnopt ≤
n
∑
i=1
qni +
n
∑
j=1
hn[j]−Me+ n,
and therefore
M ≤
⌈
2
e
⌉
.

Now, given some arbitrary matchings {µn}, construct digraphs Gn = (Vn,~En), with
Vn = Fn ∪Wn and
~En =
{
(wnj , f
n
i ) | µn( f ni ) = wnj
}
∪
{
( f ni , w
n
j ) | wnj ∈ Nnhn[n]+e,40+M( f ni )
}
∪
{
( f ni , w
n
j ) | f ni ∈ Nnhn[n]+e,40+M(wnj )
}
,
where Nnx,k( f
n
i ) represent the top k workers in terms of idiosyncratic fit to f
n
i ) (i.e., ε
n
ij) out of
those workers who have a human capital level above x, and similarly for Nnx,k(w
n
j ). We call
the edges from Fn to Wn “forward edges” and the edges from Wn to Fn “backward edges.”
The weight on each forward edge ( f ni , w
n
j ) is ε
n
ij (and not α
n
ij).
Lemma 34. If h 6= h,1 there exists c ∈ R+ such that whp there is an alternating path between every
two firms with the sum of weights on the forward edges being less than or equal to c log nn . Similarly,
there is an alternating path from any matched worker to any worker with a human capital level above
hn[n] + e with the sum of weights on the forward edges being less than or equal to c log nn .
Proof. First, let us choose e > 0 such that whp the number of workers with a human capital
level above hn[n] + e is no less than 0.99n. To see that this is possible, let us denote by νn
1This lemma also holds (with the proper adjustments) for the case where all workers have the same human
capital level, but we omit the proof here since it can easily be recovered using the arguments presented in the
more complicated case.
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the fraction of workers who are unassigned in Mn, i.e., νn := k(n)n+k(n) , and let η
n = H−1(νn).
Let e > 0 be such that sup(x,y)⊆(h,h),(y−x)<e H(y)− H(y) < 0.0049 (this is possible since we
required the density to be continuous on
[
h, h
]
, and it is therefore bounded). By Hoeffding’s
inequality whp hn[n] ∈ (ηn − e, ηn + e). Then, using Hoeffding’s inequality again, we know
that whp 0.99n of the workers have a human capital level above ηn + 2e ≥ hn[n] + e.
Note that whp there exists c1 such that there is a directed path of length less than c1 log n
between any two firms, using the same argument as Frieze and Sorkin (2007, Lemma 5). It is
true that in our case some of the workers do not have related backward edges (since they are
unmatched), but out of those workers who are connected to forward edges (with a human
capital level above h− e) at most M do not have backward edges. Therefore, by pointing
to M + 40 workers we keep the expansion rate of at least 40. We also note that some of
the constants have to be changed to account for the fact that only a constant fraction of the
workers are connected by forward edges, and that the number of workers is not necessarily
n but could rather be greater than that as long as it is O(n). We remark that e must have
been chosen such that a large majority of the firms will be matched to workers with human
capital levels above hn[n] + e; otherwise there would not necessarily be an overlap between
the two “funnels” constructed in the proof.
We then use Lemma 7 of Frieze and Sorkin (2007) which works as is, except that the
number 40 is replaced by 40+ M whenever it appears in the proof there. This completes
the argument for the firms.
As for the workers, the same argument works, but we note that in order for a directed
path to start from some worker, that worker must be matched, and in order for it to finish
with some worker, that worker must have a human capital level above hn[n] + e. 
Lemma 35. If h 6= h, then there exist c1 ∈ R+ such that
1. whp all workers with a human capital level greater than hn[n] + c1 log nn are assigned under the
optimal assignment for Mn;
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2. whp no workers with a human capital level less than hn[n]− c1 log nn are assigned under the
optimal assignment for Mn.
Proof. Let c1 ∈ R+ be equal to (c + 2), where c is the constant recovered in the proof of
Lemma 34. Assume on the contrary that there exists an unmatched worker wn1 with human
capital level hn1 > h
n[n] + c1 log nn . Let w
n
2 be the worker with the lowest level of human capital
in Mn that is matched. We want to argue that there exists a matching in which the set
of matched workers is µn(Fn) ∪ {wn1} \ {wn2} and that this matching gives a larger value.
Replace the matching µn with the one in which µn(wn2 ) is matched with w
n
1 . Note that
this matching gives a value greater by (hn1 − hn2) ≥ (c+2) log nn in human capital, but might
provide us with less than optimal noise compatibility between µn(wn2 ) and w
n
1 . Applying
Lemma 34 to our new matching, find a directed path between wn1 (which is now matched)
and some worker who is also matched and who “likes” µn(wn2 ) (in the sense of having
joint productivity greater than 1− log nn ). Apply the directed path, in the sense that now
each worker is going to be matched to the firm connected to her by a forward edge, and
the last worker is connected to µn(wn2 ). The value of the resulting matching is at least
val(µn) + (c+2) log nn − (c+1) log nn > val(µn) + log nn , a contradiction.
The exact same reasoning applies when a matched worker has a human capital level
below hn[n]− c1 log nn , and is replaced by the best unmatched worker. 
Lemma 36. If h 6= h, there exist c, c1 ∈ R+ such that whp there is an alternating path from any
matched worker to any worker with a human capital level above hn[n] + c1 log nn with the sum of
weights on the forward edges being less than or equal to c log nn .
Proof. Use the same logic of Lemma 34 but replace e with c1 log nn , which will work by virtue
of Lemma 35. 
To complete the proof, let us first consider the firms. By Lemma 34 whp for every
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , |Fn|} there exists an alternating path on Gn (induced by µn, the optimal
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assignment for Mn). Suppose one such path is ( f ni , w
n
1 , f
n
1 , w
n
2 , f
n
2 , . . . , w
n
k , f
n
j ). Since µ
n is a
core allocation, it must be that uni + v
n
1 ≥ αni1, and therefore
uni ≥ αni1 − vn1 ≥ qni + hn1 + (1− εni1)− (αn11 − un1) ≥ un1 + (qni − qn1)− εni1.
Similarly we get
uni ≥ un1 + (qni − qn1)− εni1,
un1 ≥ un2 + (qn1 − qn2)− εn12,
. . .
unk ≥ unj +
(
qnk − qnj
)
− εnkj.
Stacking all of those together we have
uni ≥ unj +
(
qni − qnj
)
−∑ εnxy,
where the last sum goes over all the firms that alternate on the path, and therefore
uni ≥ unj +
(
qni − qnj
)
− c log n
n
.
Reordering terms we get
unj − uni ≤
(
qnj − qni
)
+
c log n
n
,
which is exactly what we wanted.
As for the workers, we need to be slightly more careful. The same line of reasoning tells
us that whp for any matched worker wni and any worker w
n
j with a human capital level
above hn[n] + c1 log nn (as in Lemma 36) we have
vni − vnj ≤
(
hni − hnj
)
+
c log n
n
.
However, we also want to account for matched workers with a human capital level in the
interval
(
hn[n]− c1 log nn , hn[n] + c1 log nn
)
. Let wni be some matched worker and let w
n
j be a
matched worker in that interval. Since whp there are Θ(n) workers with human capital
levels above hn[n] + e (for any constant e), then whp one of them, say wnk , is a good match
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for µn(wnj ) in the sense that their joint idiosyncratic noise is above 1− c2 log nn for some
constant c2. Consider now a path that goes from wni to w
n
k (whp such a path exists) and then
continues to µn(wnj ) and to w
n
j , and perform the same calculation as before.
A.2 Other proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 37. Let Z = ∑nk=1 Xk where each Xk is a geometric variable with stopping probability
pk = ckn3 . Then whp Z >
1
16c n
3 log n.
Proof. Let n′ be the largest number smaller than n such that
√
n is an integer, i.e., n′ =(d√ne)2. Z dominates Z′ = ∑√n′k=1 ∑√n′l=1 X′kl , where each X′kl is a geometric variable with
stopping probability pkl = ck
√
n′
n3 . Note that X
′
kl >
1
2pkl
with probability 1− (1− pkl)
1
2pkl ≈
1− e− 12 > 0.39, and so using Hoeffding’s inequality
Pr
(√
n′
∑
l=1
X′kl >
1
4
√
n′ · 1
2pkl
)
> 1− e−2(0.39−0.25)2
√
n′ > 1− e−0.03
√
n′ .
Therefore
Pr
(
Z′ >
√
n′
∑
k=1
√
n′
8pkl
)
≥
(
1− e−0.03
√
n′
)
> 1− n′e−0.03
√
n′ .
So with high probability
Z >
√
n′
∑
k=1
√
n′
8pkl
=
1
8c
n3
√
n′
∑
k=1
1
k
≈ 1
8c
n3 log
√
n =
1
16c
n3 log n

Proof. For the sake of simplicity let us focus on the case of G = U[0, 1]. Let us take the
variant of the approximation algorithm suggested by Crawford and Knoer (1981) to solve a
generalized version of the assignment game, in which firms are ordered from f n1 to f
n
n , and
at each round only the lowest-number firm that still wants to propose actually proposes.
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Take the step size to be e = 1n3 . We want to bound the minimal number of steps through the
entire algorithm.
We note that when it is firm f ni ’s to propose, and its previous aspiration level (i.e., the
maximal utility it would get by giving some worker her current salary was ui, and if for all
unmatched workers wnj ∈Wn we have εnij /∈ [ui − e, ui), then some worker’s salary increases
by e. The conditional probability of εnij not being in [ui − e, ui) is 1− eui . We know that in the
firm-optimal core allocation at least one worker gets a salary of zero, and from Theorem 1
we learn that all workers get no more than c log nn . Combining this with the results of Frieze
and Sorkin (2007) gives us that whp ui ≥ 1− c log nn for some constant c ∈ R+. Therefore the
conditional probability mentioned before is at least 1− e
1− c log nn
> 1− 1.01e.2 This implies
that when there are n− k + 1 (k > 1) still unemployed workers, the probability of raising
the salary of one of the employed workers by e is at least
(1− 1.01e)n−k+1 > 1− 1.01(n− k + 1)e,
and the probability of employing a still unemployed worker is at most 1.01(n− k + 1)e =
1.01(n−k+1)
n3 . By Lemma 37, whp there are going to be at least
1
16.16 n
3 log n steps, and
multiplying by e we get that whp the sum of workers’ salaries is at least 116.16 log n. This
implies also that whp at least one of the workers has a salary that is at least 116.06 · log nn . As
mentioned before, in each realization one of the workers has a salary of zero. Together this
means that whp there are two workers such that the difference between their salaries is
1
16.06 · log nn , and we are done.
A.2.2 Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. As mentioned in the intuition for the proof, there must be at least one worker
whose salary is exactly zero. If h 6= h, let c1 ∈ R+ be such that for large enough n,
H
(
h + c1 log nn
)
> log nn (such c1 exists since H has positive and continuous density at h). It
2We assume that G = U[0, 1]. When G 6= U[0, 1] we have to approximate the density near the upper bound,
and rely on Theorem 1 to approximate the conditional probability of choosing a still unmatched worker.
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follows that the probability of having at least one worker with a human capital level below
c1 log n
n is at least
1−
(
1− log n
n
)n
≈ 1− e− log = 1− 1
n
.
Let c2 be the constant we arrived at in the proof of Theorem 1, if the worker who gets zero
salary has a human capital level above (c1+c2) log nn ; then Theorem 1 implies that any worker
with a human capital level lower than c1 log nn gets a negative salary. Therefore, with high
probability the worker getting a zero salary must have human capital level below (c1+c2) log nn .
It follows from Theorem 1 that whp for every worker wnj
vn,Fj ∈
(
hnj −
(c1 + 2c2) log n
n
, hnj +
c2 log n
n
)
.
By taking c = c1 + 2c2 we reach the desired conclusion.
A.2.3 Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. We prove this corollary separately for the case of workers who have the same human
capital level and for the case of workers with different human capital levels. In the first
case (hn ≡ 0) we recall that the same line of proof used in Lemma 34 could have shown us
that in this case the approximate law of one price holds for any two workers (and not just
two matched workers). The proof follows immediately from Theorem 1 by comparing any
matched worker to one of the unmatched workers (whose salary is 0).
In the second case (h 6= h), note that there exists c1 ∈ R+ such that whp all work-
ers with a human capital level below hn[n] − c1 log nn are unmatched (Lemma 35). Let
c2 ∈ R+ be such that whp there exists a worker wnj with a human capital level hnj ∈(
hn[n]− c1 log nn , hn[n]− (c1+c2) log nn
)
. Note that there exists c3 ∈ R+ such that whp this
worker has a good match with one of the matched firms; i.e., there exists f ni such that
εnij > 1− c3 log nn . It follows that the worker wnk employed by that firm gets no more than(
hnk − hnj
)
+ c3 log nn ≤
(
hnk − hn[n]
)
+ (c1+c2+c3) log nn . Now set c = c1 + c2 + c3 + c4, where c4
is the constant provided by Theorem 1, and we get the desired result using Theorem 1
(comparing matched workers to wnk ).
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A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Lemma 38.
E
 ∑
f ni =µ
n
(
wnj
) αnij
 ≤ n(log n + 1)
Proof. We want to show that for every worker the expected value of the maximal element in
the relevant column of the productivity matrix αn equals log n. To see that, note first that the
minimal element is distributed according to an exponential distribution with parameter n
(think of the first arrival of one of n identical arrivals). Due to the memorylessness property
of exponential random variables, the difference between the first minimal element and the
second minimal element is distributed like an exponential distribution with parameter n− 1,
and so on. This implies that the expected value of the largest element is
1
n
+
1
n− 1 +
1
n− 2 + · · ·+
1
2
+ 1 ≤ log n + 1.

Lemma 39.
E
 ∑
f ni =µ
n
(
wnj
) αnij
 ≥ 0.99n log n
Proof. Let µ be a matching that results from running a greedy algorithm: firm 1 picks the
worker it likes best, then firm 2 picks a worker from those remaining, and so on. The
expected value of µ is
E
 ∑
f ni =µ
(
wnj
) αnij
 =E [max {X1,1, . . . , X1,n}] + E [max {X2,1, . . . , X2,n−1}] +
· · ·+ E [Xn,1] ,
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where
{
Xi,j
}
are i.i.d. Exp(1). Therefore
E
 ∑
f ni =µ
(
wnj
) αnij
 = n−1∑
i=0
[log(n− i) + 1] ≈ n log n.
The result then follows from the optimality of µn. 
Proof. The first claim follows from Lemma 38 and Lemma 39. For the second claim, let pn
denote the probability that for a given firm f ni ∈ Fn there exists a worker wnj ∈Wn such that
αnij > 1.1 log n and maxk 6=j α
n
ik < log n. Then
pn = n · e−1.1 log n ·
(
1− e− log n
)n−1
=
1
n0.1
·
(
1− 1
n
)n−1
≈ 1
en0.1
.
This specifically implies that for any e > 0 whp there are Ω
(
n0.9−e
)
firms that meet the
above condition. If the same worker is the outlier in any two of these firms, then this worker
must get paid at least 0.1 log n under any core allocation. Since there are Ω
(
n1.8−2e
)
pairs,
we get that there are many workers who get paid Θ (log n). Finally, at least one worker’s
salary is 0 under the firm-optimal core allocation, and so we are done.
A.2.5 Proof of Theorem 10
Lemma 40. In an arbitrary balanced market with productivity matrix αn, let (µn, un,F, vn,F) be a
the firm-optimal core allocation. If f ni = µ
n
(
wnj
)
then
vn,Fj ≤
(
αnij − min
f nk =µ
n(wnl )
αnkl
)
.
Proof. Let α := min f nk =µn(wnl ). Consider a core allocation (µ
′, u′, v′) for a modified produc-
tivity matrix α′ = αn − α. It is trivial that µ′ = µn. Since this is a core allocation it must be
that ∀i : u′i ≥ 0, which means that ∀ f ni = µ(wnj ) : v′j ≤ α′ij = αij − α. Define ui = u′i + α and
v = v′, and note that (µ, u, v) is a core allocation for α since all the constraints defining the
core are preserved when we restore the constant. The result follows immediately from the
worker-pessimality of the firm-optimal core allocation. 
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Lemma 41. If Conjecture 9 holds, then there exists c ∈ R+ such that whp
min
f ni =µ
n(wnj )
αnij ≥ log n− log log n− log c.
Proof. Let the constant used in Conjecture 9 be c1, and let c = c1 + 3. The probability
that the c1 log n highest element out of n exponential random variables will be lower than
log n− log log n− log c equals
P =
n
∑
m=n−c1 log n+1
(
n
m
)(
1− e− log n+log(c log n)
)m (
e− log n+log(c log n)
)n−m
≤c1 log n ·
(
n
c1 log n− 1
)(
1− c log n
n
)n−c1 log n+1 ( c log n
n
)c1 log n−1
≤c1 log n
(
en
c1 log n− 1
)c1 log n−1 (
1− c log n
n
)n ( c log n
n
)c1 log n−1
≤c1 log n
( e
c
)c1 log n−1
e−c log n = c1 log n
( e
c
)c1 log n−1 1
nc
≤ c1(c1 + 3)
e
log n
n3
≤ 1
n2
,
where the transition in the fourth line is by Stirling’s approximation, and the one in the
fifth line uses c = c1 + 3. Therefore the probability that after taking the c1 log n highest
element out of n exponential random variables n times the minimal value is lower than
log n− log log n− log c is bounded above by
1−
(
1− 1
n2
)n
≈ 1−
(
1− 1
n
+O
(
1
n2
))
=
1
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
.
Conjecture 9 ensures that whp µn does not assign any firm to a worker who is ranked below
c1 log n, and therefore whp the claim holds. 
Proof of Theorem 10. Given Lemma 38, Lemma 40, and Lemma 41, we know that
E
[
∑
j
vn,Fj
]
≤ n(log n + 1)−
(
1− c1
n
)
· n · (log n− c log log n) ,
where c1 is such that the statement in Lemma 41 holds with probability greater than 1− c1n .
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This implies that
E
[
∑
j
vn,Fj
]
≤ cn log log n + n + c1 log n− cc1 log log nn .
Finally, use Lemma 39 to complete the proof.
A.3 Analysis of the Cobb–Douglas benchmark model
This appendix demonstrates how one can get results similar to Theorem 1 in the presence
of interaction between firms’ quality and workers’ human capital level.
A.3.1 Sketch of proof of Lemma 5
Given any n, d, m ∈N, let
Sym (n, d, m) := {σ ∈ Sym(n) | |{i | σ(i)− i ≥ d}| ≥ m} ,
where Sym(n) is the symmetric group of size n. That is, Sym(n, d, m) is the set of all
permutations σ of the set {1, . . . , n} such that there are at least m elements such that the
difference between their images and themselves is equal to or larger than d. For any
σ ∈ Sym(n) we let
val(σ) := ∑
n
i=1
√
i · σ(i)
n
.
Lemma 42. If σ ∈ Sym(n, d, m), and there exist i < j such that σ(i) > σ(j) and σ(i)− i < d,
then there exists σ′ ∈ Sym(n, d, m) such that val(σ′) > val(σ).
Proof. Consider σ′ ∈ Sym(n, d, m) defined by
σ′(k) =

σ(j) if k = i,
σ(i) if k = j,
σ(k) otherwise.
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We get that
val(σ′)− val(σ) = 1
n
(√
iσ(j) +
√
jσ(i)−
√
iσ(i)−
√
jσ(j)
)
=
1
n
(√
i−√j)(√σ(j)−√σ(i)) > 0

Lemma 43. If σ ∈ Sym(n, d, m), and there exist i < j such that σ(i) > σ(j) and σ(j)− j ≥ d,
then there exists σ′ ∈ Sym(n, d, m) such that val(σ′) > val(σ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 42. The only difference is that now
σ′ ∈ Sym(n, d, m) because σ′(i)− i = σ(j)− i > σ(j)− j ≥ d and σ′(j)− j = σ(i)− j >
σ(j)− j ≥ d. 
Lemma 44. If σ ∈ Sym(n, d, m), m > 0, and n−σ−1(n) < d, then there exists σ′ ∈ Sym(n, d, m)
such that val(σ′) > val(σ).
Proof. Let n′ be the largest number such that (n′ − 1)− σ−1(n′ − 1) ≥ d (such n′ exists since
m > 1). Denote k := n′ − σ−1(n′ − 1). If there exists i such that i > k and σ(i)− i > d, then
by Lemma 43 we are done. If σ(n′) 6= n′, then by a simple counting argument there exist
i < j such that σ(i) > σ(j) and σ(i)− i < d, and then by Lemma 42 we are done. Similarly,
if σ(n′ − k + 1) > n′ − k, we can again find i < j such that σ(i) > σ(j) and σ(i)− i < d, and
be done by Lemma 42. Define σ′ ∈ Sym(n) as
σ′(i) =

n′ − 1 if i = n′,
n′ if i = n′ − k + 1,
σ(n′ − k + 1) if i = n′ − k,
σ(i) otherwise.
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We now have:
val σ′ − val σ = 1
n
((
(n′ − k) +
√
(n′ − k + 1)n′ +
√
n′(n′ − 1)
)
−
(√
(n′ − k)(n′ − 1) +
√
(n′ − k + 1)(n′ − k) + n′
))
=
n′
n
((
1− k
n′
+
√
1− k− 1
n′
+
√
1− 1
n′
)
−
(√
1− k
n′
√
1− 1
n′
+
√
1− k− 1
n′
√
1− k
n′
+ 1
))
=
n′
n
(
− k
n′
+
(√
1− 1
n′
+
√
1− k− 1
n′
)(
1−
√
1− k
n′
))
=
k
n

√
1− 1n′ +
√
1− k−1n′
1+
√
1− kn′
− 1

=
k
n
(
1+
√
1− kn′
) (F (k− 1, n′)−F (0, n)) ,
where F (t, n′) =
√
1− tn′ −
√
1− t+1n′ . Note that
∂F (t, n′)
∂t
= − 1
2n′
√
1− tn′
+
1
2n′
√
1− t+1n′
=
√
1− tn′ −
√
1− t+1n′
2n′
√
1− tn′
√
1− t+1n′
,
and therefore ∂,
′
∂t > 0 for all t ∈ (0, n′ − 1). This implies that val σ′ > val σ as required. 
Lemma 45. For all σ ∈ Sym(n, d, m), val(σ) ≤ n+12 − md
2
8n(n+d+1) .
Proof. Let val(n, d, m) := maxσ∈Sym(n,d,m) val(σ). Given some σ1 ∈ Sym(n, d, m) such that
val(σ1) = val(n, d, m), we can define σ2 ∈ Sym(n + d + 1, d, m) by
σ2(i) =

σ1(i) if i ≤ n,
i if i > n.
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Following the same logic used in the proof of Lemma 44, there exists σ3 ∈ Sym(n + d +
1, d, m) such that σ3(n + 1) = n + d + 1, σ3(i) = i − 1 for i ∈ {n + 2, . . . , n + d + 1}, and
val(σ3) > val(σ2). However, this also implies that there exists σ4 ∈ Sym(n + d + 1, d, m)
such that σ4 is identical to σ3 for inputs larger than n, and is identical to a permutation
σ4 ∈ Sym(n, d, m− 1) that achieves val(n, d, m− 1) for inputs smaller than or equal to n. It
follows that
val(n, d, m) = val(σ1) =
1
n
(
(n + d + 1) val(σ2)−
n+d+1
∑
i=n+1
i
)
≤
1
n
(
(n + d + 1) val(σ4)−
n+d+1
∑
i=n+1
i
)
=
val(n, d, m− 1)− 1
n
(
n+d+1
∑
i=n+1
i−
n+d
∑
i=n+1
√
i(i + 1)−
√
(n + 1)(n + d + 1)
)
.
Now note that
n+d+1
∑
i=n+1
i−
n+d
∑
i=n+1
√
i(i + 1)−
√
(n + 1)(n + d + 1) =
n + d + 1−
√
(n + 1)(n + d + 1)−
n+d
∑
i=n+1
(√
i(i + 1)− i
)
=
(n + d + 1)2 − (n + 1)(n + d + 1)
n + d + 1+
√
(n + 1)(n + d + 1)
−
n+d
∑
i=n+1
i√
i(i + 1) + i
≥
(n + d + 1)d
n + d + 1+
√
(n + 1)(n + d + 1)
− d
2
=
d
2
(
(n + d + 1)−√(n + 1)(n + d + 1)
(n + d + 1) +
√
(n + 1)(n + d + 1)
)
=
d
2
 d(n + d + 1)(
(n + d + 1) +
√
(n + 1)(n + d + 1)
)2
 ≥ d28(n + d + 1) .
Therefore
val(n, d, m) ≤ val(n, d, m− 1)− d
2
8n(n + d + 1)
,
and
val(n, d, m) ≤ val(n, d, 0)− md
2
8n(n + d + 1)
.
To complete the proof, note that for m = 0 we know by Lemma 42 that val(n, d, 0) =
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∑ni=1
i
n =
n+1
2 . 
Let µn be an assignment for a certain market Mn; we denote
val(µn, Mn) := ∑
µn( f ni )=w
n
j
2
√
qni h
n
j + ε
n
ij.
Lemma 46. Let µn be an assignment for Mn such that∣∣∣{i : ∣∣∣qni − hnµn(i)∣∣∣ > nb−1}∣∣∣ ≥ na,
for some a, b ∈ (0, 1); then there exists c ∈ R+ such that
val (µn, Mn) ≤ 2n + 1− cna+2b−2
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that more than half of the firms in the set{
i :
∣∣∣qni − hnµn(i)∣∣∣ > nb−1} are matched with workers whose human capital level exceeds
the firms’ quality. Now the maximal value is given when all the firms fit workers perfectly
in terms of the idiosyncratic component (i.e., εnij = 1), and then Lemma 45 bounds the sum
of the interactive components, and we get
val (µn, Mn) ≤ 2
(
n + 1
2
−
( 1
2 n
a) (nb)2
8n(n + nb−1 + 1)
)
+ n ≤ 2n + 1− 1
8.01
na+2b−2.

Lemma 47. Let {µn} be a sequence of optimal assignments for Mn. Then there exists c ∈ R+ and
γ ∈ (0, 1) such that whp val (µn, Mn) ≥ n− cnγ.
Proof sketch. Use a greedy algorithm that divides the firms and workers into layers according
to their quality/human capital level, where each layer contains n1/3 firms/workers. Then
perform an optimal assignment within each layer based only on the noise dimension. The
result approximates the efficiency on both dimensions, and gives a lower bound on the
efficient assignment. 
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Sketch of proof of Lemma 5. We deduce from Lemma 46 and Lemma 47 that for a+ 2b− 2 > γ
it must be that
∣∣∣{i | (qni − hnµn(i)) > nb−1}∣∣∣ < na. Now assume to the contrary that there is
a firm that is matched under the optimal assignment to a worker who has a human capital
level far higher than the firm’s quality (by “far higher” we mean nδ−1 for some δ ∈ (0, 1)),
and show (using a somewhat involved counting argument) that there must be another firm
that is matched to a worker with a human capital level far lower than the firm’s own quality,
and such that a switch between the workers employed by those two firms would yield an
efficiency gain of c1n2−2δ on the quality dimension for some c1 ∈ R+. Then for each new
match, try to find an alternating path (in the spirit of Theorem 1) to fix the efficiency on
the noise dimension. This leads to an overall improvement in efficiency, which leads to a
contradiction.
A.3.2 Sketch of proof of Theorem 6
Sketch of proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 5 and similar arguments to
those used in Theorem 1, applied within a band of qualities of width Θ
(
n−b
)
.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Formal Definition of the Extensive-Form Game
Revision games: The set of players is N = {1, 2} and the sets of types are Ti = {τri , τci }. The
set of possible histories is
H ={∅} ∪
−t, (τ1, τ2,O1,O2, x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τi ∈ Ti,Oi ⊆ [−T, 0],−T ∈ Oi,
x : [−T,−t)→ {U, D} × {L, R}
 .
Here Oi represents Player i’s revision opportunities, and x(−t′) represents the prepared
profile at time −t′. For almost all realizations O1 and O2 will be finite. The players who
take action at h are given by the function P : H → 2N∪{Nature}:
P(h) =

{Nature} if h = ∅
{i | −t ∈ Oi} if h = (−t, τ1, τ2,O1,O2x)
.
The information sets partition for Player i is given by Ii whose typical element is
Ii
(−t˜, τ˜i, O˜i, x˜) ={
(−t, τ1, τ2,O1,O2, x)
∣∣∣ −t = −t˜, τi = τ˜i, Oi|[−T,−t] = O˜i, x|[−T,−t) = x˜} .
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The set of information sets in which Player i takes an action is
Ji =
{Ii (−t˜, τ˜i, O˜i, x˜) ∈ Ii ∣∣ −t˜ ∈ O˜i} .
At history ∅ Nature chooses τ1, τ2, O1, and O2 independently according to the probabil-
ities ξ1 and ξ2 (for τc1 and τ
c
2 respectively) and according to the distributions of the Poisson
processes with frequencies λ1 and λ2 (to determine O1 and O2 respectively). The game
then moves immediately to the history (τ1, τ2,O1,O2,−T, x∅), with the “empty” function
x∅ : ∅→ {U, D} × {L, R}. Following that, time moves continuously and whenever a player
is called to play the available actions are
Ai
(Ii (−t˜, τ˜i, O˜i, x˜)) =

{U, D} if i = 1, τ˜i = τri
{U} if i = 1, τ˜i = τci
{L, R} if i = 2, τ˜i = τri
{R} if i = 2, τ˜i = τci
We denote also A1 = {U, D} and A2 = {L, R}.
A feasible strategy for Player i is σi : Ji → ∆Ai such that
1. supp
(
σi
(Ii (−t˜, τ˜i, O˜i, x˜))) ⊆ Ai (Ii (−t˜, τ˜i, O˜i, x˜))
2. ∀ai ∈ Ai : σi
(Ii (−T, τri , {−T}, x∅)) [ai] ∈ {0, 1}
As mentioned we restrict players’ strategies to be measurable with respect to the natural
topologies.
The state variable x is determined by the realizations of players’ strategies. For any time
−t′ < −t, let −t′′i = max{−τ ∈ Oi | −τ < −t}, and let αi be the realized action of Player i
at −t′′i , then x(−t′) = (α1, α2).
The terminal histories are Z = {(−t, τ1, τ2,O1,O2, x) ∈ H | −t = 0}, and the payoffs at
history (0, τ1, τ2,O1,O2, x) are given by u (x(0)), where u is a function from {U, D}× {L, R}
to R2.
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Wars of attrition with Poisson arrivals: In the case of the war of attrition with Poisson ar-
rivals the definition of the game is slightly simpler.
The set of possible histories is now given by
H ={∅, D, L} ∪ {(−t, τ1, τ2,O1,O2) | τi ∈ Ti,Oi ⊆ [−T, 0],−T ∈ Oi}
The information sets partition for Player i is given by Ii whose typical element is
Ii
(−t˜, τ˜i, O˜i) = {(−t, τ1, τ2,O1,O2) ∣∣∣ −t = −t˜, τi = τ˜i, Oi|[−T,−t] = O˜i} .
The rest of the details are identical to those given for revision games, except that once
Player 1 chooses action D or Player 2 chooses action L the game moves to the relevant history
(D or L). The terminal histories are Z = {D, L} ∪ {(−t, τ1, τ2,O1,O2) ∈ H | −t = 0}, and
payoffs are given by
uwoa(h) =

u(D, R) if h = D
u(U, L) if h = L
u(U, R) otherwise
with u defined as before.
B.2 Model with Heterogeneous Revision Rates
The main text ignored the possibility of the two players having different revision rates. Here
we formalize all the necessary definitions to deal with heterogeneous revision rates. All the
proofs below are provided for the more general case of different frequencies.1 The game is
now summarized by the parameters (T; u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2;λ1,λ2), where λi is the frequency of the
Poisson process governing Player i’s revisions. We denote by φ(T; u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2;λ1,λ2) the
set of interim SE payoffs of the profile (τr1 , τ
r
2), and define the revision equilibrium payoff
1With the exception of Theorem 17.
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set of (u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2;λ1,λ2) by
φ¯(u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2,λ1,λ2) = lim
T′→∞
φ(T′; u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2;λ1,λ2).
We extend Definition 2 trivially.
Lastly, the definition of strength becomes slightly more complicated.
Definition 4. Player i’s strength is given by
si(ui;λ1,λ2) ≡ λ3−i · |ui(U, L)− ui(D, R)|
λ2 [ui(U, L)− ui(U, R)] + λ1 [ui(D, R)− ui(U, R)] .
Player i is stronger than Player j if
si(ui;λ1,λ2) > sj(uj;λ1,λ2).
Player i relative strength (with regard to Player j) is
∆ij(u1, u2;λ1,λ2) = si(ui;λ1,λ2)− sj(uj;λ1,λ2).
Note that a player is stronger if her revision frequency is low or if her opponent’s revision
frequency is high. The relative frequency of play allows a player to commit and thus
makes her a stronger competitor (a player whose frequency of play is much lower than her
opponent is practically a Stackelberg leader).
B.3 Proofs
All proofs are for the general model (with heterogeneous revision rates). Whenever the
statement of the result changes because of that, the new formulation is explicitly brought.
Whenever the statement is the same as in the main text, it is omitted.
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B.3.1 Proof of Proposition 12
Proposition 48. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, ξ1 = 0, and ξ2 > 0; then the revision
equilibrium payoff set is bounded away from Player 1’s preferred outcome:
u(U, L) /∈ φ¯(u1, u2; 0, ξ2;λ1,λ2).
Proof. Let {Tk}∞k=1 be a sequence of horizons such that Tk → ∞ and let {σˆk}∞k=1 be a
corresponding sequence of equilibria. We let Pk denote the probability measure induced by
Nature’s moves (i.e., the lottery over types and the stochastic Poisson processes governing
players’ revision opportunities) and by equilibrium strategies σˆk.
Choose KA > 0, −tA < 0 and δA > 0 such that
1. δA < 13 (u2(D, R))− u2(U, L)),
2. e− 12λ1tA (u2(D, R)− u2(U, R)) < δA,
3. for any k > KA, given that it is common knowledge that Player 2 is rational by time
−tA, the expected continuation payoffs induced by equilibrium strategies σˆk are below
u2(U, L) + δA for Player 2.
The reason we can find KA, −tA, and δA that meet these conditions is due to Lemma 49
below, the proof of which is a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 3 of
Calcagno et al. (2014) and it is omitted.
Lemma 49. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, and ξ2 = 0. Then the revision equilibrium
payoff set contains only Player 1’s preferred outcome:
φ¯(u1, u2; ξ1, 0;λ1,λ2) = {u(U, L)}.
Assume to the contrary that u(U, L) ∈ φ¯(u1, u2; 0, ξ2;λ1,λ2). This implies that
lim
k→∞
Pk
(
EL(−tA) | E2r
)
= 1,
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where
E2r = {Player 2 is rational}
EL(−t) = {L is prepared before time − t}
(or else the equilibrium result will be bounded away from the intended limit). Then for any
δ′ > 0 there exists K′ > KA such that for any k > K′ Player 2’s expected utility under σˆk can
be bounded above by
(1− δ′) ·
(
u2(U, L) + δA
)
+ δ′ · u2(D, R) ≤ u2(U, L) + δA + δ′u2(D, R). (B.1)
We can take δ′ = δAu2(D,R) and get that there exists K
′ > 0 such that for any k > K′ Player 2’s
expected utility is bounded above by u2(U, L) + 2δA.
The rational Player 2 can deviate to the strategy in which she prepares R until time − tA2 ,
and then best-responds to the prepared profile. Note that
lim
k→∞
Pk
(
Ec2r |
[
EL(−tA)
]c)
= lim
k→∞
ξ2
ξ2 + (1− ξ2) · Pk
(
[EL(−tA)]c | E2r
) = 1.
And therefore for large enough k Player 1’s strategy from −tA onward will be to prepare D
conditional on Player 2 never preparing L. This will ensure the rational Player 2 an expected
utility bounded below by
(
1− e− 12λ1tA
)
u2(D, R) + e−
1
2λ1t
A
u2(U, R) > u2(D, R)− δA. (B.2)
By the definition of δA, (B.1), and (B.2), it follows that Player 2 has a profitable deviation
and we get a contradiction.
B.3.2 Proof of Theorem 13
Proof. Let ξ¯2 be implicitly defined by
ξ¯2
1− ξ¯2 = ∆12(u1, u2;λ1,λ2) ·
λ1u1(D, R) + λ2u1(U, L)− (λ1 + λ2)u1(U, R)
(λ1 + λ2)u1(D, R)
.
The reasons for using this definition will become clear in the proof.
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Given some ξ2 ∈
(
0, ξ¯2
)
, let {Tk}∞k=1 be a sequence of horizons such that Tk → ∞ and
let {σˆk}∞k=1 be a corresponding sequence of equilibria. We let Pk denote the probability
measure induced by Nature’s moves (i.e., the lottery over types and the stochastic Poisson
processes governing players’ revision opportunities) and by equilibrium strategies σˆk.
Note that the rational type of Player 2 must myopically best-respond after time −t∗2 ,
where −t∗2 is implicitly defined by
u2(U, L) =
(
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗2
)
· λ1u2(D, R) + λ2u2(U, L)
λ1 + λ2
+ e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
2 u2(U, R),
or more simply
e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
2 = s2(u2;λ1,λ2).
Let −tB be such that −tB ≤ min{−tA,−t∗2}, with −tA being defined as in Proposition 12.
Using the notation defined in the proof of Proposition 12 we know that
lim
k→∞
Pk
(
EL(−tB) | E2r
)
< 1.2
Assume to the contrary that there is no last-minute strategic interaction. This implies
that the probability of the profile of prepared actions changing in the interval (−tB, 0) goes
to zero as k goes to infinity. Let E(a1,a2) denote the event that (a1, a2) is the prepared action
profile at time −tB.
Claim 49.1. limk→∞ Pk(E(U,R) | E2r) = limk→∞ Pk(E(D,L) | E2r) = 0.
Proof. If the action profile prepared at time −tB is either (U, R) or (D, L) there is a constant
probability that Player 2 will be called to play after time −t∗2 , and will best-respond to the
prepared action of Player 1, which contradicts the lack of last-minute strategic interaction.

Claim 49.2. limk→∞ Pk(E(U,L) | E2r) > 0.
2For convenience, and without loss of generality, we will assume throughout the proof that all the sequences
of probabilities we mention converge.
110
Proof. If limk→∞ Pk(E(U,L) | E2r) = 0 then for any δ > 0, Player 1’s utility for large enough k
is bounded above by u1(D, R) + δ. However, Player 1 can deviate to the strategy of playing
only U until time −t∗2 and then best-responding, so that she will get a payoff bounded below
by
(1− ξ2) ·
( (
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗2)
)
· λ1u1(D, R) + λ2u1(U, L)
λ1 + λ2
+
e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
2 u1(U, R)
)
+ ξ2 ·
((
1− e−λ1t∗2
)
u1(D, R) + e−λ1t
∗
2 u1(U, R)
)
>
1− ξ2
λ1 + λ2
·
(
λ1u1(D, R) + λ2u1(U, L)− s2(u2;λ1,λ2)·
(λ1u1(D, R) + λ2u1(U, L)− (λ1 + λ2)u1(U, R))
)
=
1− ξ2
λ1 + λ2
·
(
λ1u1(D, R) + λ2u1(U, L) + (∆12(u1, u2;λ1,λ2)− s1(u1;λ1,λ2)) ·
(λ1u1(D, R) + λ2u1(U, L)− (λ1 + λ2)u1(U, R))
)
= (1− ξ2)u1(D, R)+
(1− ξ2)∆12(u1, u2;λ1,λ2) · λ1u1(D, R) + λ2u1(U, L)− (λ1 + λ2)u1(U, R)
λ1 + λ2
>
(1− ξ2)u1(D, R) + ξ2u1(D, R) = u1(D, R),
where the last inequality comes from ξ2 being strictly less than ξ¯2 and the definition of ξ¯2.
The fact that we have a lower bound that is strictly above u1(D, R) implies that we can select
δ small enough such that the deviation will be profitable for Player 1 for large enough k.

Claim 49.3. limk→∞ Pk
(
E(D,R) |
[
EL(−tB)
]c ∩ E2r) < 1.
Proof. Suppose limk→∞ Pk
(
E(D,R) |
[
EL(−tB)
]c ∩ E2r) = 1. We know from Claim 49.2 that
for every δ′ > 0 there exists K′ such that for every k > K′ Player 2’s payoffs from equilibrium
σˆk are bounded from above by
u2(D, R)−
(
lim
k→∞
Pk
(
E(U,L) | E2r
)
− δ′
)
· (u2(D, R)− u2(U, L)) .
Player 2 can deviate and always prepare R and for any δ′′ > 0 there exists K′′ such that for
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any k > K′′ Player 2’s payoffs from this deviation will be bounded from below by
u2(D, R)− δ′′ · u2(U, R). (B.3)
If we pick δ′ and δ′′ to be small enough, and take K = max{K′, K′′}, Player 2 has a profitable
deviation for all k > K. 
From Claim 49.3 and Proposition 12 we know that
lim
k→∞
Pk
(
E(U,R) | E2r
)
= lim
k→∞
Pk
(
E(U,R) |
[
EL(−tB)
]c ∩ E2r) ·
lim
k→∞
Pk
([
EL(−tB)
]c | E2r) > 0,
which contradicts Claim 49.1. This concludes the contradiction argument and proves that the
parameters induce last-minute strategic interaction. The proof is completed using Lemma 50
below.
Lemma 50. If parameter vector (u1, u2; ξ1, ξ2;λ1,λ2) induces last-minute strategic interaction,
then it induces inefficiency.
Proof. Given the vector of parameters, we know that there exists −t′ < 0 and δ > 0 such that
for every sequence {Tk}∞k=1 such that Tk → ∞, and every corresponding sequence of SEs, the
probability that the prepared profile changes between time −t′ and time 0 is bounded above
δ as k approaches infinity. Note that two of the four possible action profiles are inefficient
and there is no way to change from one efficient profile to the other without passing through
an inefficient profile. Therefore, there is a probability of at least δ of reaching an inefficient
profile at some time between −t′ and 0. It is therefore possible to bound the inefficiency
from below by δ times the probability that no player moves from the time an inefficient
profile was reached until 0, that is, δ′ = δ · e−(λ1+λ2)t′ .
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B.3.3 Proof of Proposition 14
Proposition 51. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, and ξ1 = 0. Then Player 1’s preferred
outcome is in the limit of the revision equilibrium payoff set as ξ2 → 0:
u(U, L) ∈ lim inf
ξ2→0
φ¯(u1, u2; 0, ξ2;λ1,λ2).3
Proof. This proposition is a specific case of Theorem 17 (part 1), whose proof can be found
below.
B.3.4 Proof of Theorem 15
Proof. We will first show that substantial delay is induced, and this in turn will imply
last-minute strategic interaction and inefficiency (via Lemma 50).
Let {Tk}∞k=1 be a sequence of horizons such that Tk → ∞ and let {σˆk}∞k=1 be a corre-
sponding sequence of equilibria. We let Pk denote the probability measure induced by
Nature’s moves (i.e., the lottery over types and the stochastic Poisson processes governing
players’ revision opportunities) and by equilibrium strategies σˆk.
Choose KA > 0, −tA < 0 and δA > 0 such that
1. δA < 13 (1− ξ1) (u2(D, R))− u2(U, L)),
2. e− 12λ1tA (u2(D, R)− u2(U, R)) < δA,
3. e− 12λ2tA (u2(U, L)− u2(U, R)) < δA,
4. for any k > KA, given that it is common knowledge that Player 2 is rational by time
−tA, the expected continuation payoffs induced by equilibrium strategies σˆk are above
u1(U, L)− δA for Player 1 and below u2(U, L) + δA for Player 2.
The reason we can find KA, −tA, and δA that meet these conditions is due to Lemma 49.
3See Footnote 20.
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We describe several events using the following notation:
E1r = {Player 1 is rational}
E2r = {Player 2 is rational}
Er = E1r ∩ E2r
ED(−t) = {D is prepared before time − t}
EL(−t) = {L is prepared before time − t}
Assume to the contrary that no substantial delay is induced. This implies that the
probability that by time −tA the only profile that was prepared was (U, R) conditional on
both players being rational converges to zero as k→ ∞. Formally:
lim
k→∞
Pk
([
ED(−tA)
]c ∩ [EL(−tA)]c | Er) = 0.4 (B.4)
Claim 51.1. limk→∞ Pk
([
EL(−tA)
]c | Er) > 0.
Proof. Suppose that limk→∞ Pk
([
EL(−tA)
]c | Er) = 0; then for any δ′ > 0 there exists
K′ > KA such that for any k > K′ Player 2’s expected utility under σˆk can be bounded above
by
ξ1 · u2(U, L) + (1− ξ1) ·
(
(1− δ′) ·
(
u2(U, L) + δA
)
+ δ′ · u2(D, R)
)
(B.5)
≤ u2(U, L) + δA + δ′u2(D, R).
We can take δ′ = δAu2(D,R) and get that there exists K
′ > 0 such that for any k > K′ Player 2’s
expected utility is bounded above by u2(U, L) + 2δA.
The rational Player 2 can deviate to the strategy in which she prepares R until time − tA2 ,
4For convenience, and without loss of generality, we will assume throughout the proof that all the sequences
of probabilities we mention converge.
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and then best-responds to the prepared profile. Note that
lim
k→∞
Pk
(
Ec2r |
[
EL(−tA)
]c ∩ E1r) =
lim
k→∞
ξ2
ξ2 + (1− ξ2) · Pk
(
[EL(−tA)]c | Er
) = 1.
And therefore for large enough k the rational Player 1’s strategy from −tA onward will be to
prepare D conditional on Player 2 never preparing L. This will ensure the rational Player 2
an expected utility bounded below by
ξ1 ·
((
1− e− 12λ2tA
)
u2(U, L) + e−
1
2λ2t
A
u2(U, R)
)
+ (B.6)
(1− ξ1) ·
((
1− e− 12λ1tA
)
u2(D, R) + e−
1
2λ1t
A
u2(U, R)
)
>
ξ1 · u2(U, L) + (1− ξ1) · u2(D, R)− δA.
From the definition of δA, (B.5), and (B.6), it follows that Player 2 has a profitable deviation,
and we get a contradiction. 
Following Claim 51.1, let p¯ ≡ limk→∞ Pk
([
EL(−tA)
]c | Er). Choose KB > KA, −tB ≤
−tA and δB > 0 such that
1. for any k > KB, given that it is common knowledge by time −t ≤ −tB that Player 1 is
rational, and that Player 1 believes that Player 2 is a commitment type with probability
at least ξ2, the expected continuation payoffs induced by equilibrium strategies σˆk are
below u1(U, L)− δB for Player 1,
2. e− 12λ1tB (u1(U, L)− u1(U, R)) < 12 (1− ξ2) p¯δB.
We can select such KB, tB, and δB as shown by Theorem 13 (note that the method of proof
there implied that payoffs can be bounded for all times before −tB simultaneously).
Claim 51.2. limk→∞ Pk
(
ED(−tB) |
[
EL(−tB)
]c ∩ Er) < 1.
Proof. Note that Claim 51.1 and (B.4) imply that
lim
k→∞
Pk
(
ED(−tB) ∩
[
EL(−tB)
]c | Er) > 0.
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Assume to the contrary that limk→∞ Pk
(
ED(−tB) |
[
EL(−tB)
]c ∩ Er) = 1. Then
lim
k→∞
Pk
([
EL(−tB)
]c | Er) = lim
k→∞
Pk
(
ED(−tB) ∩
[
EL(−tB)
]c | Er) > 0.
This in turn implies that for any δ′ > 0 there exists K′ > KB such that the rational type
of Player 1’s expected utility under σˆk can be bounded above by
ξ2 · u1(D, R) + (1− ξ2)·
((
1− lim
k→∞
Pk
([
EL(−tB)
]c | Er)+ δ′) u1(U, L)+
(
lim
k→∞
Pk
([
EL(−tB)
]c | Er)− δ′) · (u1(U, L)− δB)
)
.
And if we take δ′ < 12 limk→∞ P
k
([
EL(−tB)
]c | Er) and remember that
lim
k→∞
Pk
([
EL(−tB)
]c | Er) ≥ p¯,
we get an upper bound of
ξ2 · u1(D, R) + (1− ξ2) · u1(U, L)− 12 (1− ξ2) p¯δ
B. (B.7)
Player 1 can deviate to the strategy in which she prepares U until time − tB2 , and then
best-responds to the prepared profile. Note that
lim
k→∞
Pk
(
Ec1r |
[
ED(−tB)
]c ∩ [EL(−tB)]c ∩ E2r) =
lim
k→∞
ξ2
ξ2 + (1− ξ2) · Pk
(
[ED(−tB)]c | [EL(−tB)]c ∩ Er
) = 1.
This deviation will ensure the rational Player 1 an expected payoff bounded below by
ξ2 ·
((
1− e− 12λ1tB
)
u1(D, R) + e−
1
2λ2t
B
u1(U, R)
)
+ (B.8)
(1− ξ2) ·
((
1− e− 12λ2tB
)
u1(U, L) + e−
1
2λ2t
B
u1(U, R)
)
>
ξ2 · u1(D, R) + (1− ξ2) · u1(U, L)− 12 (1− ξ2) p¯δ
B.
From (B.7) and (B.8) it follows that Player 1 has a profitable deviation, and we get a
contradiction. 
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We have
lim
k→∞
Pk
([
EL(−tB)
]c | Er) ≥ p¯ > 0 (Claim 51.1,−tB < −tA)
lim
k→∞
Pk
([
ED(−tB)
]c | [EL(−tB)]c ∩ Er) > 0 (Claim 51.2)
which together imply that
lim
k→∞
Pk
([
ED(−tB)
]c ∩ [EL(−tB)]c | Er) > 0,
and therefore substantial delay is induced.
B.3.5 Proof of Proposition 16
Proof. In an equilibrium of the prescribed form with cutoff times −t∗1 and −t∗2 , where
−t∗2 ≤ −t∗1 , the following three equations must hold.
Indifference of Player 1: (B.9)
u1(D, R) = (1− q(t∗2 − t∗1)) ·
[ (
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗1
)
· λ2u1(U, L) + λ1u1(D, R)
λ1 + λ2
+
e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1 · u1(U, R)
]
+ q(t∗2 − t∗1) ·
[(
1− e−λ1t∗1
)
u1(D, R) + e−λ1t
∗
1 u1(U, R)
]
.
Indifference of Player 2: (B.10)
u2(U, L) =
(
1− e−λ2(t∗2−t∗1)
)
u2(U, L) + e−λ2(t
∗
2−t∗1)×[
(1− ξ1) ·
[ (
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗1
)
· λ2u2(U, L) + λ1u2(D, R)
λ1 + λ2
+
e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1 u2(U, R)
]
+ ξ1 ·
[(
1− e−λ2t∗1
)
u2(U, L) + e−λ2t
∗
1 u2(U, R)
]]
.
Bayesian updating: (B.11)
q(t¯) =
ξ2
ξ2 + (1− ξ2)e−λ2 t¯ .
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Note first that (B.10) can be reduced to
u2(U, L) = (1− ξ1) ·
[ (
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗1
)
· λ2u2(U, L) + λ1u2(D, R)
λ1 + λ2
+ (B.12)
e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1 u2(U, R)
]
+ ξ1 ·
[(
1− e−λ2t∗1
)
u2(U, L) + e−λ2t
∗
1 u2(U, R)
]
In equilibrium, −t∗1 is nailed down by (B.12), and so any change to Player 1’s payoffs
does not affect −t∗1 , and changes only −t∗2 . Assume that strategies defined by cutoffs
(−t∗1 ,−t∗2) form an equilibrium, and examine (B.9). Note that from the structure imposed
on the payoffs it is always true that u1(D, R) is greater than the second part of the RHS of
(B.9) (the part multiplied by q(t∗2 − t∗1)). The first part of the RHS of (B.9) must therefore be
greater than u1(D, R). If u1(U, L) becomes larger it makes the first part of the RHS even
greater, and since t∗1 does not change, this must mean that q(t
∗
2 − t∗1) goes up, which in turns
means that t∗2 becomes smaller. The probability of reaching (U, R) is simply e−(λ1t
∗
1+λ2t
∗
2),
and so if t∗1 remains the same and t
∗
2 becomes larger, this probability becomes smaller. A
similar argument shows that raising u1(U, R) also decreases this probability. When u1(D, R)
increases, the LHS of (B.9) rises more than the RHS, and then by a similar argument the
probability of reaching (U, R) increases.
Dealing with changes in Player 2’s payoffs is only slightly more involved. Raising
u2(D, R) makes the first part of the RHS of (B.12) larger, and so it must be that e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1
becomes larger as well, and this means that t∗1 becomes smaller. Looking now at (B.9), we
see that the decrease in t∗1 has two direct meanings if t
∗
2 is kept constant: q(t
∗
2 − t∗1) increases,
and e−(λ1+λ2)t∗1 and e−λ1t∗1 both increase. This means that each part of the RHS of (B.9)
becomes smaller, and the weight on the second part becomes larger. Both effects lead to
the RHS becoming smaller, and to offset it, q(t∗2 − t∗1) must decrease, which implies that t∗2
decreases. So both t∗1 and t
∗
2 decrease, so that the probability of reaching (U, R) increases.
Similar arguments show that this probability decreases with u2(U, L) and increases with
u2(U, R).
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B.3.6 Proof of Theorem 17
Theorem 52. 1. Assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, and both players play cutoff
strategies. Then in the limit as ξ1 → 0 and ξ2 → 0, the probability of reaching ex-post
inefficiency tends to zero.
2. Assume players are equally strong (∆12(u1, u2;λ1,λ2) = 0), λ1 = λ2 = 1,5 and both players
play cutoff strategies. Let the sequence (ξk1, ξ
k
2)
∞
k=1 be such that limk→∞ ξ
k
1 = limk→∞ ξ
k
2 = 0,
and limk→∞
ξk2
ξk1
< 1. Then in the limit as k→ ∞, the probability of reaching ex-post inefficiency
tends to
s1(u1;λ1,λ2)× lim
k→∞
ξk2
ξk1
[
= s2(u2;λ1,λ2)× limn→∞
ξk2
ξk1
]
.
Proof. Part 1: For any given ξ1 and ξ2, consider a SE that is defined by a pair of strategies for
the rational players. Player 1 prepares U until time −t∗1(ξ1, ξ2), and best-responds (according
to the component game’s payoffs) from there on. Similarly, the rational Player 2 prepares R
until time −t∗2(ξ1, ξ2), and best-responds (according to the component game’s payoffs) from
there on. In order for these two strategies to form a SE it is sufficient that three conditions
are satisfied. The first is that the rational Player 2 “gives up” before Player 1 does, that is
−t∗2(ξ1, ξ2) ≤ −t∗1(ξ1, ξ2).
The second condition is that Player 1 is indifferent between preparing U and D at
−t∗1(ξ1, ξ2), conditional on the current prepared action of Player 2 being R and on her
5This theorem requires players’ revision rates to be equal. This is because solving the equations involves a
polynomial of degree λ1λ2 . Proofs for the cases where
λ1
λ2
∈ { 14 , 13 , 12 , 2, 3, 4} can also be found. Furthermore, for
the specific case of a symmetric payoff matrix, it is possible to prove this claim for arbitrary revision rates. It is a
reasonable conjecture that the theorem holds even for non-symmetric payoffs and arbitrary revision rates.
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playing according to the prescribed strategy at any subsequent time. This can be written as
u1(D, R) = (1− q (t∗2(ξ1, ξ2)− t∗1(ξ1, ξ2)))× (B.13)[ (
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗1(ξ1,ξ2)
)
· λ2u1(U, L) + λ1u1(D, R)
λ1 + λ2
+
e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1(ξ1,ξ2) · u1(U, R)
]
+ q (t∗2(ξ1, ξ2)− t∗1(ξ1, ξ2))×[(
1− e−λ1t∗1(ξ1,ξ2)
)
· u1(D, R) + e−λ1t∗1(ξ1,ξ2) · u1(U, R)
]
,
where q(t¯) is the posterior probability that Player 1 assigns to the event that Player 2 is the
commitment type conditional on Player 2 not preparing L on an interval of length t¯ and her
playing a strategy that dictates preparing L on this interval, which is given by
q(t¯) =
ξ2
ξ2 + (1− ξ2)e−λ2 t¯ . (B.14)
Note that as q(·) is weakly increasing in t¯, Player 1 strictly prefers preparing U before
−t∗1(ξ1, ξ2), and strictly prefers preparing D after −t∗1(ξ1, ξ2).
The third condition is that the rational type of Player 2 is indifferent at −t∗2(ξ1, ξ2)
conditional on Player 1’s prepared action being U and her playing according to the prescribed
strategy at any subsequent time:
u2(U, L) =
(
1− e−λ2(t∗2(ξ1,ξ2)−t∗1(ξ1,ξ2))
)
· u2(U, L)+ (B.15)
e−λ2(t
∗
2(ξ1,ξ2)−t∗1(ξ1,ξ2))×
[
(1− ξ1) ·
[ (
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗1(ξ1,ξ2)
)
·
λ2u2(U, L) + λ1u2(D, R)
λ1 + λ2
+ e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1(ξ1,ξ2) · u2(U, R)
]
+
ξ1 ·
[ (
1− e−λ2t∗1(ξ1,ξ2)
)
u2(U, L) + e−λ2t
∗
1(ξ1,ξ2)u2(U, R)
]]
.
This means that the rational type of Player 2 weakly prefers preparing R prior to −t∗2(ξ1, ξ2),
and weakly prefers preparing L after −t∗2(ξ1, ξ2) (she strictly prefers preparing L after
−t∗1(ξ1, ξ2)). It remains to show that these three conditions can be met simultaneously (as
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T → ∞). To see that, note first that (B.15) reduces to
u2(U, L) = (1− ξ1) ·
[ (
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗1(ξ1,ξ2)
)
· (B.16)
λ2u2(U, L) + λ1u2(D, R)
λ1 + λ2
+ e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1(ξ1,ξ2) · u2(U, R)
]
+
ξ1 ·
[ (
1− e−λ2t∗1(ξ1,ξ2)
)
u2(U, L) + e−λ2t
∗
1(ξ1,ξ2)u2(U, R)
]
,
which implies that t∗1(ξ1, ξ2) only depends on ξ1. Furthermore, from continuity:
lim
ξ1→0
e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1(ξ1,ξ2) =
λ1 (u2(D, R)− u2(U, L))
λ1u2(D, R) + λ2u2(U, L)− (λ1 + λ2)u2(U, R) .
Therefore t∗1(ξ1, ξ2) approaches a constant as ξ1 → 0, and in this equilibrium the ra-
tional Player 2 is indifferent between insisting on playing R or not along the interval
[−T,−t∗1(ξ1, ξ2)]. Knowing that t∗1(ξ1, ξ2) does not change with ξ2 and converges to a con-
stant, and looking at (B.13), we can immediately deduce that q (t∗2(ξ2)− t∗1) also converges
to a constant. It follows from (B.14) that t∗2(ξ1, ξ2) tends to infinity as ξ1, ξ2 → 0. This means
that for small enough ξ2 the first condition is also satisfied, and ensures that the strategies
we described form an equilibrium for small enough ξ1 and ξ2.
As mentioned above, when ξ1, ξ2 → 0, t∗1(ξ1, ξ2) approaches some constant, and t∗2(ξ1, ξ2)
tends to infinity. This means that the limit of the expected payoffs (for the rational types) is
u(U, L), and the probability of reaching the Pareto inferior outcome approaches zero.
Part 2: Assume that −t∗2(ξk1, ξk2) ≤ −t∗1(ξk1, ξk2).6 We need to solve a set of four equations,
namely, Equations (B.9), (B.12), (B.11), and ∆12(u1, u2) = 0. Inputting all of these into a
6This is not without loss of generality, because the two players have different payoffs and different
probabilities of being the commitment type. Nevertheless, we will show that this is the right assumption if
limk→∞
ξk2
ξk1
< 1.
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standard mathematical solver and then simplifying gives
e−t
∗
1(ξ
k
1,ξ
k
2) =− ξk1s2(u2)
(
u2(U, L)− u2(U, R)
u2(D, R)− u2(U, L)
)
+√
(1− ξk1)2s2(u2) + (ξk1)2s22(u2)
(
u2(U, L)− u2(U, R)
u2(D, R)− u2(U, L)
)2
e−t
∗
2(ξ
n
1 ,ξ
n
2 ) =
ξk2
ξk1
×
[
− ξk1s1(u1)
(
u1(D, R)− u1(U, R)
u1(U, L)− u1(D, R)
)
+√
(1− ξk1)2s1(u1) + (ξk1)2s21(u1)
(
u1(D, R)− u1(U, R)
u1(U, L)− u1(D, R)
)2]
.
Taking the limit as k→ ∞ gives us
lim
k→∞
e−t
∗
1(ξ
k
1,ξ
k
2) =
√
s2(u2)
lim
k→∞
e−t
∗
2(ξ
k
1,ξ
k
2) =
ξ2
ξ1
×
√
s1(u1).
Given cutoff strategies the probability that both players never revise their strategies is
e−t∗1(ξk1,ξk2) × e−t∗2(ξk1,ξk2), and this is also the probability of reaching an ex-post inefficient
outcome. Because s1(u1) = s2(u2) we get in the limit exactly
s1(u1;λ1,λ2)× lim
k→∞
ξk2
ξk1
[
= s2(u2;λ1,λ2)× lim
k→∞
ξk2
ξk1
]
B.3.7 Proof of Lemma 18
Proof. Let us denote
σi(−t) = Ej
[
σi
(Ii (−t, τri ,O′i)) | −t ∈ O′i] ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to Player j’s beliefs on the possible realizations of
revision opportunities for Player i up until time −t (that is, it is a simple expectation derived
from the definition of the Poisson process), such that −t itself is a revision opportunity as
well.
We wish to show that any pair of strategies played in equilibrium satisfies some kind of
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restricted “pairwise-monotonicity,” or formally
(σi(−t) > 0) ∧
(−t < −t′) ∧(∫ −t′
−t
σj(τ)dτ > 0
)
=⇒ σi(−t′) = 1.
Note that if σi(−t) > 0, then Player i’s continuation payoff at −t if not exiting is less than
or equal to her payoff if exiting (the continuation payoff cannot rely on previous revision
opportunities because they do not affect Player j’s behavior). The continuation payoff at
time −t is a convex combination of (1) the expected payoff in case Player i is called to make
a decision on the interval (−t,−t′] and exits (in which case she gets the same payoff), (2)
the expected payoff in case Player j is called to make a decision on the interval (−t,−t′]
and exits, and (3) the continuation payoff at t′. Since the probability of Player j exiting is
at least e−λi(t−t′)
(
1− e−λj(t−t′)
)
· ∫ −t′−t σj(τ)dτ > 0, the expected continuation payoff at time
−t′ must be strictly lower than the payoff from exiting. This means that Player i exits at −t′,
i.e., σi(−t′) = 1.7
Finally, define
−t∗ = lim sup
{
−t
∣∣∣∣ mini
∫ −t
−T
σi(τ)dτ = 0
}
.
It is immediate from the definition that at least one of the players exits with zero probability
before −t∗.
Assume (without loss of generality) that
∫ −t∗
−T σ2(τ)dτ ≥
∫ −t∗
−T σ1(τ)dτ. To see that
for any −t′ > −t∗ we have σ1(−t′) = σ2(−t′) = 1, consider first how the pairwise-
monotonicity property works for Player 2. Let e > 0 be such that e <
∫ −t′
−t∗ σ1(τ)dτ, and let
−t ∈ [−T,−t∗ + e) be such that σ2(−t) > 0 (exists from definition of −t∗). This implies
that σ2(−t′) = 1. This is true for arbitrary −t′ > −t∗, so σ2(−t) = 1 for all −t ∈ (−t∗, 0].
Now let −t ∈ (−t∗,−t∗ + e) be such σ1(−t) > 0, and since
∫ −t′
−t σ2(τ)dτ > 0 the pairwise-
monotonicity property again implies σ1(−t′) = 1.
7We here use the sequential rationality property of the equilibrium; the last step would not have worked for
a Nash equilibrium concept.
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B.3.8 Proof of Corollary 19
Proof. We wish to modify the strategies to get a new pair of strategies that are essentially the
same as the old pair, and still constitute an equilibrium. Similar to the proof of Lemma 18,
let
σ′i (Ii (−t, τri ,Oi)) = Ej
[
σi
(Ii (−t, τri ,O′i)) | −t ∈ O′i] .
Note that the fact that Player i could have played any continuation strategy at time −t
without Player j knowing about it implies that she must be indifferent between playing σi
and σ′i . Furthermore, σj is a best-response to σ
′
i , because nothing was changed with respect
to Player j’s beliefs or expected continuation payoffs. For the rest of the proof we abbreviate
and write σ′i (−t) instead of σ′i
(Ii (−t, τri ,Oi)).
Define
−t∗i ≡ inf
{
−t ∈ [−T, 0]
∣∣∣∣ ∀ − t′ ∈ (−t, 0] : ∫ −t′−t σ′i (τ)dτ > 0
}
.
That is, −t∗i is the earliest point from which Player i has a strictly positive probability of
exiting (it could be that −t∗i = 0). We know from Lemma 18 that there are only two possible
equilibrium structures:
1. −t∗2 ≤ −t∗1 , and both players exit starting from −t∗2 .
2. −t∗2 > −t∗1 , and both players exit starting from −t∗1 .
Without loss of generality, consider the first case, and define −tˆ∗2 as
tˆ∗2 = t∗1 +
∫ −t∗1
−t∗2
σ′2(τ)dτ.
We claim that the strategies in which the rational type of Player 1 exits from −t∗1 , and the
rational type of Player 2 from −tˆ∗2 , constitute a SE. To see that, note that Player 1’s incentives
are essentially the same, but they might have “shifted,” because now the relation between
the exact time and the probability is different. However, for every posterior probability of
Player 2 being the rational type, the same probability that Player 2 is going to exit until time
−t∗1 remains the same, and so the fact that the previous pair of strategies was a SE implies
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that the new strategy is a best-response as well.
B.3.9 Proof of Corollary 20
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 13, and we omit some of
the technical arguments and definitions.
Let {Tk}∞k=1 be a sequence of horizons such that Tk → ∞ and let {σˆk}∞k=1 be a corre-
sponding sequence of equilibria. We let Pk denote the probability measure induced by
Nature’s moves (i.e., the lottery over types and the stochastic Poisson processes governing
players’ exit opportunities) and by equilibrium strategies σˆk.
Following Corollary 19 we know that there is a sequence of equilibria in cutoff strategies,
denoted by {σ¯k}∞k=1, such that the expected payoffs from σ¯k are the same as the expected
payoffs from σˆk. Let σ¯k be defined by the cutoffs
(−t¯k1,−t¯k2).
If limk→∞ t¯k2 = ∞,
8 then Player 2’s payoffs must approach u2(D, R). If they are not, then
Player 2 can deviate to the strategy of never exiting, thus convincing Player 1 that Player 2
is the commitment type, and getting a payoff that approaches u2(D, R). This implies that
Player 1’s payoffs must approach u1(D, R), but then, as in the proof of Theorem 13, Player 1
can deviate to the strategy of exiting only after −t¯k2 and get a payoff that is strictly greater
than u1(D, R) (for small enough selection of ξ¯2). We reach a contradiction, implying that
limk→∞ t¯k2 < ∞. Because of the same deviation, it cannot be that limk→∞ t¯
k
1 = ∞, and so we
get that the sequence {σˆk}∞k=1 exhibits substantial delay.
Moving back to the sequence {σ¯k}∞k=1, it must be that the common cutoff time, which
we will denote by −tˆk, does not approach infinity either, and there is a positive probability
of reaching it. This means that the parameters induce substantial delay, and inefficiency
follows.
8For convenience, and without loss of generality, we will assume throughout the proof that all the sequences
we mention converge (in the broad sense).
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B.3.10 Proof of Corollary 21
Corollary 53. In a war of attrition model, assume Player 1 is stronger than Player 2; then her
preferred outcome is the unique limit of the equilibrium payoff set as the probability of Player 2
being the commitment type approaches zero. Formally, lim infξ2→0 φ¯
woa(u1, u2; 0, ξ2;λ1,λ2) =
{u(U, L)}.
Proof. The existence proof is very similar to (an abbreviated version of) the proof of Theo-
rem 17. Following Corollary 19, we need only to show that there is no other pair of cutoff
strategies that forms a SE. We can rule out this possibility by showing that there are no
such equilibria with −t∗1 < −t∗2 for small enough ξ2 and for large enough T.9 The other
case, in which −t∗2 < −t∗1 , is already nailed down in the calculations appearing in the proof
for Theorem 17. To see that indeed there are no equilibria of the former type, suppose that
Player 1 starts exiting first. Then the rational Player 2 must be indifferent at −t∗2 , which
gives
u2(U, L) =
(
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗2
)
· λ2u2(U, L) + λ1u2(D, R)
λ1 + λ2
+ e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
1 · u2(U, R)
or
e−t
∗
2 = λ1+λ2
√
λ1 (u2(D, R)− u2(U, L))
λ1u2(D, R) + λ2u2(U, L)− (λ1 + λ2)u2(U, R) . (B.17)
We also know that Player 1 is indifferent at −t∗2 (because she is indifferent along the interval
(−t∗1 ,−t∗2)), that is,
u1(D, R) = (1− ξ2)
[ (
1− e−(λ1+λ2)t∗2
) λ2u1(U, L) + λ1u1(D, R)
λ1 + λ2
+
e−(λ1+λ2)t
∗
2 u1(U, R)
]
+ ξ2
[(
1− e−λ1t∗2
)
u1(D, R) + e−λ1t
∗
2 u1(U, R)
]
.
9Both t∗1 and t∗2 may be functions of ξ2 and T. We omit this dependence in our notation except where it is
crucial for understanding.
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If we define t2 ≡ limξ2→0 limT→∞ t∗2(ξ2, T), taking the last expression to the limit gives us
e−t2 = λ1+λ2
√
λ2 (u1(U, L)− u1(D, R))
λ1u1(D, R) + λ2u1(U, L)− (λ1 + λ2)u1(U, R) . (B.18)
Turning back to the assumption that Player 1 is stronger than Player 2, (B.17) together with
the limit in (B.18) yield a contradiction, as needed when ξ2 tends to zero.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 22
1. This part is immediate from the definitions and is omitted.
2. Let h be a substitutable preference that satisfies the law of aggregate demand,1 and
assume in contradiction that q=q′h does not satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Then
there are two sets of doctors D′ ⊆ D′′ such that |Cq=q′h (D′)| > |Cq=q
′
h (D
′′)|, where
Cq=q
′
h is the choice function related to the preference q=q
′
h .
Let E = Ch
(
Cq=q
′
h (D
′) ∪ Cq=q′h (D′′)
)
. Then from the law of aggregate demand (applied
to h) we have |E| ≥
∣∣∣Cq=q′h (D′)∣∣∣, which means E 6⊆ Cq=q′h (D′′), and there exists
some d ∈ E \ Cq=q′h (D′′). Since {d} ∪ Cq=q
′
h (D
′′) ⊆ D′′ and |Cq=q′h (D′′)| < q′, then
1The substitutability assumption is imperative. A counterexample when substitutability is not assumed is
the following preference relation:
= {d1, d2, d3}, {d1}, {d1, d3}, {d2, d3}, {d3}
which satisfies the law of aggregate demand, but after imposing capacity of 2 the resulting preference does not
satisfy the law of aggregate demand.
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Ch
(
{d} ∪ Cq=q′h (D′′)
)
= Cq=q
′
h (D
′′). Putting all together we get:
d ∈
(
{d} ∪ Cq=q′h (D′′)
)
∩ Ch
(
Cq=q
′
h (D
′) ∪ Cq=q′h (D′′)
)
, and
d /∈ Ch
(
{d} ∪ Cq=q′h (D′′)
)
which contradicts the substitutability of h.
3. Consider the following example. Let D = {d1, d2, d3, d4} and H = {h}. Hospital h’s
preferences over doctors are given by:
h={d1, d2, d3, d4}, {d1, d2, d3}, {d1, d2, d4}, {d1, d3, d4},
{d2, d3, d4}, {d1, d2}, {d3, d4}, {d1, d3}, {d1, d4}, {d2, d3},
{d2, d4}, {d1}, {d2}, {d3}, {d4}
This preference is substitutable and satisfies the law of aggregate demand (h never
rejects any doctors). However, imposing a capacity 2 on h gives us the following
substitutability violation:
{d2, d3, d4} ∩ Cq=2h (D) = {d2} 6⊆ {d3, d4} = Cq=2h ({d2, d3, d4})
C.1.2 Proof of Theorem 26
Let µ = ψH(P) and µ′ = ψD(P′). Throughout this proof “agent i is better off” means
µ′(i) i µ(i), and similarly for “indifferent”, “weakly worse off”, and so on. Assume in
contradiction that there exists no S ⊆ D such that S 6= ∅ and every doctor in S is worse off,
and every hospital in {h | ∅ 6= µ′(h) \ µ(h) ⊆ S} is better off.
Construct a directed graph with vertices V = D ∪ H, and edges
E = {(d, h) | µ′(d) = h} ∪ {(h, d) | µ(d) = h} .
We prove a series of claims that will enable us eventually to show that the number of
outgoing edges is strictly larger than the number of incoming edges (in the entire graph),
thus reaching a contradiction.
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Note that Claims 24.1 and 24.2 continue to hold, but Claim 24.3 relied on responsiveness
and does not hold here.
Claim 53.1. For every hospital h ∈ H \ {h0} that is not indifferent there is at least one doctor in
µ(h) who is better off.
Proof. If not then h (which is worse off by Claim 24.2) and the doctors in µ(h) block µ′. 
Claim 53.2. For every hospital h ∈ H, if there exists some d ∈ µ′(h) who is worse off, then
µ′(h) \ µ(h) = {d}.
Proof. If |µ′(h) \ µ(h)| > 1, then S = {d} provides a contradiction. 
Claim 53.3. For every hospital h ∈ H, the number of doctors in µ′(h) who are better off is less or
equal to the number of doctors in µ(h).
Proof. If h = h0 this is immediate from the assumption on q′. For other hospitals, denote
by D˜ the set of doctors in µ′(h) who are better off. From the substitutability of h and
D˜ ⊆ µ′(h) it is immediate that Ch(D˜) = D˜, and from the stability of µ it is also true that
Ch(D˜ ∪ µ(h)) = µ(h). Then the law of aggregate demand implies that
∣∣D˜∣∣ ≤ |µ(h)|. 
Claim 53.4. For every agent i ∈ D ∪ H the number of incoming edges is less or equal to the number
of outgoing edges: deg−(i) ≤ deg+(i).
Proof. If the agent is a doctor, this is immediate from Claim 24.1. Suppose the agent is
h ∈ H. If deg−(h) = 0, the conclusion is immediate. If there exists a doctor d ∈ µ′(h) who
is worse off, then by Claim 53.2 |µ′(h) \ µ(h)| = 1, but we also know from Claim 53.1 that
|µ(h) \ µ′(h)| ≥ 1, and so we have deg−(h) = |µ′(h) ∩ µ(h)|+ 1 ≤ deg+(h). If there exists
one doctor d ∈ µ′(h) who is better off, then by Claim 53.3 the conclusion is correct. And
finally, if all the doctors in µ′(h) are indifferent, then deg−(h) ≤ deg+(h). 
Sum the indegrees and the outdegrees of all agents. From Claim 53.4 we know that
∑i∈D∪H deg
−(i) ≤ ∑i∈D∪H deg+(i). Moreover, since by assumption deg−(h0) ≤ q′ <
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mh0(P) = deg
+(h0), the inequality is in fact strict. This concludes the contradiction argu-
ment, proving that the required S exists.
The conclusion of the theorem follows from the hospital-optimality and the doctor-
optimality of µ and µ′ respectively in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 23. The
polarization of interests for the optimal/pessimal stable matchings under substitutable
preferences is proved by Roth (1984b, Theorem 3).
C.1.3 Proof of Theorem 29
Let µ = ψH(P−d0) and µ
′ = ψD(P). Throughout this proof “agent i is better off” means
µ′(i) i µ(i), and similarly for “indifferent”, “weakly worse off”, and so on. Assume in
contradiction that all hospitals in H are weakly worse off.
Construct a directed graph with vertices V = D∪H, and edges E = {(h, d) | µ(d) = h}∪
{(d, h) | µ′(d) = h}.
Claim 53.5. For every hospital h ∈ H, if there is at least one doctor who is better off in µ′(h) \ {d0},
then |µ(h)| = qh, and all doctors in µ(h) are weakly better off.
Proof. Let d′ ∈ µ′(h) \ {d0} be better off. If |µ(h)| < qh then h and d′ form a blocking pair
under µ, and therefore |µ(h)| = qh. Suppose d ∈ µ(h) is worse off. From the stability of µ
we have:
µ(h) h µ(h) ∪ {d′} \ {d},
and from the stability of µ′ that:
µ′(h) h µ′(h) ∪ {d} \ {d′},
which together contradict the responsiveness of h. Hence no such d exists, and all doctors
in µ(h) are weakly better off. 
Claim 53.6. Let h′ = µ′(d0), then the number of doctors who are better off in µ(h′) is strictly larger
than the number of doctors who are better off in µ′(h′) \ {d0}.
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Proof. First, note that there must be at least one doctor in µ(h′) who is better off, or otherwise
h′ (which is worse off by our contradiction assumption) and µ(h′) form a blocking coalition
under µ′. If all doctors in µ′(h′) \ {d0} are weakly worse off then we are done, and if some
are better off, then use Claim 53.5. 
Let Db ⊆ D \ {d0} denote the set of doctors who are better off (d0 not included), deg−b (h)
denote the number of incoming edges from doctors in Db to hospital h, and deg
+
b (h) denote
the number of outgoing edges from hospital h to doctors in Db. We know that:
∀h ∈ H : deg−b (h) ≤ deg+b (h) (Claim 53.5)
deg−b
(
µ′(d0)
)
< deg+b
(
µ′(d0)
)
(Claim 53.6)
∀d ∈ Db : deg−(d) ≤ deg+(d) (individual rationality)
We sum over all hospitals to get:
∑
h∈H
deg−b (h) < ∑
h∈H
deg+b (h) = ∑
d∈Db
deg−(d) ≤ ∑
d∈Db
deg+(d) ≤ ∑
h∈H
deg−b (h)
We reached a contradiction and therefore there exists some non-empty set S ⊆ H of hospitals
that are better off.
The conclusion of the theorem follows from the hospital-optimality and the doctor-
optimality of µ and µ′ respectively, in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 23.
C.1.4 Proof of Theorem 30
Let µ = ψH(P−d0) and µ
′ = ψD(P). Throughout this proof “agent i is better off” means
µ′(i) i µ(i), and similarly for “indifferent”, “weakly worse off”, and so on. Assume in
contradiction that there exists no S ⊆ H and T ⊆ {d | µ(d) ∈ S} such that S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅,
every hospital in S is better off and every doctor in T is worse off.
Construct a directed graph with vertices V = D∪H, and edges E = {(h, d) | µ(d) = h}∪
{(d, h) | µ′(d) = h}. As in the proof of Theorem 29, let Db ⊆ D \ {d0} denote the set of
doctors who are better off (d0 not included), deg−b (h) denote the number of incoming edges
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from doctors in Db to hospital h, and deg
+
b (h) denote the number of outgoing edges from
hospital h to doctors in Db.
Claim 53.7. There exists h0 ∈ H such that deg−b (h0) < deg+b (h0).
Proof. Let h0 be some hospital that is better off (by Theorem 29). If there exists a doctor d ∈
µ(h0) who is worse off, then S = {h0} and T = {d} provide a contradiction. It must be then
that all doctors in µ(h0) are weakly better off. Since by assumption |µ(h0)| = mh0(P) = qh0 ,
it follows that deg−b (h0) ≤ deg+b (h0). If d0 ∈ µ′(h0) then we are done. If d0 /∈ µ′(h0), and
all doctors in µ′(h0) are weakly better off, then we get a contradiction to the stability of µ
through the blocking coalition composed of h0 and µ′(h0). 
Putting everything together we know that:
∀h ∈ H : deg−b (h) ≤ deg+b (h) (Claim 53.5)
∃h0 ∈ H : deg−b (h0) < deg+b (h0) (Claim 53.7)
∀d ∈ Db : deg−(d) ≤ deg+(d) (individual rationality)
We sum over all hospitals to get:
∑
h∈H
deg−b (h) < ∑
h∈H
deg+b (h) = ∑
d∈Db
deg−(d) ≤ ∑
d∈Db
deg+(d) ≤ ∑
h∈H
deg−b (h)
We reached a contradiction and therefore the required S and T do exist.
The conclusion of the theorem follows from the hospital-optimality and the doctor-
optimality of µ and µ′ respectively, in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 23.
C.1.5 Proof of Theorem 32
The method of proof is very similar to the one used in proving Theorem 23. We repeat the
construction done there and recall that µ = ψH(P) and µ′ = ψD(P′) (the existence of µ′ is
guaranteed from Observation 31). Note that Claims 24.1 and 24.2 continue to hold.
Claim 53.8. For every hospital h ∈ H, if there is at least one doctor who is better off in µ′(h), then
|µ(h)| = qh, and all doctors in µ(h) are weakly better off.
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Proof. For every h 6= h0 the proof is the same as the proof of Claim 24.3. For h0, let d′ ∈ µ′(h0)
be better off. If |µ(h0)| < qh0 then d′ and h0 form a blocking pair for µ, hence |µ(h0)| = qh0 .
Suppose d ∈ µ(h0) is worse off. From the stability of µ we have:
µ(h0) h0 µ(h0) ∪ {d′} \ {d},
and from stability of µ′ we have:
µ′(h0) tr(d¯)h0 µ′(h0) ∪ {d} \ {d′},
and since tr(d¯)h0 is a truncation, these two statements together contradict the responsiveness
of h0 . Hence no such d exists and all doctors in µ(h0) are weakly better off. 
Claim 53.9. All doctors inW ∩ D are weakly worse off.
Proof. Let Db = {d ∈ D | d is better off}. Let deg−b (h) denote the number of incoming edges
from doctors in Db to hospital h, and deg
+
b (h) denote the number of outgoing edges from
hospital h to doctors in Db.
UnlessW ∩ Db = ∅ we can find d′ ∈ argmind∈W∩Db δ(h0, d), where δ(x, y) denotes the
distance between nodes x and y on the graph (V , E). We denote h′ = µ(d′). We claim that:
deg−b (h
′) < deg+b (h
′). (C.1)
Note that d′ ∈ µ(h′) and so deg+b (h′) ≥ 1. If deg−b (h′) = 0, then we are done. Let
ni = |µ(h′) ∩ µ′(h′)| denote the number of doctors who are indifferent in µ(h′). If 1 ≤
deg−b (h
′) + ni < qh′ then we can use Claim 53.8 to prove the strict inequality. Finally, if
1 ≤ deg−b (h′) + ni = qh′ we need to distinguish between two cases. If h′ = h0 then we
know all doctors in µ′(h0) are weakly better off. However, there must be at least one doctor
d′′ ∈ µ′(h0) \ µ(h0) such that d′′ h0 d∗ ∈ µ(h0) (by the assumption on the truncation), and
so we get a contradiction to the stability of µ. If h′ 6= h0, then there must be d′′ ∈ µ′(h′)∩Db
such that δ(h0, d′′) < δ(h0, d′), contradicting the way d′ was chosen.
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Putting everything together we know that:
∀h ∈ H : deg−b (h) ≤ deg+b (h) (Claim 53.8)
deg−b (h
′) < deg+b (h
′) (Equation C.1)
∀d ∈ Db : deg−(d) ≤ deg+(d) (individual rationality)
We sum over all hospitals in H to get:
∑
h∈H
deg−b (h) < ∑
h∈H
deg+b (h) = ∑
d∈Db
deg−(d) ≤ ∑
d∈Db
deg+(d) ≤ ∑
h∈H
deg−b (h)
Which is a contradiction, proving thatW ∩ Db must be empty. 
Pick some d ∈ µ(h0) \ µ′(h0), and let h = µ′(d) (exists by Claim 24.1). We get that
hospital h (which is worse off by Claim 24.2) and the doctors in µ(h) (who are weakly worse
off by Claim 53.9) form a blocking coalition under µ′. This concludes the contradiction
argument, proving that the required S exists.
The conclusion of the theorem follows from the hospital-optimality and the doctor-
optimality of µ and µ′ respectively, in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 23.
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